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Eb;IAPJ) STETTIJHUS Ai:-lD 1'HE O?.IGINS OF 'l'IE ;_~ac;o CIT[ crnJF3~JC3
~Jar

.American leadership in the latter stages of :Jo:.cld
enhanced the prestige and position of the United
national affairs.

Unfortunately, while

Stat~s

~·Iashington

II

ln inter-

attracted ITBny

new frier.ds, certain old supporters ivere alienated.

By the fall

of 1944, strained relations with Latin America were of grave concern
to Secretary Edward R. Stet tinius, Jr. and his State Department
colleagueso

Political, econor:ti.c, and social

probler.~

of common

American interest raised by the :·rar or foreseeable after the i·1ar
.
~
. ; ,_ cons::.. d era t•ion. 1
Here pressing
ior
JOiri"

had not met since the Rio Conference of

The Pan American republics
191+2~

As time elapsed,

. "such issues as the Du.11bartori Oaks proposals, the s t.:ltus of the inverAmerican security system, the isolation of Argentina, a:i.d the
development of econorrri c tra!lsi ti on programs had emerged as de 1-:
points of Latin American interest.

c•r~e

These lL'1attended controversial

matters bred resentment among the South American nations toward
their northern neighbor.

To r:uintain hemispheric solidarity and

overcome La tin antagon.ism, a consul.ta. ti ve meeting of the American
republics was necessar'J.

This urgent need to exchange views and

reconcile differences eventually culminated in the i·lexico City
Conference of

1945.

-2-

The talks at Chapultepec Castle are now overshado•ied by
other surnmi t r:i.eetings such as Yalta and Potsda:n.

Nevertneless, the

Mexico City Conference, an important episode in the diplor..a. tic history of the United States and the Western Hemisphere, is worthy of
further examination.

An attempt is made herein to analyze ·the

strengths and weaknesses of the Chapultepec talks against the back-

ground of the contributions of the United States' chief delegate
in Mexico City, Edward R. Stettiniusr Jr.
'----

---

-

LATI.l'l AMERICAN

RE~'3ENTt·IE.1IT

To understand the origins of the Chapultepec Conference, one
must study the causes of Lat.in American resentment toward the
United States in late 1944..

One highly debated theme within inter-

American affairs arose from United States involvement in planning
a world organization.

The "Big Four" (the United States, Soviet

Union, China, and Great Britain) met outside Washington, D.

c.,

at

Dumbarton Oaks beginning AUo"USt 21, 1944 to formulate guidelines
for an international peace-keeping body.

The secrecy in which the

conferees deliberated perturbed Iatin Americans, concerned as they
. 2
were over the preservation of the inter-American regional system.
When the discontent. became too vocal, Cordell Hull, the~ Secretary
of state, and Undersecretary Stettinius invited latin American
diplomats in Washington to private briefings.

2.. Jor.n Lloyd
Sec''"'i ty l 1808-1
960
........
,.,.__ ..:..:.;....._
~_........,,.

...

'_J .....

1961) 7 P• 255.
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By October, 1941+ the Dll:r.lbarton Oaks talks Here completed.

American spokesmen endeavor-ed to play

do~m

the

growing divergence

of interests between the United Sta.tes and the ri..a tions south of the
border.

However, the Iatin American republics became increasingly

apprehensive as it appeared that the United States was preparing to
ta.1<:e a leading role in world affairs and cooper3te w:i.. th the great
powers in allocating to themselves a domin.:mt position in the proposed United Nati.ons. 3 At a Columbus Day reception for L3.tin
.American diplomats at the Blair House, Stettini.us soueht to assure
the guests that the United States delegation to the conference had
done ever.{thing possible to preserve the inter-American regional
system.

Referring to specific Dumbarton Oaks proposals regarding

regional arrangements, Stettinius declared that the United Nations
Security Council would encourage the settlement of local disputes
through a regional system. 4 At the same reception, President Roosevelt stated that,

11

within the framework of the world organization

of the United Nations the inter-American system can and must play

a strong and vital role. 115
Despite assurances-by Stett.i.nius and Roosevelt, the other

Pan American reoublics
were not so sure that the proposals granted
....
_the regional system an acceptable status.

They wanted an opportu..'1ity··

3. Gordon Connell-Smith, The Inter-A:nerican Svster.i (Hew York:
Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 129.

4.
p. 256.

l·lecham,

ar~cl

-

I~1ter-~~~eric3.n

-4-

to excnange ideas at a general inter-American discussion of the
Dumbarton Oaks resolutions.

They favored a r.1eetir.g prior to Uic

United Ilations conference scheduled for April, 1945 in San Francisco.
\·iashington 1 s southern neighbors objected to the provision
that no enforcement actions. could be taken by a regional agency
without authorization by the Security Council.

They saw in this

the end of the inter-American system's autonomy.
having non-American powers

reprc~cnted

ruling on herrri.spheric matters.

Iatin

unequal membership of the council.

They also opposed

on the Security Council

American~

Five seats

to the five principal powers implied direct
policy by first class power:'> only.

6

cFiticized the
per~anently

dictatio~

assigned

of world

Perhaps the most pronou."lced

complaint of the Iatin Ar;iericans was that just the "Big Four" had
planned the United Nations structure.

South American arguments

against the Dumbarton Oaks proposals centered around two rr.ajor
points:

1)

the great powers had been granted too much authority

and would dominate the world organization, and 2) the inter-American
system had not been given the important role it should enjoy. 7
Deeply concerned with the proposed plan for a world orga.Tli.zation, the southern republics desired a meeting of the rrri.nds ID. th
the United states.

They hoped to revise the objectionable provi-

.sions produced at Dumbarton Oaks.

An inter-A."1erican conference

rrri.ght also present the opportunity for latin America to restrain

6.

p .. 256 ..
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ua·shington 1 s power and interv.::ntionist h:J.bit",s by building up a
series of regional legal and political safegt:..:i::-ds.
United States standpoint, a hemispheric r.!eetir.g

Roosevelt's

J:·'rom ·(,he

~·;ould

adari..nistration to gather solid bloc

forthcoming United Nations coni'erence.

8

allow

support for the

In addition, the State

Department would be able to develop some kind of solidar-lty program to keep Iatin American nationalists in line until such time

as mu.ltilateral agreements cou1d get moving again.
As long as Cordell HuLl 1·:as Secretary of State, however,

there could be no •1artime inter-American conference.
Roosevelt was so preoccupied

~Ii th

President

the war effort tr.at the State

Department was given a free r.and in regulating foreign affairs with
Latin America.

Hull firnly opposed a meeting oi the hemispheric

republics because he feared tr.at Argentina would further disrupt
.

.

-~

.

..

inter-~merican u.'U.~y.

9 Other State Department officials such as

Brechinridge Long shared Hull's distrust of Argentina.

Buenos Aires

resented the hegemony of the United States and had been the main

obstacle to hemispheric unity against Axis aggression.

World War II

fl..ad upset Argentina 1 s plan to make herself the leading power of

South America.

Fearing the European dictators, Iatin America r..ad

drawn closer to her northern neighbor and thus isolated Argentina.

During most of the war, Buenos Aires pursued a policy of neutrality.
Her leaders expressed open adr:ri..:ration for fascism, particularl,7

, . ,.-1

I
~·r

,

-o-

for Franco's Spa.in, and allo:,.1ed .Nazi agents
id thin their country.

10

co~1sider::.1bl~

i'reedom

lat.in An:erica and the United s-:-..ates con-

demned Argentina for her failure to

brea~{

rel..:l. lions Hi t.h the A.xi::;

powers.
Secretary Hull had desired more extreme

n~easures

against

However, Great &-:i.. ta in was

Argentina such as econonti. c sanctions.

dependent upon Argentine beef and the United States could not afford to h.tnder her ally' s food import..s.

:fniJ.e

t~nsion

rr:ollilted

between Washington ar.d Buenos Aires, nationalistic army officers
staged a coup in Febrli.ary, 1944.

General

.&l.~LnLro

J. Farrell

headed the new .Argentine regime which proceeded to become more
fascist and more repressive than its predecessor..
retaliated by

per~.uading

The United States

the other Latin American republics not to

recognize the Farrell gover:1ment.

11

Liter, 1:ashington decided

to freeze Argentine assets within the United States.

In October,

1944 Buenos Aires requested a meet.ing of inter-American foreign
ministers to examine its problems.
the Argentine case.

Hull ".-1as not willing to discuss

He feared that Farrell might attempt to in.:..

tensify Ia tin American discontent.
The Pan American repubJics were distlU'bed by Argentina's

exclusion from hemispheric activities.

Seek:L"lg to restore inter-

American harr.:ony 1 they supported Argentina's motion for a meeting
to iron out differences..

Not ur1til the stubborn Hull was replaced

by a more conciliator;,r Secretary was there a r;hance tha L the

10.
(New Yo::-k:

11.

Ale;(ar:der DeG :J!lde 1 :\ 1-Ii J to::.---..t
Scrioner 1 1963) ~ P· ?lo.
'. '

I
~·1

P•

717.
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United States would alter its attitude toward. an in ter-Arneri can
conference.

When failing health forced Hull to retire from public

.

service, a flexible rr.an, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. became head of
the State Department on November 27, 1941+.

He and his Assistant

Secretary for lat.tn American affairs, Nelson A. Rockefeller, were

eager to repair the damage done to hemispheric solidarity during

the preceding year.
Argentine impasse.

They desired.an equitable solution for the
Thus, with a sh.:i.ft. in 1eader3(lip withLn the

State Department, an attempt to cope with Argentine isolation

became more conceivaole.
Another critical issue which aggravated United States rela-

tions with Latin America involved economic matters.

Considered

a low priority area in the fight against fascism, Centrnl and
South America during

~forld

War II suffered from consumer shortages

and the curtailment of development

prograrr.s~

Although a certain

amount of industry had been stiraulated by the war effort, the end
of hostilities would mean not only the drastic reduction but possibly the eventual termination of the war-created demand for
11'.aterials. 12

peace.

Latin Americans feared the economic consequences of

They were plagued by several vital questions.

be done to overcome the
si tion to

peacd·in~

~.assive

production?

industries be reduced?

What i;.dll

unemployment created by the tranHow seYerely :iill raw material

Uill the United States assist in substan-

tially raising the standard of livi_ng in 12.tin Ame.::ic.:.t?

12..
p .. 258 ..

raT11

For the

tilecha:zt, T~1c [;~it,a•l Sta ~,..es a£:,:is~~~-=_,~;~:er·ico..n S~?~!i~Y!'

-S-

southern repubJics, an inter-American conference f-o lundle these
postwar economic questior:s could not come too ::;oon..
United States alone possessed the

k~y

Since the

to the :.;olution oi' their

problems, obviously a mee t.ing must be convened to Nheed.le concessions from the "Colossus o.f the North .. "l3

Developments outside the Hestern hemisphere magnified the
growing problem of inter-American economic cooperation in the postwar period.

During the final months of the war., the United States

became increasingly aware of the treacherous ways of its Soviet
ally.

Washington felt tr.at the best defense against Russian ag-

gression in Western Europe Hould be through economic assistance

prograrns.

American po Ji cyma!-<ers began to .fo r:nula te plans to channel

large amounts of rr.aterial and r.:onetary aid to the devastated war
zones..

Witnessing a growing United States interest in

reconstruction,

Europ~<m

some Latin Americans feared that all prewar and

wartime plans for

pos7~r,:ir:

development projects tdthin the hemis-

phere would once again be relegated to obJivion.11+

The maintenance

of Ia.tin America as a low priority area and the continued fixation

with European policy by·the State Department could only serve to

increase herrri.sphenc resentment toward the United States.
early as December,
He;d..co warned:

As

1943 George Messersmith, American Ambassador to

"we must not try hysterically to build up the

economies of our e!1emies {Germny and Japan) after the war, but

lJ.

Ibid ..

-9-

must do what we can to build up the economies of our friends,
i.."lcluding the republics of this hemisphere. 1115
By

the time Stett.L."'lius succeeded Hull in November, 1944,

the bonds of the Good Neighbor Policy had been grea.tzy ·:rnakened.
The new Secretary bad to overcome the burden of persistent ·Iatin
American resentment.

Major policy questions associated with the

Dumbarton Oaks proposals had to be clarified.

The Argentine

problem had to be settled for the nc.ke of herni5pheric solidarity.
Economic programs to sti::rulate inter-;\merican industry and agriculture required attent.i.on.

Stettin:.us quickly perceived the

urgency behind the Iatin American cries for a hemispheric conference.
Before he could act, however, Ezequiel Padilla, the Mexi.can Foreign
Minister forced the State Depg.rtment• s band.

As Hull

~vas

prepuring

to step down, P3dilla circuL:i.ted among the Latin American republics
a proposal to hoJd a hemispheric conference..

Ambassador Messersmith

cabled Washington ivarning that the United States would seriouszy
jeopardize Padilla's position in Mexico and probably undercut
one of its strongest Iatin .American supporters unless it backed

his proposai.16 The Roosevelt admlrri.stration thus decided in late
November, 1944 to participate in an inter-American meeting and arrangements began in earnest for the Mexico City Conference of

1945.

16. ~., P• 167.
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STATE DEPARTMENT

PL~'JNING

FOR Th'E MEXICO GITY

CONFJ.•:RE~CE

Although the Chapultepec tall<s became a concrete possibility
in November, 1944, there were earlier events which foreshadowed
the inter-American conference.

The latin American countries were

deeply concerned about the relationship between their regional
system and the proposed world security organization.

The State

Department there.fore inaugur3. ted an exchange of views with the
other nineteen Pan

A~erican

republics via a circular telegram on

the problems of creating an international peace...;{eeping body.
1
This diplomatic correspondence ivas issued on ,Ju..ly 11, 1944. 7

later, after the Dumbarton Oaks conversations began, latin
American diploir..:i.ts attended briefing sessions during the months
of August and September..

Stettinius's Blair House reception of

October 12, 1944 began a series of meetings for the systematic
but informal intercr.ange of views on the Dumbarton Oaks proposalss
As soon as time had been allowed for comments from la tin American
governments, anothe::- uBlair House Mee t.ingu with chiefs of the
missions was held on October 26.
.

were held at the State Department.

Thereafter similar meetings
18

At a third meeting of Latin diplomats and American Foreign
Service officers on November 9, a

.

annointed to
~

17.
18.

su.~'!E.ri.Ze

Com.....'"'Ii..tte~

of Coordination was

comments and suggestions made regarding

-11-

the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Membership on this body consisted

of the Ambassadors from Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Brazil
and Norman Armour, Director of the Office of American Republic
Affairs.

After this conference, Stettinius, then Acting Secretary,

publicly spoke of being encouraged by the support that the ·American
republics were showing for the basic ideas embodied in the United
Nations proposals. 19 While in consultation with Senate leaders
on November 21!- 1 Stettinius reiterated his belief in la tin American
support for the world organization.

He revealed that his first

public statement had received the prior approval of the various
chiefs of the missions in Washington.
By

the end of November. various strategy sessions projected

that a meeting of the hemispheric foreign ministers might convene
about Januar.r 10, 1945 if practicable.

The Senate had just ap-

proved Stettinius' s appointment as Secretary of State.

With a

change in State Department leadership, the Padilla invitation to
a consultative meeting was more readily acceptable.

The nature of

the desired meeting was clarified through a State Department memorandum.

It was to be an inter-American conference to consider the

problems arising from the present hostilities.

Only those American

republics which had participated in the war effort were to be in-

. •-..:!

VJ..

\lt:\J..

20

This stipulation prevented Argentina's attendance and

thus avoided the possibility of an embarrassing confrontation
between :·lashing ton a:;.d

20.

-

Ibid.

3u~nos

Aires.

-12-

Following the meeting of ambassadors o"1 December 29, .1944,
Secretary

Stet~"lius

noted that the diploi>a ~...ic channels were func-

tioning smoothly in preparing for an int.er-Americ.:i.n conference.
Plans to hold such a meetLig became more definite as the new year

began.

On Januar-.r 13, 1945 He.xi.co City was announced as the loca-

t i on of the hemispher-lc taL"<s.

A few days later, FebruarJ 21

was confirmed as the opening date of the conference.

Informal

exchanges id.th the arncassadors continued and even intensified.
Fi Ye rr.ore meetings :.;ere held

~d th

L3. t.in Ail:eri can diploma ts on Janu-·

ary 5, 26, Jl and Februar; 5 and 9 to further analyze the United
Nations plan.

21

Under normal ci:r-ctrn1s t.ances, the Govern.in.:$ 2oard of the Pan
American Union would have .formulated the agenda and completed
arrangements for a hemispheric conference.

Since Argentina was a

member of the Union but was to be excluded from the Chapultepec

taLlcs, direct diplorratic negotiations were employed to organize the

meeting.

B3.sed upon consultations with the invited governments,

the host countrJ, Me:cico, submi. tted an agenda which closely resembled the United States proposed subjects for discussion.

On

January 18, President Roosevelt approved the topics to be covered
at the Mexico City Conference ..
1)

The rrain headings included

further cooperatiYe measures for the prosecution of the

to complete victory, 2)

problems of an international organization

for peace and security, J)

21.

Ibid .. ,
·

p .. 401.

war

social nrobleci> of ~he Ar.:~ricas, and

-13-

4)·other rr.atters of general and irr~'n~diate conc~rn to ti1e pJ.r. . t"ing
t icipa

~

goverr~~en~s.

22

State Departrr.ent preparations for the Chapultepec tall..:.:s

paralleled developments on the international level.

On October 17,

1944 department staff experts organized an advisory group for the
consultations i;-.r.i.th I.atin American ambassadors.

&lckground papers

on inter-American problems were written and subr.ri..tted to a Policy

Committee.

RockefeD.er served as c1'.airrran of r,:-d.s body, ;;;ill.ch was

composed of his assistants and the appropriate Foreign Service

personnel from the Office of

;~~erican

Repub1ic Affairs.

These

po1icy-rnakers met eighteen tines from January 17 through Feb-

ruary 7, 1945.

23

'l\·m other i·10rking groups uere created to lay the ground-

work for American participation in Me;d.co City.

One committee

collected data on Iatin American economic problems and reported its
f:i.ndings to Assistant SecretarJ William Clayton, who was responsible
for the development of United States policy in this field.

The

other body dealt with po1i tical issues like the strengtheni.."'lg of
the inter-American system and its relationship to the world organization.

Membership in this latter group included men who would

later rrake significant contributions for the American delegation
at Chapultepec Castle.

Technical Experts Arvra Warren, Jolm M. Cabot,

and Harley Notter met alr:1ost daily in the poll ti cal car.mi. ttee ..

2J..

Ibid. 7 P• .403.
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Prior to the inter-American conference, the United States
delegation met on February 13, 1945 for purposes of

organi~ation.

The delegation was broadly representative of the various government agencies.

Over one-third of its advisors and technical

officers bad actively participated in preparations for the

~on-

ference. 24._ Foreign Service personnel Oscar Cox and Leo Pasvolsky
were jaL"led by military men like Generals George V. Strong and
Stanley D..

E~bid-<

and Ad.':l:il'3.l CeciJ_ Train an the delegation.

Congress sent Senators Tom Connally· (Democrat of Texas) and
Warren Austin (Republican of Verrr.ont) and Repre~->entatives Luther
Jobnson (Demo era t of Texas) and Edi th Nourse Rogers (Republican

of Massachusetts) to Mexico City.

To coordinate the

acti~rities

of

this diverse party, the recently-appointed Secretary of State,

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., was selected as the United States•
chief delegate to the Chapultepec
diplo~at

taL~s.

For the businessrran-

the Mexico City negotiations loomed as a critical test of

_his abilities.

Stettinius bad to overcome I.atin American resent-

ment toward certain Dumbarton Oaks provisions, the Argentine
questiont and Washington's postwar economic goals..

How he con-

ducted himself at the Chapultepec talks would be a big factor i_n
determining the United States' success in restoring hemispheric
solidarity.

24.

~., P•

405.
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FRON GfilfERAL (·DTORS TO CHAPULTEPSC: TlG ::US3 02
ED~'iAIID

STETTINIUS

Though the halls of Chapultepec C:i.stle and the con.ference
rooms of General Motors have little in common, they are bot.h sig-

nificant places in the career of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

The

chief American delegate to the Mexico City Conference of 1945 was
a rr.an with imIJressive

c::·edentials~

A cl':!Ver admnistrator without.

much knowledge of foreign affairs, Stettinius tnrough his rnanagerial ability c:.nd business ac:1men nad ri::.>en fro:H a lowly stock
clerk to the hig:iest State Department

oi'f.:!.c~

in a mere t:,rnnty years.

He was born in Cricago, October 22, l900, the son of a. partner

in J. P. Horgan a11d Company.· Stettinius att8;:ded the

Po~:1fret

School in Conn.acticut and later the Un:i.versi ty o.f Virginia from
1919 to 1924.

Ar1 indifferent ~~chol3.r 7

ti:e future

to meet the requirements for a college degree.

ciiplmrat failed

This flaw in aca-

der.ri.cs was minor in comparison to the wany successes he achieved

at that time.

Stettinius•s college days are characterized by an

idealism which persisted throughout his life.

Devoted to helping

others, he became president of the campus Y.- H. C. A. and later
founded a Student Self-Help Bureau to find ,jobs for needy students.
In addition, he taught Sunday school and did missionary work among

the :nountain people.

In all his

activitie~>,

a remarkable energy and organizational

wl.~:::t

liness and warmth for wnid1 he was la tGr

Stettinius displayed
as

~fell

a.s a friend-
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The young university student's extracurricular activities
brought him to the attention of Virginia alumnus John Lee Pratt,
a vice-president of General Motors.

The business executive con-

vinced Stettinius to enter the field. of industry rather than the
ministry.

In

1924, the son of a Morgan financier began his first

job in the stock room of the Hyatt Roller Bearing Company.

As a

clerk in a division of General Motors, his wage scale was fortyfour cents per hour.

Within two

to special assistant to Pratt.

year~;,

Stettinius was promoted

This advancement er.abled him to

demonstrate his innovative abilities.

He created one of industr-.1's

first group insurance programs, opened modern medical clinics within
factories, and employed the new lA".adison Avenue advertising techniques.

In record time, Edward Stettinius overcame the handicaps

of wealth and a brilliant father to establish his mm niche in
26
the industrial history of the nation.
.At the age of thirty-one,
he became a vice-president of General Motors in charge of public
and industrial relations.
Moving on to the industrial giant, United States Steel,
stetti.nius became a member of its board of directors and chairman
of its finance committee in 1934.
·-~~o

Again, his talents permitted him

rise quickly within the company hierarchy ..

At the age of
·-.

thirty-seven, Stettinius was appointed chairman of the board of
directors with an annual salar<J of one hundred thousand dollars.
· n n a c..:..e
,
o+'
,... ,,..,..
·~ - in the business
In his rapid ascen" .1."o t'n<::- pi.
... ..,u
.... ~<..-~::.
•

.1.

world, the so-called

26.

~.,

11

P• 5.

wonder boy" ne'Jer lost those qu.ali ties of
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compassion and warmth ·;-rhich were to s t.:md him in
later years.

;~oocl

:..; tcad in

27

Al though associated Hi th traditionally conservative big business interests, Stettinius held liberal social and political views.
i·Iilling to experiment and innovate in a time of economic disorder,
he shared in the optimism of Roosevelt's New Deal.

:Jashington

called on his services for the first time in 1932, when he was invi ted to serre on the Industrial Ad'risary Board.

As a liaison

officer with the National RecoverJ Administration, Stettinius impressed rra.ny with bis loyalty, sincerity, and boundless energy.
Noted for his ability to ll.artt:onize and reconcile conflicting interests, he was appointed to a munber of troublesome administrative
posts within the federal governr.ient..

In 1939, Stettinius decided

to devote his full time and effort to public service..
•

-

.,

he became chairr;i.an of the \1ar rlesources noard.

28

At that time,

The following

year, President Roosevelt asked him to serve on the AdvisorJ Commission to the Council of National Defense in charge of industrial
r..aterials.

As the possibility of American involvement in World

war II increased, Stettinius was selected as Director of Priori ties
of the Office of Production :Managenent in JanuarJ, 1941.

Eight

over the administration of the Lend-Lease
man ths lat er, n'"'v too'..r
~
program..

As coordinator o.f this militarJ assistance project, the

former businessrran rr.ade his first contacts in the fie],.d of foreign

affairs..

Convinced of the value of lend-1..ease, he t.ook time out

-18-

in ·the sprin.g and summer of 1943 to write lend-Lease:

for Victor:ir.

L~

Weapon

this work, he explained the necessity for the

program's con-';inuation possibly even after the A..'Cis defeat. 2 9
By September,

1911-3, another federal agency was in desperate

need of bureaucratic innovation.

The State Department was opera-

ting in a haphazard and confused manner.

The diplonatic corp was .

hampered by a bad press, low morale, and an inability to cope with
increasing responsi biJ.i. ties.

Various functions overlapped dif-

ferent offices and day-to-day decisions were often made wl th little

regard for over-all policy.

The Department was further handicapped

by inadequate methods and hence lacked the machinery for a
' public relations program.

30

so\L~d

The situation became intolerable as

a result of the personality clashes between Secretary Hull and his
chief assistant, Sumner Welles..

At the urging of adYisors

James F. Byrnes and HarriJ Hopkins, President Roosevelt appointed

Edward Stettinius to the post of UndersecretariJ of State on

September 25, 1943.

31

The administrative troubleshooter approached hi.s new job

determined to introduce ·efficiency, flexibility, and optimism to
·the State Department.

Hull welcomed Stettini us' s program of reorg-

anization, but considered him basically a bureaucratic harmonizer.
The new Undersecretary attempted to improve the channels of communication with other executive offices and the Congress.

31.

He also

WaL1':er 1 The A:nerican Sec::et-3.ries o.£' State, p .. 3 ..
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initiated a public relations campaign to restore the Department's
prestige and clarify its role in the war effort.

Stettinius created

new offices and bodies with specific responsibilities to release
his assistant secretaries from excessive papenrork.

Consequently,

the CommLttee on Postwar problems and the four geographic directorships were established.

Some of the old Foreign Service officers

were critical of the new ways.

The J.!!:.~_1.9rk

J.1~

remarked, however,

uthat the Undersecretary brought a breath of fresh air to somewhat
musty corridors ~ 1132
Stettinius was at his best in coping id.th problems of rranagement and organization.

His role in the State Department took on

new significance i'1hen failir.g health forced Cordell Hull to step
dmm in late 1944.

The Undersecretary was not t.he most likely can-

dida te to succeed Hull as the architect of Amer:i. can di. plorna cy.

He

was not experienced in the subtleties and complexities of international relations.

But President Roosevelt intended to dictate

American foreign policy through direct negotia lions with Churchill

and Stalin.

While the chief executive would make the high-level

decisions, he needed a loyal assistant to oversee the smooth operation of the State Department's admi.nistrative rr.achinery.

Thus;

,Stettinius was promoted to Secretary of State on November 27, 1944.
-._

Readily assenting to Roosevelt's determination to be the formulator
of policy, he saw his mm responsibilities to consist of re-inforcing
the Department, impler.ienting decisions, and serving as a two ~·my

messenger between the Dapartr.ient and the President.

32 ..

33 ..

r.'

~·1

33
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The selection of Stettinius as a "caret.::ll<er"

Se~reta.rJ 1·ms

acceptable to both leoosevelt and his Hhite House advi:.;ors..

Un-

like rr..any public servants, he i..ras not associ3. ted :d th party poll tics
and had no intention of usurping Presidential power.

Without

formal training in i·/Orld affairs, Stettinius did a commendable job

in keeping the chief executive weJJ..-informed on policy issues.
He also advanced Hull's earlier efforts to obt.:lin bipartisan support for

~he

world security organization.

Consi3tent idth his

"good·,dll to all attitude," the United Na ti ans dream eventually
became his greatest goal..

AJJ.. other interests were subordinated

to rr.aking the international

peace~keeping

body a reality.3 4

During his tenure as Secrel:.3.rJ, Stettinius greatly utilized
the infor:ral, persot".al approach in carrying out his duties.

Side-

steppi!"'..g the rigidity of diplorr.a tic protocol, he rrade his office
n:ore accessible to both his mm subordinates and

forei~i.

diplor.a ts ..

Undersecretary Joseph Grew was ah;ays informed of the latest developments in foreign policy.

It wi.JJ.. be noted later tb.at throughout

the Mexico City Conference, Stettinitis daily cabled Grew to seek
advice and to relay progress reports.

The Secretary's quick smile

and easygoing ways also helped to partiaJJ..y alleviate the resentQent of Latin American ambassadors at briefing sessions on the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

As an expert in public relations,

stettinius sought to improve their.age of.the State Department
th.rough inform:i.l talks :r.i th leaders of r:atior..al op.inion-forming
groups..

34,.

Congressional fi6ures an.d fell.0·:1 ca oinet :::embers ·.·iere

-21-

also cultivated to maintain a friendly basis for cooperation.
"Big .Ed.11 as he was nicknamed, revitalized the State Department through 'nis personal charm and inexhaustible energy.

He

and his "new team" of Assistant Secretaries, Nelson H.ockefeller,
William Clayton, and Archibald MacLeish, conscientiously fulfilled
the dictates of the Hhite House.

Being a rranagerial wizard rather

than an experienced diplorrat, the Mexico City Conference of 1945
renresented a unique c!i..allenge for Stet tinius.

Hiles away from

the friendly confines of Washington, he would have to rnake on-thespot decisions of great significance.

His goal

~-muld

the Good lieighbor Policy to its past preeminence.

be to restore

Equipped only

iri. th a personal zeal for ·.wrk, persistent idealism, and COi7:plete

loyalty to President 1ioosevelt &nd the idea of a wo:-ld organization,
Edward Stettini1.is thus prepared for the Chapultcpec taU;:s.

CHAPTEH II
DAYS OF OP..GANIZATION AND FOLICY ~TAT8·Ei~TS

FEBR.UA.P..Y 20,

1945

The Inter-American Conference On The Problems Of Peace And
War did not begin in a very auspicious way for Edward Stettinius.
He arrived a day early on February 20, 1945 to become acquainted
wi. th and help organize the opera lions of the Americ.:m delegation.

A few hours prior to the completion of his journey from Yalta to
Mexico, the Secretar'J paid a visit to the ruling .Junta of Guateoola.
Filled with aspirations of restoring hemispheric solidarity,
Stettinius encmmtered resentment in Gu.at.er.ala City..

He discussed

political issues 1tl th strong men l'!arshall Javier Aranl"..a, Senor
Guillermo Torriell0, and Capt..:iin Jacobo Arbanz who rev;;'.!aled their

displeasure over American recognition of the new regime in El Salvador.1

They believed that the United States had let them down

in accepting the change in Salvadorean leadership.

Fortunately,

Stettinius was at the Crimean conference at the time of recogrlition and could not be blamed for this diplorratic move.

After his

short conversation \fl.th the Junta, the Secretary rr:ade a brief
statement expressing his respects to the rulers of Guaterrala and
regret for the brevity of his visit ..

2

He also cabled Joseph Grew

1. Edward R. Stettinius 1 Jr., Calendar .('Iotes 1 Feoruar.r 20,
1945 1 p. 3, Box. 285, Ed';.-ard R. Stettinius7 Jr .. Papers, Alderrran
LibraFJr University of Virginia, Charlot.:Oesville, Virginia ..
Herein cited as stettinius Papers.
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in. Hashington, requesting him to obtain British and Russian consent to deliver the invitations for the world org.::miz<ition conference.
He wanted this approval no later than the opening day of the Chapultepec talks .J

This ivas an early indication of Stettinius' s

preoccupation with the United Nations plan throughout the Mexico
City sessions.
The chief American delegate flew into the Mexican capital

about 1:45 in the afternoon..

Another uncomfortable scene developed

when Stettinius issued a statement to reporter::> at the airport.

A typogr-aphical error in the text had substituted the word "own"
for "friend."

Consequently, the Secretary read the passage:

"The United States looks upon Mexico as a good neighbor, a strong
upholder of democratic traditions in this hemisphere and a cotmtry

we are proud to call our ovm. 11

4

but went on with the speech.

Although of no real significance, the

Realizing the mistake, he gasped

minor slip denoted the extreme intensity of coverage given to every
item at the press conference. 5 A Foreign Service officer immediately
corrected the error, but the verbal remark had already been overheard.

James Res ton of the New York Times and Time Magazine later

6
.
published the textua 1 mx-·up.

Ibid., P• 5.

4. James Reston, "Secretary's Error Puts Error in Stettinius•
Mouth,"

5 ..

Na:.• York Ti:nes 7 FeoruarJ 21 7 1945r p. 2.

stettinius, Calend.:1.r Notes, Febr..iary 20, 194-5, p .. 6,

Box 285, Stettin.ius Papers.

6.

1
=1..cmr-~s 1
Res ton, New YorK
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P..ecovering from .his shakw 0ta.rt, Stet,t:,inlus

W3S

impressed

by the cordiality of the correspondents ar.d the great µublic interest

in his arrival.

From the airport, the SecretarJ was taken to the

Hotel Geneve, 11here he would reside for the duration of the conference.

This suburb3n lodging housed Stettinius 7 his chief

advisors, and a secretarial staff.

Huch of the speech writing and

processing of documents ',vas to occur at the Gcneve.

The central

offices of the AmericJ.n delega t.i·.:>n :·1ere in another ho tel 7 the .i!.dificio Imperial.

The conference itself Has to be held at Chapultepec

Castle, on a hill. two hundred feet above the ca pl tal city.

This

ancient fortress was :;trongly linked to Mexico's heritage.

It had

been an Aztec palace 7 a rrri.li ta:rJ school, I·!aximilian' s royal residence, and most. recently a national museu:n.

7

Stettinius later wrote

that its history and natur3.l beauty lent extr3.or<linilry dignity and
a feeJing of perspective to t 'ne

~a

.L

lk s. 8

The SecretarJ held his first strategy session in the Geneve

at 4:00 P.M.

In attendance were Rockefeller, Messersmith, Special

Assistants Leo Pasvolsky and Robert 1{t7lch and Technical
Hayden Raynor.
speech.

E.~pert

Stettinius read the latest draft of his opening

Reactions to it were enthusiastic and only a few minor·

changes were suggested.
gation was discussed.

Afterwards, the size of the Ar.1erican deleThere were four cor.gressional advisors and

7. Arthur P::es tor1 ~n.~i t,(1~:~r, L'J. ter'-_:\~~-ci_c:.=.~1_ 1\:.fr1i rs.. l 9h5
c.ie~-r York: Colu;;;oia Uni'JRI'SiGJ-" ?n~S3r 1946), p. J~

s.
Bo:{ 285 7

Stettinius, Caler.d3.r !Iotes: Febrinry 20, 1945 7 pp. 8-9 7
Stctt-,,inius P3s>~-r~s,.
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over one hundred State Derartr.:ent. perscnnel in ti1e

grot~p.

In-

eluded in the delegation •1ere h;enty-nine ;:cvisor::; four ;)pecial
Assistants to the Secreto.r-;,

t~·Jenty-two

1'3chnical offict:::rs, b1enty

translators, press and ad:.ti.r..istra t.i ve aides, and twenty-four stenographic and clerical people. 9 Surprised at the composition of the

United States party, Stettiri..ius became critical of the nwnber of
people brought to Hexico City.

Differences were reconciled when

Rockefeller gave a vigorous del.'ense for the si::;e of the group.
Of several decisions rr.ade at this meeting, the most important

dealt with access to inforrration.

The Secretary i:i.sis ted that not

only pleri..ary sessions but also rrajor committee meetings be open to
the press.

With his high regard for public re lat.ions, he announced

that daily conferences with American correspondents would be held
if possible.

It was also decided th.Jt the American delegation would

assemble every day at 9:CO A.H. at the Bdificio Imperial for brief.

ing sessions.

10

stettinius 1 s first opportunity to exercise his personal approach to diplomacy came in the early evening when he visited
Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla.

They discussed the close

relationship between the United States and ~1exico.

Padilla, like

most I.a tin Americans, was concerned about economic problems.

stated that the youth today have a tendency toward com1nunisrn.
The best way to combat it he felt ·,.;as not by i'orce, but by in-

'.'

I
~

10.

.,

p. 10.

~., pp. lC-11.

He
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creased education, economic activity, and an improved standard
.
11
Of l iving.

The Merican Foreign Minister also reported that the

Argentine situation was in hand.

This delicate matter would be

brought up at the end of the Chapultepec talks.

Stettinius noted

t.hat on his arrival, he had f01.md the Buenos Aires quest.i.ori boiling ..
He was convinced that decisive action should be taken promptly to

naintain the L"'li tia tive.

If Argentin;:1 met certain conditions, the

unity of the Americas could be insured.,

The Secretary beli.eved

that nor!n3.l rel.3.tions >·iith Buenos Aires could be restored if she

1) declared war on Ger;;:any and Japan, 2) adhered to inter-American
defense measures, and 3) gave public notice of troop dispersions
concentrated adjacent to the Brazilian and Chilean borders.

12

The

conversation between Stettinius and the strongly pro-American
Foreign Minister lasted almost half an hour..

The whole spirit of

the meeting was one of sincerity, cordiality, and complete agree- ·
ment.

13
With his first day in Mexico City drawing to a close, the

United states' chief delegate met inforrr.ally with correspondents
at the American Embassy.

He recounted off-the-record his expe-

riences at the Yalta Conference.

After.·1ards 1 he attended a

. reception for the Foreign Ministers of Brazilt Venezuela, Cuba,

11.

Report on 6:C0 P.1·1. Ezequiel Padilla-St3ttinius Con-

versation, February 20 7 19451 P• 2, Box 2S5, Stettinius Papers ..
12.

Argentine A.ffairs Report, Februar.1 20 7 1945, p. 1 7
Box 285, Stettinius Papers.
padilh-Stettinius Corn~r-sation, F_;b::-uary 20, 1945,
Box 285, Stettinius Papers.

lJ.
p. 3,
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Chile, Peru, Hexi.co, and Co.lumbL.l at the

i~.::!for;:-a

I:ot.cl.

Outside

of the embarrassment in Gu3. tema.la City .:i.:1d the typographical rnl:Jtake at the airport, the day's acti vi tics had coi:ie of.f ;:;rooothl.y.
As expected, Latin America ;.;as concerned about the ,\rgentine
question and economic problems.
meeting with· Padilla.

This was confirr.1ed at Stettinius's

Though delicate issues ·.-1ere involved, first

impressions depicted tf:e Secretary as a :.inirhrind of optir.d.sr:i 7
hoping to rrake the i·Ie:dco City Coni'erence as successful as the
.i.~-1
14
.
Cnmean uo.l..:<:s •

FEBitUAJY 21, 1945
The .Argentine iss:.1e dorn:i..nateC.. !-,he openin6 of the Uexico City
Conference on Febr1..:arJ 21, 191;..5.

There ·..;ere b::i ~,i1 public .:i.nd pri-

Stettinius, like tne 0L1er deleg2.tes, ·.·;as
created by Argentina's alier.ation.

c:~posed. Lo

the tension

Journal entries reveal that

throughout the day, from bJ.s attenc1ance at the preliminar:1 session
until his evening composition of telegrams, the SecretarJ's
thoughts were directed to the Argentine question.

1

5

The morPing session of the conference steering committee provided the first opportu..'ii ty to debate the rotter of herrd.spheric
solidarity.

The chief delegates assemoled at 11:00 to orga::'lize

subordinate co;r.nrl..ttees and approve the agenda..

Foreign Minister

Acosta of Costa Ri.ca nolilin::ited Ezequiel Padilla i'o.: t,he presidency

14.

Rcston. 7 11 Stettinius L3.nds Fo:- ;.:exi.ca 'i'alks, 11 llew York
-February 21 7 J.91.;.5, p .. 11.

stet ti.nius 1

'I'"i-,,,~es
-- •• 1

pp. 1-8,
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of ·the Chapultepec talk::;..

Stettinius in hi::> first. official act

at the conference seconded the r.Jo ti on..

Padilla

\~as

t.:rwrrl.r.i.ously

chosen president and proceeded to establish sb: study groups
which would research and submit :::-esolutions to the conference.
Because of his great interest in the proposed United 1Jations, the
American Secretary was selected to chair the committee on the \'lorld
security organization.

Other groups dealt

~·rl.th

further military

efforts to win the war, the strcngtberLi..ng of the inter-·American
system, economic and social problerr.s of the tro.nsi ti on period, and
'

pos~war

. an d socia
. 1 issuesp
.
16
econorm..c

Hith the comntl.ttet!s appointed, the next r::atter of business was

to formalize the agenda.

Not lll1expectedly 7 the Cuban delegate pro-

posed that the Argentine issue be given preferential treatment by

the conference..

Paraguayan Ambassador to the United St::ltcs 7

Dr. Celso R. Velasquez, suggested that Argentina be discussed first
rather than last on the age.naa.

17 Padilla replied that the nations

of the hemisphere had agreed otherwise in replying to the Mexico

City invitations.

This question was not scheduled to be reviewed

until the end of the proceedings.

The conference president pro-

posed that the delegates adhere to that agreement and debate the
issue later with the "greatest amplitude and with absolute frankness."18

This reasoning prevailed and the Velasquez r..otion ~·jas

16.

Coni'erence Steerin6 Coti'.r.ri. ttee Re_?or:., Februar-; 21 7 1945,
p. 1, Box 235 1 StGttinius Papers.
Jar.Jes ..'.leston~ "Di.Jpute is Put Of:.'
New Yor~..: T:Lnes, .i?ebruary 22, 1945, P• l.
17.

18..

I':Jid. 1 p .. 11.

,\os~nce

is

D-~plored, 11
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defeated.

Thus, the awkward problem of Buenos Aires' isolation

was not solved but merely postponed.

An unknmm quantity at this

point was the United States' Hillingness to discuss the issue.
Though the Argentine question \·Tas temporarily shelved, certain
resolutions were later related to it.

In fa.ct, fear of the· Farrell-

Peron clique forced the Uruguayan delegate to conclude the prelir.tina.ry
session with a unique proposal.

He suggested the promulgation of

a mutual guEn"8.n tee of territorial and poli tica:.t. unity within the
Western hemisphere ..

19

Following the stecrlng comm:i.. tteo meeting, SecretarJ Stettinius
visited Me:icican President Avila Camacho.

In this attempt to fur-

ther cultivate personal contacts, the American delegate had a
friendly talk with Mexico's chief executive.

Carr.o.cho stressed the

importance of success at the Chapu1tcpcc Conference and asked how
he could help achieve this.
that he and Stettinius had

The Me:icican president later remarked
11

clicked 11 at once.

20

In two days, the

Secretar-.t' s personal approach had reaped rewards.

The Hexican

leadership, . specifically Camcho and Padilla, i:..rere quite eager to
cooperate with the. United States.
Throughout the afternoon, various festivities celebrated the
... opening of the He:icico City Conference.

That evening, t:1.e first

plena:q session 1,.;as convened at Chapultepec Castle.
speeches reaching a high oratorical level

~·iere

:r.3.de.

Several
Stetti:riius
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gauged the value of each r.iessage by ho~.; qu.icl<:ly the photogr3phers
21
-i-a
d ed over t o .._'
._
s.,-mpe
..,ne ros1,rlL'TI.

"''
ine Secretary did not plan t.o

address a plenary session until the folloning day.

As part of the

audience, he was content to take notes on the gathering.
The keynote address was given by President Camacho.

The speech

reflected Iatin American concern for the pressing problems which
!',ad stimulated southern resentment toward the United States.
pointed out how important the

11

Camacho

spiri tml" help of even the weaker

na ti.ans had been to the imr effort and the need now to discuss their
post-.1ar problems.

He rel'Y'arked that democracy was the best protec-

tion against the further infiltration of totalitarian propaganda.
For this reason, it

~·ms

necessarJ that democratic processes be

protected and intensified withL"1 the American rt!publics.

The

ifaxican president tied poll tics o.nd economics together by emphasizing that democracy can only survive when economic and social
conditions are sound.

11

We must create a world in which a minimtun

standard of living is guaranteed and where there will be economic
.

, 22

cooperation between coun t nes.'

In a subtle fashion, Carracho was

appealing to the United ·States to assist in the elimination of economic distresses within the hemisphere.
the Mexican leader's most controversial
United Nations and the Argentine issues.

Stettinius observed that
co~~ents

related to the

In a low-key rr.anner,

Carra cha expressed his belief tl:i..a t if the peace should be based solely
on the wisnas of the pm..rerful nations: the 11ar v:ou:ld fi.a'Ja be~n

21 ..

~ .. , P•

22~
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fought in vain.

23

He upheld the right of the

;\r.i~ric.:::.3

the shaping of the international security program.

to help in

Ho·t1ever, the

"Big T'nree 11 dictates at Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks ha<.l conflicted
with this herrd.spheric. right.

Enthusiastic applause was evoked by

the Hex:ican chief executive's rerrarks on the world organiza.tion

and Argentina.

In reference to the controversy with Buenos Aires,

he deplored the absence of Farrell's country but still held a cordial place for it in

11

his thought and in his affection. 1124

At. the

expense of United States prestige, latin Amerlca sought reconciliati on with Argentina.

After reviewing the day's activities, Stettinius spent the
latter part of the evening working on diplorratic correspondence.
read dispatches and forwarded reports to Grew in Hashington.

He

A

cable from Argentina informed the Secretary that Buenos Aires would

probably not declare war on Gerrrany.

Civilian and rrd.li tary circles

were pressuring the Farrell-Peron regime not to move against the

Axis powers. 2 5

This news must have cor.ie as a blow to. Stettinius.

To restore relations with Argentina, he wanted demonstrations of
good faith such as her involvement in the war and not unimplemented
declarations.

Luckily 1 Padilla had succeeded in postponing the-

Buenos Aires question until the end of the conference, giving the
Secretar<J time to cultivate the inter-American delegations and

'"'
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hopefully come to some

co~~Dn unu~rsto.nding.

Besides the unfavorable Argentine

ne~-1s,

a negative report on the pla.'1...'!.ing of the

Stett.iniu.s received

s~n

Franci.:>co Conference.

Despite the efforts of the State Departr::ent, France had not yet
expressed agreement with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals completed at
the Crimean talks.

France and Nationalist Chl.na had not partici-

pated in the final revision of the proposals.

But the United States,

Soviet Union, and Grea. t Bri ta:Ln had invited them to help sponsor
the world organiza t.ion coni'erence in April.

:ihile China had accepted

these terms ir:mediately 1 de Gaulle's Pro'lisional Government had not

cornmitted itself y·:!t.
cate position.

Stettinius wired Grew t:r.at he \>ias in a deli-

He had been elected chair::ian of the United Nations

committee and was thus responsible for studying the possible integration of the regional system into the proposed world organization.

la.tin Americans realized that the Security Council would be the
vital cog !'Ii thin the United Ha tions r.achlnery.
to lmow its voti..r1.g procedures and operations.

They ~·1ere anxious

This iruormation

could not be released, according to a Yalta agreement, until the
invitations to the San Francisco Conference had been delivered.
A vicious circle had developed whereby no invitations could be ·
issued until the sponsors had been deter:n.ined.

The longer F'rance

dawdled over the question of sponsorship, the more difficult became

the Secretar:-r' s position.

A reluctant France ~·rould only help to

:..tlden the creclibilit~/ gap bet:-.reen tl:e

.t'\merica.

';iOr ld.

Stettinius ca.Oled ~Iashingtor1:

org;i~za ti on 3.nd IE~ tin

-33-

From the standpoint of .frank :i.r:d .f.::ilr d~alir.g 1
I should ba a':Jla to discus3 .:ill :-ingks or the
iwrld security proposals at i:.he ca~.U::s t pos~;ible
moment. I still ho~e that between tills cvan.i.ng
ar.d the following night, i1hen I ueliver my a.ddress,
that Ar.ibassador Caffery will be able to cxpl:.l.in
in Paris the fact that twenty reoublics
'-ire meetinO"
•
0
to discuss the world organi:::a tion and that the
French delay is n:ost embarrassing to the United
26
States.. He ardently hope for prompt consent • • • •
Unfortunately, the problem of French sponsorship had just begun.
Februar"IJ 21, like the preced!.ng day, was a time of orgoini-

zation and preparation for both Ed·11ard Stettinius and the He;d.co

City Conference.

Although the Secrct.J.r:/ rod esL:i.blishecl some per-

sonal contacts, he had also encotmtered ::;orne t.races of resentment.
The delicate problems relatad to t,he United Nations, Argentina,

and postuar

eco~oll'iC

policies had quickly

c~.erged,.

Greatly in-

terested in a sr.iooth t:r:msition to peace, L:l t.in Axed ca uas an:r.ious
to know the United States' posbmr policy.

Thu~,

the ::;outhern

republics looked forward to Stettinius's pronouncement3 of
Februar'J 22.
FEBRUARY 22, 1945
By the second day of the Chapultepec talks, the delegations

were ready to tackle the problems of transitional plan..>U.ng.

With

the opening forr.:ali ties completed, a pattern of cor..rrd.. ttee meetings
and plenar-<; sessions iras established.

At this point, Secretary

Stettinius emerged as a key spok~srran for postwar cooper'.:! ti on and
the Good Neighbor Policy.

On Feo:: 1Y1:ry 22, 1945: he :·ras t..he center

of attention i:i. He;dco City..

26 ..

~ .. , p"

7-

Eis introductory speech on Washington's
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hemispheric policy highlight.ed th..:!se ea.:::.·ly cor..ference
Prior to deliveril'.g his policy

~essage,

p~·o,:eadings.

Stettinius spent. the

early pa.rt of the clay rapping out s t.rategy Hi :-..h hi3 aides.

!ie

attended the 9:00 A.a. briefing of the United States tlelegation
at the Edificio Imperial.

These daily gatherings proved to be of

great value.

They provided a clearinghouse for ideas and an in27 Throughout the
f orrral means to cope with troubleson:e points.
conference, the Secre t.a:r.71 a ttencled these morning sessions '..;hen his

schedule perrrri. tted..

Ordir.3.rily, they were presided over by his

chief alternate, 1lelson Rockefeller..

Stettinius lud long been re-

garded as a good rr.anagar of men rather tr.an as a substantial
. .
li
28
for:nulator of American po cy.

He had a tendency to trans fer

.

irnnortant
resconsibilities to caoable
aides.
..
.

3uch a case would

be P..ockefeller's supervision of the daily delegation rr.cet.i.ngs.

The chief alterri..ate received oral cor..mi.ttee reports and decided
which ones should be rel.3.yed to the Secreta!"'J.
The United States delegation gathering of Februar.1 22 revealed
Stettinius's

high regard for public relations.

In attendance

were representatives of American labor, agriculture, and business
.....
·
as well as the usua l .t'Oreign

service
· orr·icers. 29

These individuals

27. Stettinius 7 Calendar Notes, February 22, 1945, p. 1,
Box 285, Stettinius Papars.
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~Jot0s,

l?ebr!13.r:r 22,
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not regularly employed by the
nom:i.c advisors.

S~te Depa:ct::1~nt.

They sy;nboli:.:ed the Secretary'::; att.,!1npt to

public participation in American diplo.mcy..

the wethod of deliver;/ for Stettinius's
cussed.

Here pri::w.rily cco~-riden

i\t this fi::-st 1:1eeting,

aft~z-::ioon

speech was dis-

It was decided that the Secretary would pause at the end

of each major passage to per:nit a Spanish translation.3°
After the delegation meeting, Stettinius began to prepare for
his role as chairr.an of Commission II on the world organization.
Knowi:ng that Iatin American involvement in the United Nations would
be a touchy rratter, he had formed an advisory body on

~mrld

security.

This group included Leo Pasvolsky, General Strong, Congresswan Johnson,
Hayden Raynor, and later Sena tor Tom Con.."'.3.lly.

At a 10: 00 A .r1.

meeting, they reviewed la.tin American attitudes toward the Dumbarton
Oaks proposals,.

These advisors realized that the United St3.tes was

bound by a gentler:ian's agreement not to negotiate the United :Nations

resolutions with other states until the San Francisco Conference.
However, Venezuela and Ecuador were already organizing a campaign
. .
th e proposa 1 s. 31
.
to compose a conference reso 1 u t ion
cri. t•icizing

stettinius's advisorJ group had to disassociate the United States
from any movement of this nature.

But there were other threats to

.the American position on the world organization.

The Chilean dele-

gation wanted the membership of the Security Council increased from
eleven to fifteen ';Tith the four additional sea ts going to L3.tin

30.

~ ..

31.

~., !?•

J ..
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American nations.

Others desired a hemispheric lobby which might

force concessions from countries of other r0gions.3 2
were intolerable to the Secretar'J •

These ideas

The si tU.'.l ti on was so delicate

that the American delegation could not even afford to initiate its
own

resolution on the

Du.'ll~rton

Oaks

proposals.

Such

a

move would

become the focus for all those wishing to express opposition to the
United Nations.33

Foreign Minister Padilla's conception of a world

organization resolution appealed to St.;ttinius.

In other words, he

sought a proposal which would be 1) an expression of the desire for
a general international organization and 2) an endorsement of the
Dumbarton Oaks resolutions as a basis for drafting the organization 1 s charter. 34
Following a reception given by President Camacho nt the H<1tional
Palace 7 the SecretartJ assembled the American

ste~ring

cor.mti.ttee.

This group included his world security advisors plus m.lliam Clayton,

Adolf Berle, and other Foreign Service officers.

They fWlctioned

throughout. the conference as Stettinius's chief consultative body.
It· will be noted later that many of the crucial decisions rrade by
the Secretary originated in this council.

The steering committee met

at this time to analyze resolutions to be introduced by the United
states.

End of Censorshi-p In Air.ericas Urged,"
York Times, FebruariJ 23, 1945, P• J.4..
.32.;

New

All proposals were due for submission on or before Saturday

33.
,..
28 )1
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night Febrmry 24.

In

vie~-.

of

th~

fact that ClL.l.~fton, L:1e Assi;:,t.:.int

Secretary for Economic Affairs h.:ld just J.:rriv2d, t!'lc cor..mittee decided
to ask for an
resolutions. 35

e.~tension

of tioe until Eond.ay for cartain economic

Hith the Mexico City Conference in just its :Jecond

day, nineteen proposals had already been introduced.
motions alone related to the. United Nations plan.

Severr of these

One of the first

resolutions that Stettinius's people planned to draft dealt with
the abandonment of censorship regulations.

The American delegation

desired a freedom of inforr.ation clause which would result in all

hemispheric countries providing correspondents with the right to
gather information freely wherever they chose.

In addition, the

press would be allowed to transmit that inforrration abroad without
control by official sources.

The Se ere tar;/ i1anted the L:l ti...'"l Amer-

ican countries to do what they could to assure these two freedoms
in the hemisphere and to secure the same
the worlct.

advan~~ges

elsewhere in

36

Ui.th the day's strategy sessions behind him, Stettinius prepared for his first major test at the Chapultepec talks.

His

policy statement at the·4:30 P.M. plenary session would probably

set the mood for the rest of the conference.

Since the United·

states was the largest and most powerful heraispheric republic, her
post'.-rar goals would directly affect Iatin America.

Eajor economic

and social advances in South .4.;:ierica could only be achieved with

35.
p. 2 1 Box

36 ..
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Washington's cooperation.

Therefore, i'i'r..:i t. rieveloo1rent
the
...
...oro;:-rar:lS
......,

inter-American nations hoped to obtain o. t. t.he i!exico Ci t7 Conference

depended upon the concessions the United S-Wtes \·<as willing to rrake.
As Washington's chief spokesman, Stettinius had to rea;;sure the

southern countries of United Stat.es friendship and cooperation

throughout the transition and postwar periods.
Prior to Stet tinius 's address 7 Foreign Hi.ru ster Padilla opened
the plenar-.r session

~vi th

a brilliant extemporaneous speech.

Setting

forth the objactives which he hoped the Chapultepec Conference to
achieve, he then stressed the need to preserve the unity born of
war.

most

The strongest part of his message and that which evoked the
~·1hole-hearted

response from the delegates described the dignity

of the comrr.on man and the masses in the Americas to i'eel they had
a stake in the preserva t.ion of

11en1Lsph~!.tlc:

soli darl t.y

.3 7

The Mexi-

can diplomat's cry for economic liberty so tr-.at "every rran will be
able to feed his family and educate his children" was loudly ap, 1 38
plauded by the assemo y.

11

It was vital for I.atin America to do

more than just produce raw materials and live in a state of semicolonialism.

The goal", he said "of an economic program in this

hemisphere should be that of stable employment in trades and indus·tries which satisfy the demand of masses for goods.

1139

United
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States capital would ba required to .'.rnbs tantiall.y

r:1..i.~>e

t.he :;tan-

dard of living and the purchasing po>•er of t.lic southern republics.
Padilla warned of the ever-present ideologic.:i.l threat to underdeveloped regions.

He a::-gued that people turned desper:i.te by

hunger would be attr.::i.cted to communis;n or fascism.

Hence, democracy

must fulfill its promise of steady work• f'a..ir :'/ages, and a decent
home, 40

Thus, playing upon Hashington''s increasing fear of Soviet

subversion, the conference president appealed for united States
support in moderniziri..g la tin America.
After Padilla's fine orator'/, Secret.:ir.v Stettinius addre:.;sed
the chamber..

He spoke in what was later noted as an

and serious rmnner. 41
American doubts about

even-ton~ ...

The Sacret,arh anxious to rerr.ove any Latin
:-Jashingt~m•s

desire to aid. its southern

neighbors, stated:
The United States Goverrune:it looks upon this
conference in Hexico City as a meeting of decisive
importance. Our unity Ii.as been :Jtrengthened by
our wartime collaboration. Now it is our task to
advance this unity still further, both for the war
and in our poJitical, economic, and social collaboration in the tasks of peace. I wish to reaffirm
to the representatives of all Governments assembled
here that the.United States Goverru:lent regards
the Good Neighbor Poli~J and the further development of inter-American cooperation as indispensable
to the building after victorJ, of a peaceful and
democratic world order. I ·wish also to reaffirm
the belief of the United States that this democratic
order i:lUSt be built by all nations, Hrge and small,
'
.
acting tog~tner
as so·vereign
equ:i ls • ........
·
40~
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This passage ivas warmly received by the Ia tin :1.meric.:in d~le~o. tes.

Stettinius Has obviously also tr,;ring to soften
tm·ra.rd the proposed United Nations.

t.h~ir n~sent;-nt:!nt.

The southern :rc::publ.ics had

been angered by their exclusion from the Dumbar-ton Oaks taLl<s.

the Secretary was calling for the

~'lorld

Now

corrununity, not just the

"Rig Three·," to participate in the creation of the world peace.
Stettinius continued by stating his purpose to reveal the
United States• objectiYes at Mexico City and in over·all foreign
p~licy.

Hashington•s ir:unedio.te goal 1·1as to bring about the earliest

possible defeat of the J\_.'cb powers.

Besides deposing the dicta.tors,

the Secretary felt tb.a t their ideologies must be eradicated..

Harn-

ing against possible Nazi and .Fascist infiltration, Stettinius

an.'1ounced that:

The people oi.' the United Swtes are confident-,
that- the A:::erican P..epublics ·.•ill join in ·.;1hatever
cooperative measures r.ay be necessarJ to stamp
out utterly ever-J vestige of Nazi influence in
this hemisphere. That must be our unalterable
purpose • ·~ • • 43
Turning to the world security question, Stettinius examined
the relationship between the international organization and the
inter-American regional system.

He declared that the Dumbarton

Oaks proposals would create a peace-keeping body to prevent
aggression and remove the causes of ii'ars.

Totally committed to

the concept of a United Nations, he stressed the value of the forthcorrri.ng San fran::isco Conference.

This April, 1945 !:ieeting would

utilize the Du.:lbarton Caks proposals to preven C. 7-hi:; .fu t.u.:.~e use of

-41-

lawless power politics.

The Secretary also

ackno;·1l·~dged

that the

i..'l1.ter-Ameri.can system should play an import.:mt role in tne postwar

period ..

He reminded the dele 0crates too of the valui=!- -in

it within the framework of the Unitzd Nations.

L.

,..,t"
••
1::grat·l.:ng

Consequently, the

stronger we can ma!<e the inter-American system in its own s·phere
of activity, the stronger the world organization 1.dll be and
vice versa. 44
The last section of Stettinius 1 s message concentrated on the
economic worries of Ia.tin America.

His ref8rence to the necessity

of raising the standard of living of the rasses

~vas

particularly

appreciated and timely, since it hit the same key:i.ote as the preceding Padilla speech. 45

He depicted the United States as wilJing

to contribute its vast economic 7 industrial, and techrri.C'.ll resources
to the improverr:ent of conditions within the herrri.spheric republics.

Washington would propose and support measures for closer cooperation
in public health, nutrition and food supply, labor, education,
science, and transportation.

The Secretary remarked that as his

countriJ helped to soften the economic dislocations of the transition period, collaboration in economic and financial measures would

.
achieve the "rising standard of living we all seek.

11

46

In concluding bis address, Stettinius spoke of the possible
historical significance of this inter-American conference.

A

realization of the objectives he just set forth might place the

41+·
45.
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Chapul tepee talks among the "great historic •~1ilcs ton;.-.!s on ti1e road
to lasting peace."47

The Secretar'J cabled Gre:<1 that

questing his reaction to the :Jpeech.

ni,~ht.
<=>
,

re-

He beli8ved th::t t the dele,:;a t.es

appreciated this outline of r::aj or po in ts o.f United s w tes poll cy
and the choice of the Hexico City Conference as the forum for as

important a declaration by this Goverru:ient. 48

Although there were

then twenty points marked by applause, Stettinius observed that the

names of Stalin and Churchill had not

be~n

well .received.

No con-

crete assistance programs iv-ere revealed in the American policy
statement, nor was Argent.i.n3 covered.

Washington's chief spokesrr.an

i·1as not willing to comprorri.ise on the Buenos Aires situation.

Canri.lle M. Cianfarra of the New York Tir.:es noted that crystal-clear

proof of all-out collaboration in keeping ;·ri th (err.ocratic principles
would be needed before Argentina would be accepted into the com. ...

muru.~y

9
.
o f American
na t·ions. l+

The SecretarJ's address however did

show tt-...at Washington was receptive to I.a.tin American pleas for aid.
Speaking after Stettinius, at the ple:n.arJ session Cuer'/O Rubio of

Cuba praised the "solid political, humanistic message" of the

50

United states delegate..

This positive comment reflected the

general sentiment of the hemispheric representatives.

47.

~., P•

9.
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49., Camille H.. Cianfarra, 11 U.. s. Promises Help .for the
Americas," Ue'1l York Tir::o'!s_, febri..:.ar;,r 23~ 1945~ P• 14.
50 •. stettinius, Cal~ndar Hotes, l"ebruar7 22r 1945 1 p .. 7 1
Box 235, Stetti:aius Pap~rs.

J,

-43-

· During the early evening, the Secrewr:r• ::> .i'i:-;:; t r:-njor con-

ference speech was <igaJ.,.v1 in the limelight.

At i3:.JO p

.i-1.,

participated in a radio broadcast over the Blt:.t! nct•wrk.

he
This t:Jo:<

the form of a dialogue between the zmnouncar, Bd Tomlinson and
Stettinius.

They opened the program by reviewing the initial pro-

ceedings of the Chapultepec

taL~s.

The SecretarJ then outlined

again the aims of his afternoon address.

Tomlinson asked questions

about Yalta 7 which Stettinius tried to associ::i.te with the Mexico

City Conference and the in tar-American sy3 t ..'-!m.

The final broad-

cast rema r:'ks dealt with the Dumbarton Caks proposals and at tempts
to raise the world standard. of living ..

51

Thus; the second day of the Chapultepec talks featured impertant speech-making.

li'oreign Mini::; t.er Padilla b.:J.d voiczd the La tin

Ar.ierican desire for econoraic liberty.

The southern republics looked

to the United States for support in their struggle for technical
and industrial independence.

Ed:.zard Stet.t.inius had identified him-

self and the United States with their cause.

His plenarJ session

address had advocated peace, international security arrangements,
and postwar cooperation in hemispheric problems.

The American

Secretary had reassured Iatin America of Washington•s dedication
to the Good Neighbor Policy.

With the milit...arJ, economic and social··

"'... . Stettiru.· us wired President P..oosevelt:
di scussions ye t +. . o be.st;n.
"The conference is off to a good start ..

51.
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CHAPTER III
A CIDSE-UP ON PUBLIC RELATIONS MID TflS :roRLD 0~1.}ANIZ..\'l'ION

FEBRUARY 23 7

19~5

As the five conference corr.missions develooed
committed oraa•
D

nizat.ions, Secretary Stettinius prepared the agenda of his world
organization group and held his first Chapultcpdc press conference.
Prior to these acti vi.ti~s,

howev·~r.,

the

chi~f

Ar:!erican

began the day on the telephona with :·lashing ton~

d~lega te

Joseph Grew called

hi:n to review the Fr:!nch sponsorship issua and his opening confer-

ence message.

They agreed to issue the inv1tations to the san

Francisco Conference on Tuesday, February 27 Hith or without France,.

The Acting Secretary also congra cula ted Ste ttini t:.3 on his great
job

th~ d3.y

before with the

pl<.~n.ary s~ssion,.

Grew con::side::-ed it

"one of the finest, r.iost foreeful~ important st..J.te1aent.s that had

come out in the war."

1

H~ infor:ned his bos3 that American news-

papers had given the message considerable prornL'1ence and space.
The New York Times had carried a front page stor'J on it and had
devoted three and one half columns to excerpts.
~ regarded the speech as the

The Washington

"first review of American foreign

policy since the Yalta Conferance."
used superlati•1es to describe it.
i t a rr.astarful address and stated:

2

The Phil:ldeluhia Inauirer

An Inouirer editorial labeled
"~1r .. St~ttinius said the right

things in the right pbces and in a tone of h~J.pf'ulrn!SS and rea.s-

2.,

~ .. , p ..

6.

-h5-

Suran.Ce r.n th.out 'oom'o·ast.ft3
"-'- ¥·

u· .-.e t\.1.::
l

L'
sou.vn~rn

\ l'
repu?J.....:.c::;,
the J\;;ier-

ican press had welcomed Stettinius ts rerr.ar!\:s.
At the daily 9:CO A.H. r.:eeting of

th~

delegation,

discussed the status of American resolutions.

t..h~

Sec:ceta:r-y

Up to th.i.;:; point,

only two United States proposals had been submitted at. the conference.

One dealt with the removal of censorship barriers and the

other with the strengthening of the inter-American regional system.
After Stettinius asked for cor..:ni ttec progress

r~port3,

Harley Not tar

read the text of a possible resolution on Dumbarton Caks.
drafting of resolutions
economic field.

·~:as

The

b8in5 conducted smoothly e:<cept in the

latin American an;dety over indust:dal and tech-

nical r...atters dictated a slow, cautious approach to economic
proposals.

Rockefeller infor;:icd the delegation that Ar;ierican reso-

lutions in this area nri.6ht not,

rr.~et the Saturday

:mbnd.s::;lon deaclline.

Eager to get his o·..m commission off the ground, the Secretary
convened the world organization committee at noon.

This body had

the delicate task of relating the inter-American system to the
proposed United Nations.

Stettinius opened the meeting expressing

confidence that the deliberations about to occur would prove as
invaluable to the world of the future as had the results of the.
Dumbarton Oaks talks.5

At this particular gathering, the delegates

had to elect officers and establish guidelines for discussing rele-

3.

stettinius, Calendar Not.as, Febrt.:arJ 26, 1945, p. 1,

Box 285 1 Stettinius

4.

Papers~

stettinius, Cal~r.dar Notes, f3orW1.r;Y 2J, 1945, p. 1,

Box 285, St0ttinius ?ap~rs~

5.

lli£•1

P• 2.,

4
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vant· issues.

The Secretary invited nomi.na tions for the posi ti.ans

of vice-chairman and cor.,rn:i.. ttee reporter.

Ambassador Guillermo Belt

of Cuba and Foreign Ministar Para-Perez of Venezuela were elected
respectively to these posts.

Intense interest in the regional sys-

tem's relationship to the world organization was reflected by the
committee's immediate consideration of five reoolutions relating
to integration.

To avoid unnecessary debate, Stettin.i.us proposed

a sub-commi.ttee to analyze the re$olutioru; and report its findings
to the full. comr.rission.
com:ni.ttee.

para-Perez was selected to head tha sub-

This srraller body compiled all the Iatin American

opinions on the United Nations and eventually produced the comrnis6
sion's position paper on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.
In order
for the Venezuelan Foreign Hinister' s group to sum:r.arize t.he world

organization recommendations, it was important to know how far the

United States would go in permitting

s~estions.

Stettinius as-

signed several top aides, especially Leo Pasvolsky, to protect

American interests at these sub-committee meetings.

Other American

delegates assigned to Commission II included John Cabot, Hayden Raynor,
Harley Notter, Senator Tom Connally, and Congressman Luther Jo.hnson.7
While the Secretary's world organization group met, other

committees were in session.
the question of jurisdiction.

Commission I on the war effort debated
Unsure whether its interests covered

just the war or also the transition period, it decided to seek the

6..

Developr.:ents of February 2.3, 19L,5, P• 2, Box 285, Stet.tinius

Pape.rs.

7,. stettinius 7 Calendar l'Iotes, February 2J, 1945, p .. 3,
Box 285, Stettinius Paper3.

,,..,

-•.i.(-

advice of the conference steering committee.

\·Ji tirin Commission TII
Gc.!'T·~ral

on the strengthening of the inter-American systcc1,
proposals were presented.

The Uruguayan dell:!gJ. t.:ion

hemispheric security pact.

uniqu'=!

~l~ppor-ted

a

Columbia al;;o sougbt some kind of Pan

American non-aggression treaty.

Raversing the

a~ci~nt

doctrine

tbat the United States should be kept from intervening in any disputes below the Rio Grande, the Colurnbian resolution asked for a
general guarantee of all Aiiliffican boundaries against any aggressor

within or without the hemisphere.

8

This meant that :Jasbington and

its soutber·n neighbors would consider iJ.ny atta:;1pt against the terri-

torial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence of an
9 Columbia's
A
•
'
.nmer:t.can
state
as an ac t 01 aggression aga:i.ns t, :i.•tse lf'
n

•

•

unprecedented request was destined to play a
Hexico City

Conf,~rence..

Unll~rn

$

~ajar

role at the

the intcr-Americnn study group, the

economic comm:i. ttees did not produce any drama tic proposals.
mission

Com-

DJ met briefly and discussed what subjects would be proper

for the Chapultepec talks to consider and iibat topics should be
.
10
held over for the Ju.'le technical conference in Washington.
In
the Commission V meet.ing, Peruvian Foreign Minister C..allagher suggested that raw materials contracts with the United States be
extended or renegotiated.

ll

·
·
·
Paac"'
8. James Eeston, 11u
.. emspneric
~ ,~
-..
New York Times, February 21.i., 1945, p .. 1 ..

9.
10..

Sough~

:\ t ParleJ'-."
,

Ibid., P~ 7,.
Telegram, stettinius to .Joseph Gr~~1r11 Februar-;,r 2J 1 1945,

P• 3, Box 287: Stettinius Pap~rsp
· of February 23: 1945r p .. 2, Box 2S5,
ll. Develapr::enr.s
Stettinius Papers.
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· At 1:30 P .. N. at the Edificio
first press

conf~rence..

l:::.peri.:il~

;:)t,3t.ti'ci.us held hi::>
b~corne

He called the :rieetlng to

with representatives of the Herican press and
12
.
d e 1 egaw..on,.
•·
.
t ies
o f ·th e A
·men.can

t,;)

acquaintc..><l

review the activi-

Always ::-ealizing the value of

good public relations, the Secretary hoped to establish friendJ.y
contacts among local journalists.

He noted th.at the opening days

of the conference bad brought satisfaction and encouragement to
all people.,

Commenting on Nexican leadership, he st.a ted:

In the splendid addresses of P!"esident Avil.'.1
Gama.cha a.nd Dr • .Padilla we b..>ve hea:"'i n<'.!w and
inspiring expres3ions of the ideals of friendship and cooperation that have been t.ha tradition
of the American Republics,, and which He now
seek to t!"anslate into greater welf.:ire for all
people.13

After this introduction, he shifted to the central issues he
wished to discuss,,

llei tera ting one of the themes of his plenary

session address, Stettinius stressed the value of the regional
system in creating world peace.

He observed that:

Neither victory nor peace can be won without
the full support of the American republics and
the effective and continuing collaboration
among ourselves and the rest of the world.
That sacred obligation we must repeat and
recognize here in Mexico City • • ,. • JJ+
The Secretary, in empr.asizing the new world's potential to improve

the status of rnanld.nd, also acknowledged the importance o:f a United

12. stettinius 7 Calendar ;Iotes, Feoruar;/ 23, 191+5 1 p ... 3,
Bo;{ 285, Stetti11iiJS P3.pers.
1.3.. stettin.ius, Press Conferznce Statement, februa.:r.1 23, l945,
P• 1, Box 285, stetti:ti11s IJ.::ipers ..

14.

-

Ibid.,

-p ..

2~
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Nations.

As a strong advocate of the intern.:1t.ion3.l peace-keeping

body, he sought regional integration

~nd

declared:

The United States Govarn.m~t believes t:,bat the
stronger we can rralce the L'1ter-..;meric:rn ~wst,'!m
in its own sphere of activiti:'!s, the stronger
the world org:.:mization will be . . . . . 15
He revealed to reporters that the American delegation's first two

Chapultepec resolutions had been drafted with the purpose of
strengthening the inter-,Amcdc.."ln

arr~1.ng8mcnt.

The first proposal

sought the free exchange of and access to infor;;;.-3. t.ion through the

aoandon;nent of censorshl?•

"If

'.Ie

J.re to have enlightened public

opinion," Stettinius rer.arked, "infor:ration en current events and

trends of thought should be readily available to the pu'olic .. 11
.According to Iati:n. ·American circles 7 this resolution

1·;as

not

16
C..."C-

pected to rr.eet opposition even r,:iough the rr.ajo.r.it,y of th.;;! southern
•
republics had stnct

·i·i.
rm...!.l.~ry

". l7
and po liti
"'ca1 censorship..

'l"
_ne

Secretary and bis staff had overlooked one fla·.i1 in their proposal.

They had weakened the draft by not calling for the immediate abandonment of censorship.

As a result, those rulers i.;ho utilized

censorship to strengthen their autocratic gover:i.ments could get
around the freedom of infor:ration concept.
Stettinius next outlined the Ai1lerican recom.~endations to

strengthen the regional system's administrative rr.achLJ.ery.
ington was attempting to buttress the Good Neighbor Policy.

15 .. _foid ... ,

--

•)
p .. _.,

Ibid .. 1 P• 2 ..

WashA

-50-

possible secandar-J motive o.f

tb~se

proposal::; uight.

l~::i.ve been to

allay latin fears that the United s:.at3s ·,.;as becoming too preoccu-

pied with the world security organL:::.ation.

'foe J;:nerican dr-...:ii't

suggested tr.at heor:Lspheric conferences be held at regular interval::>
of four years to consider broad

proble~~

of common

i~terest.and

that meetings of foreign mi.nisters be convened annually to resolve
major problems of more immediate concern.

It also sought to broaden

the functions of the Pan A:::e.dcaa Union and

creat~

an economic

a~d

social council u."lder the auspices of the Union's Governing Board.
Finally, Stettinius's program called for the esta.bli::;hrn.ent. o.f

.:U"1

inter-American education.al and cultural co;nr;ri.ssion and further
efforts to more effectively correlate the Tll.L.":lerous cxis ting inter-

.
.
18
Amen can agencies ..
After completing llis forml statement, the Secretary held a
short question and answer period.

On

t,~.,o

pressing issues, Argentina

and postwar economic planning, he refused to cor.unent, feeling any
discussion of these r..atters premature.

Eex:ican reporters ques-

tioned him about the United Nations and Security Council procedures.
He replied that as soon as negotiations with France and China were
completed, invitations would be issued and operations clarified.
The SecretaT'J also revealed that he did not anticipa.te any serious
obstacles in attempting to coordinate the goals of the inter19
1d
. t•
Hoping to
American system with those of the wor_
orgamza
ion ..

19.

-

I

Ibid .. , p .. o ..
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s . . . . eak with local -r-eport,:i.r-::
-

conference around 3: 00 p .H.

·t.'n~
-

·.~ .. ~ r,-'
c·
•
v
,
z.,;
. ~ue d ·'-'::e
press
0 •·,·e.:>k-.

~
-follo•,.rJ.·~
.. -~ ......

20

Throughout the latter part of

th~

afternoon, Stcr,tinius had a

few appointraents Ni th magazine cor!'espondents.

He also completed

arrai.'1.ger:lents to reside at a count!"'J estate near Cuernavaca ·for the
weekend.

The

of the week.

5:JO plenax-.f sassion i·as his last conference

meeting

Although not as dramatic a meeting for him as the

preceding day, the 3ecreta.ry still r;ade a significant contribution

to the session.
Roosevelt.

He presented a message of ;;re.::ting from President

The American chief executive declared that:

The assembling of the Conference of American
F.epublics on the Probler.is of v:ar and Peace
move me to send cordi::i.l salutJ.tions to you
and r;iy felicitations to the Govzrm;cnt 3.nd
people of M~xico as hosts to this sif~'1ificant
meeting. Hill you ple<i~e co,r.r.n.w.i~tc to the
del3gates r.1y greetings a:-id confident anticipation o.f notable accor.iplish:;ient.
Since the days of their independence, the
American Republics have t.irel~ssly explored
ever<J pathway to human freedom, justice and
interr.ational well-being and today the cowr..on
men of all oeace-loving nations look to them
and you for- light on the arduous road to world
peace, secu..."'"ity, and a higher level of economic
life. 21
·

Another noteworthy item at the session was a Peruvian delegate's
appeal for the establishJnent of an international court of justice
in association wi. th the D·mnbarton Oaks proposals.
from Honduras a l so

20 ..

-

Ibid.J

.

D ..

·

.1..

C:t ue

A re pres en ta t.i ve

0
d the
• ne"'d
- - 1··or U:uted States m~ cb'"'ru·
......... cal

5 ..
;Jtct~ini.~1s,

February 23 ~
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equipment and instruction in scientific r.iethods of agriculture,

mining, commerce, and transportation. 22
Stettinius's day concluded with the reappearance of t.-10 nagFrom Argentina came word that Juan Peron might succeed

ging issues.

Farrell and that the Columbian delegation to the Mexico Cit.y
Conference had been asked to pl.3:y "Godfather" to Argent:i.ne attempts
2
at rehabilitation .. 3

persisted,..

The question of French sponsorship also still

The Secretary recci·re<i

c::~

c;;;iJ..egram frora President

Roosevelt regarding the United Nations conference..

The chief execu-

tive left to Stettin.tus the final decision on delivery of the
San Francisco invitations; but he acknowledged that March 1 was his

preference. 24

The Secretar-J still had to hear from the French Pro-

visional Government and so this iratter could not be 0ettled ye:;.
Although the Buenos Aires and French sponsorship problems were
unresolved, the chairman of the AmeriCJn deleg3.tion had had a pret,ty
successful day.
ing.

ti.is world organization corr~'ilittee was now function-

The United States had submitted two resolutions which suggested

Washington's strong interest in the plight of Latin America.
Stettinius had established good rapport

T;,ri th

the local press.

Finally,
In

reviewing the day's activities, he cabled Joseph Grew:
I feel that the work of the com.'lti.t~ees got
under way with dispatch. The com.'lD..ttees have
now been set up, proced:ires ~efined, and I
believe that the atmospnere is goodM 2 5
22. stcttinii.:...s, CJ.lendar ffotesr Februar-J 23 1 191~5 ~ p .. L..,
Box 285 7 Stettin:i.us Pap.;;rs ..

23.

24.
25.

-

Ibid .. , p ..

--

Ibid.,

.

..__,.,.

5 ..
r.

o, ..

Telegr3 ~, Stet~inius to Grew, Feb:rual"'J

Box 287, stattinius P.3.pers ..

2J, 1945,

p .. 6 1
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Relaxin.g at Cuernavaca for the 1.1eekecd, Stettinius left his
capable assistant Nelson Hockefeller in cbarge of the i\merican
delegation.

The Secretary's r..apers do not reveal his reasons for

withdrawi...'1.g fror;i. the center of confcrenct! ;.ictiv5... tics 7 but 3.gain
key aides directed

it was true that

~,iashingt::m ~

f8W

s policy rather than he..

Al though

negor,ia:-ions and no plenary ;;essions were

scheduled du.."":Lng these t·..10 days, Stettinius, the 3taunch adyocate
of the United Nationsr did miss a meeting of his own Corn:nission II
on the world organization.
c1~ntered arou."1d

His only official acti vi tics on Saturday

bis participation in an e·1ening radio broadcast;

on Sunday, he concentrated on solving the French ~ponsorship
problem.
On Saturday, the American delegation studied the Columbian
proposal for a non-aggression pact.

The goals of this resolution

included the consideration of any attempt against the -territorial
integrity, sovereignty, or poli.tical independence of a.~ American
state as an act of aggression against oneself.

Another provision

called for constiltation with each nation and agreement. on measures
deemed necessar'J to deal with any case oi' aggression or with any

state planning aggressive action.

A third clause reco:-:-"'1endad t.he

following measures be taken ag3.iz-1st ail aggressor:
'"a-'-;
diploma tic repres9n'"'"
..,_~r"""
~...,,

Gev~ra.:ice

r-3eall of

of consul::ir 2.nd diplorr.atic

:forces to

relations,

-5J-

!EU£"'"' mmeue1ts1&1aaua;;
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repe,
-1

.

af"fiZ-r>eS"'"On.
o.._...,.._

1

Gen°ral
. • ~

n
'
•
l
l~lllOl.C.K

re3. d

:1

' +
'
3W._e:nent
from
t:-ie joint

chiefs of staff approv:Lng the Colwnbian I=<J.Ct. ;-;ince i:, '.·iOuli cor..:::; Utute a regional agreement that c::>uld be built into the 1-iorld
security system.

2

He went on to point out tlJ..'lt the world organi-

zation nright or rrri..ght not succeed and if it did not, the solidarity
of the Americas ivas es sen t.ial to the de.f cnse of the United States

.3

After listening to the r.rili tarJ aspects of thi3 non-aggression

treaty, Pasvolsky reca.:·ked that its l'S-13. lions.hi. I> to
ization from econoirrl.c and political points of
compl.ica.ted..

vie~1

t,~1e

wor l:l organ-

\·1as more

Rockefoller suz,gested !:.bat Embick study tbis matter-

further and discuss it \-tlth the Secretary early

t~e

following wee!< ..

At this point the State Depart::nent. person..'1al decid.:!d to seek
Uruguayan support of the Columbian proposal

bec~1use

resolutions

from both these cou.1.tries were quite

~i!rri.lnr.

in reference to the security pacts

i1hether the United States

A lrny question 3.rose

could take immediate action in the event o.f Argentine aggression
against a neighbor.

Pasvols~.r noted

tr.at paragraph .five of the

Moscow Declaration made it nnndatory that the United States consult

with the signatory powers before taking r.ri.litarJ action.

But

General Ernbick interpreted this passage as relating to only the.
present w·dr.

Ne~-1

1.
York
2.

Box 285,

4 The issue was temporarily shelved after both Embick
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and Pasvolsky agreed that the Columbian security pact might require the ratification of the Senate .. 5
Turning to other war measures, the Americ:m diploma ts agreed

to support the creation of a permanent inter-American Defense Board.
This Nerican proposal sought to build the rrachinery for unified

milita!"J action against aggression from inside or outside the hernisphere.

A body composed of representa.tives from the various general

staffs would draft joint defcn.:::e plans.

Defor:.;; the AmericJ.n delo-

ga tion adjourned, Rocke.feller revlewed the activities of the

conference.
favorably.

He observed that the press had treated the sessions
He reported, however, that

cer~in

Argentines were

attempting to destroy the solidarity created by the Chapultepec
6
talks but. were ma.king no headway.
Only Commission I on the war effort nnd Cor..mission II on the
1.·mrld organization met on Sa tur::iay.

to set up its sub-committees.

The forr.:er convened only briefly

The latter assembled to receive the

progress report from Para-Perez's study group on Latin American
attitudes toward the United Nations.

The Foreign Minister of

Venezuela suggested that his group compile a minimum rather than
a ma..."Ci.mtL~ statement of views concerning the Dumbarton Oaks proposals
from each country and produce one large sumrr.ar'J.
Cuba supported this motion.

reflecting -various

5.

He indicated that a series of speeches
on the world organization would waste

·
~r te~ Fe'.:lruar.y 2!+. 1%.5, p .. 4:
Stettirri.us, Ca1 enaar l• 0 " .:.>r
,

Box. 285, StettiniUS

6 ..

:';.,.,; ns
0 ~.......,_ 0

Dr. Salaya of

-

Ibid,., P•

Pap~rs.
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the .commission's ti.......
T'1us
... e .. 7
•
,

i· ..n '-h,,.
·1'OSf:nce
i... •• "
'·

.,
~.ll

· · · ·
•.c-.
1v\.!\,i;J.n1.us,

•·
·cne

corr. rnission decided to allow a study group to clo r::oat ·.if :ne dr.::i.ft.ing

of the United Nations resolution.
!fr~li"!
.rHJ.. -

the Ame.,..;can
.....
•

d~lP.gation
"nci
""

th;:-- •·
· ·
·
1.,,.;o cornmLJ:.>l.ons
were in

session in Hexico City, the Secretary rested at Cuerr1avaca, awaiting
his 8:00 P.H. address on the NBC radio network.

'l'his ::;peech was

indicative of Stettinius' s desire to r0sto:re t.l1e presti3e of the
State Department.

Odginat.ing in

~·ia:::;rungton,

cast was the first in a series of six
of a

~'lorld

peace.

~'1eekJ..y

D. c., t.he broadprograms on the creation

8 Dean Acheson and Arr::hibald

~·'.3.cLli~h

were to

participate in the broadc.?.st from the United States capitol.

The

top American diplorrats Here attempting through thest! progracrs to
ckrify to the public their role in tcrrrri.r:.:rting the hostilities a:td
stabilizing the postwar world ..
The final text of Stettinius's r:lessage represented :Jeveral
attempts by Foreign Service personnel to obtain a consansus on the

rr..atter.

Technical Expert Wilder Foote composed the first draft.

This was cabled to 1i'iashington on Thursday evening with Stettinius's
request that Assistant SecretarJ MacLeish try his hand at preparing

some thi
• ng di I".feren~. 9 Hhen no new draft bad been received by .
.L

Fri.day afternoon, St e t .L.,i• ru· us ts s+""""ff

f':fOt

0

'-.·Jashin0aton on the pn'011~_

and l'i...ad the Nacleish text dictated to them.

E:J.yden naynor discussed

8.. Stett.inius, Cale:::dar ?Iotes 1 Fe:')r"WJ.r;;.' 2L 1 l<)l,.), n. 2 7
Box 285, Stettinius Papers ..

-

Ibid .. , P• 1.
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this· new draft with Pasvolsky 7 Gn~en l!::ick~o:-tl~ ( ~1:-.! d3loga tio;1h>

legal advisor) and Michael !.JcDerr..ott (the c.:-::!ss :s•)crot:lrJ).

'fh.Jy

all agreed that Nacleish' s work did not cont..J.i:t .:mough subs t.ance
' t suos
, ta nee i•t..i~d
.
and wna
uJ..
con ta'in was inacc•.i.ra
te. 10

inappropriate with its very l i terarJ style.

It was al30

11

Under the leadership of Pasvolsky, this :Jmall group of ad-

visors wrote their own version of the speech.

They presented it

to the Secretary prior to his departure for Cuer:IBvaca.

He read

it aloud to those who happened to be in the hotel room (I?aynor,
Foote, Ma.jar T-Json, and Ilobert L.ynch).

Th~y all felt tbat this

new draft was an improveraent over the r·IacLeish text, but. one or
two comments indicated tta t it dragged.

12

Foote, ho.,.ever, liked

the speech from Washington and hoped it i·;ould be ut.ili:::.<:!d w:i. th the
inaccu...""3.cies corrected..

vol3ky

a..~d his

Stet,tiniu.s finally decided to r..ave fu3-

group revise

th~ir

draft that Friday evening,

telephone it to Washington, and deliver it to Cuerna va ca on
.
13
Sa turd.ay morm..ng.

Pasvolsky, F..a.ynor, and McDermott worked on the speech u.."ltil
1:00 A.M.

After completing their editorial project, P..a.ynor for-

warded the latest composition to Washington.

At 6:45 A.M., MacLeish

telephoned from the State Department highly excited, telling R:lynor
14
that the new version was "perfectly dreadful. 11
Trfi.ng to calm

10.

~·

11.

~-

12.

lJ.
11+.

-Ioid.
Ibid.

Ibid ..

-
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the Assistant Secretary, Ibynor expl.1:Lned tba t th:.:: :; pt!c')Ch
basically on the Dumbar t.on Oaks proposal:.3 and that l:e ·,re.ls oblig3. ted

to allow the world security <:!.dvi:.wrs to revise t.he
as

·t..h.~y
-

so

..--l.

a'c=!C:].·r-~ - •0--·

rrll~e
lH

m
,
•
E'!CGIUCa

l

present both drafts to Stettinius,

~
...
~cperv

~vit.h

~·;ashl!!gton

t 0 xt

... lly ;.igreed to
evanvlW.

an cxpl::l.nat:i.on of Maclcish's

views. 15
At breakfast P.aynor and i-lcDer:nott revie;..red the situation and
decided to go back to the

. ...
OI" lv

i·!acL:Ji.3~'1

Jdd.:-::!ss 1 ·.mr'.-:i.:1g to use as much

1.'
~l~.e
h inaccur3.cies.
.
.
16
as pOSSl. bl e, correcving

They cello.borated

i·li th Hackworth and Technical Expert Harry Frantz to produce a fourth

version of the Sa tu..-i-d.ay night speech.
sent to Cuernavaca around l:JO P.H.

17

This fir.al combined form was
After three clays of

~-1riting

and editing, the Secretary's Dum:)3.rton Caks t3lk was ready to be

given.
Unknown to Stettinius as he spoke over HOC radio, a breakdown

in broadcasting facilities permi tt~d his voice to be heard only
west of the Mississippi.

Archibald HacLeish, reacting quickly in

·washington, read the revised draft to the other half of the
United states.

The Se ere tary opened the program by noting that it

was appropriate to initiate a series of broadcasts on the building
"
M
•
0 c;ty
of the peace 1rom
l'lexic
... •

He observed th.at:

Delegates from the American Republics are
assembled in this beau~iful cl ~y o~· He;cico to
,... )'1,,. .... ,,"'n frate:r:-:al tics deve.Lopeu through r..any
St 8
....

J.""'C:) t..i:~·-

15.

~Ibiq~

16 ..

-

17.

Ibid ..

-
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decades and to ir:iprove the intcr--A:;:iedc3.n
system of relations. They are e:1.;;J.g~d in tha
serious business of considering l1ow t!<eir
friendship and wity of purpose r:<J.y ;Jest contribute to a world for peace, s~curity, r.tnd
a better way of life.18
Stettinius went on to stress the hardiness and determination

of the new world.

Ar.iericans were accustomed to unprecadented work

and would not listen to the counsels of despair.

They had tamed

a i::ri.ld land and:

fostered a spirit of neighborlindss, i·1hich :Ls
indispensable to a new society of r..a.nkind. '.Ie
P..av·e good r:~ason, therefore, ~car auoro.:ichln~ th·e
grea t~s t labor of human history (a· ~·1orld pe~ce
enforced by the United Nations) Hi th such high
hopes, with such unshakeable deterrnina lion. He
have not li2tened in the past and ·.-1e '.~ill not
listen in the future to voices of frustration
and defoa t 'ilhl ch tell us vie cJ.nnot rlo what •~e
perceive ue must do .. 19
As the Secreta:r;; reveal~d the will of the :fostern hemisphere to

build a new peace, he also reviewed the ef.forts of the "Big Three"
to create a world security organization.

He acknowledged the value

of the upcoming san Francisco Conference in building the machinerJ
for an international body.

To offset an.y resentment that lesser

powers might hold toward the "Big Three 11 for their planning the
United Nations by themselves, Stettinius played up the equality of
+·
na::.:i..ons.

He remarked that:

The sovereign equali t;r o.f nations large and
sir.all is a b.asic princi9le under}.:ring the (Dumbarton
Oaks) proposals. T~ose ~rop?~als n? t o~~y embrac~
_.. ·np so•r"'r"'i ""D eGJ.1al.J..tTr 01 na t..ions, out vne.'f also inv~ -

-- ~

o

....

"

st 0 tti:-iiu:1 1 }1'1.dio Spc~echr
Box 285, Stettinius ?aperz.
18.

F::!orWJ.Y;;l 2l+,
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te.n.d that the po:.,.er of all r:.a tit.::n3 .:>i:.:ill b~
used in the ~Bteres ~,3 of ~iorld !Jc.'1C~ 7 ~;C:!curi ty,

and freedom,.

While appeasing the smaller nat.i..ons, the

s~cretary

cont.inued to

skirt the issue o.f, votinz procedures in the Security Council.

He

hinted that these procedures recognized the b;o essential clement3
of u.."1.ity of action and equality of sovereignty.

Yet five days after

his arrival, the French sponsorship problem still prevented him
from revealing all the opera t.ions of the council.
Stettinius closed his address by restating the purpose of the
broadcast series..

He hoped the programs stir::ulated the Ameci.can

people to study, discuss, and reflect on the proposals to create

the United Nations.

All the facts wust be placed before the country

in accordance with the democratic rr:ethods of freedom of thought,
speech, and action..

The Secretary tied the people's right to knm1

to J:iis censorship resolution.

In his final staterr.ent, he declared

that:
Here in Me;dco City, we J:i.ave sought to support
that democratic oethod by offering a resolution ~-1hich
declares the right of people to have free access
to ini'orma tion. In this way, and only in this way,
will truth,_ the enemy of .tyranny, assert itself'
for the freedom and security of rrankind.21

stettini.us's radio speech indirectly referred to one of the
most persistent problems he encountered during his first ;ieek in
• Frenc h ;,p
"' onsorshio
Merico City, tne
• qu - stion
• ..
0

r..,tin
1:\.memcan
dele,,._;.;.
........
_

gates at the Chapu.ltepec tal..'L:s were a.rnd.ous to know the operations

·-·?o .

T ' . ct'
..::-~·

21 ..

T •. rl
~

.,

p ..

J ..
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~·ii thout

of the Secu....""'i.ty Council.

a F:rl!nch co:::m:i. t!.-.ent oa ::;ponsor-

ship, the Secretary could not reveal this :i..n.for-rntion..

He was

bound by a Yalta agreement not to divul 3e any c.lata relat:i.:ig to

t.l~e

council u...-1til sponsorship had been established nnd invitations
issued.

Just before delivering his address on NEC radio, StettLl'li.us
had reason to believe that the sponsorship problem was almost re-

solved.

That Saturday r::orning 7 Joseph Grew had telephoned Hayden

Raynor in :Mexico City.

The Acting Secretar<J relayed a telephone

conversation batween Assistant Secretar:r James Du..'1.i.'1 and the American
Ambassador to Paris, Jefferson Caffery..

Dunn :•as inl'ormed tr.at

France iwuld accept the invitation to o.tt.end ::ind al30 to sponsor

the San Francisco Conference..

Ho~·1ever,

de Gaulle rs GOVer:ncent

wished to rrake a reservation to be aLlo;..;ed to present. amendments
.,
t.i
. Sa .
.
22
to the Dumbarton Oaks proposa 1 s .f or consiaera ,on in
n Francisco.

Grew felt this was a strange request. because everJ countr-J had the
ri~ht
0

to submit amendments.

In the interest of good relations, he

and Dunn believed the United States shoUld accept the reservation,

but before doing so, notify the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and
China. 23

After bis conYersation with Grew, Raynor phoned Cuerna-

vaca to acquaint Stettinius ~Tith the most recent developments in
the sponsorship rr.atter.

ment responses.

22.
Box 285 7

23 ..

The Secretary apprond of the State Depart-

But '"'O
....., Pasvolsk;7, his top United l'fations adYisor.,

stettinius, Cal-endar Uor,es 7 F,~brtll:r-y 24.r 1945, p. 3,
St~t.t,i:r.i:.;s P.:i.p~;:s ..

-
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was .not comfortable with the reservat.ion..

..:10 f e lt, t!-:a L the psycho-

logical effect would be to open up the ~3.J.n F:-::i.nci.::>co Gon.f'3rence to

too rrany additional ~rnggestions and r:iake the .;;r~ation
organization more difficult.

or

the world

24

FEBRUARY 25, 1945
On Stmday, the twenty-fifth, hopes for French sponsor:Jh.ip

changed abruptly..

tr.at

1.~ritten

Arou.Iid noon, Dunn phoned Pas v-olsky to report

confirmtion fi..ad been received from Paris.

But the

situation was not the same as depicted in the earlier conver::>ation
with Caffery.

Apparently the French

~·anted

their arr.enct.-;:en ts pL1.ced

on the table at San Francisco on an equal basis . ..nth the Dumbarton.

Oaks proposals., 2 5 The "Big Three" had outlined the world security
organization gradually through a series of talks and Gtrategy
sessions.

Now de Ga1ille:s regir:ie felt it could si:aply create its

own conception of the United Nations.

Grew and Durm recomr.:ended

that the reservation not be accepted on tnese terms.

PasvolskiJ

for.varded this news to Cuernavaca and Stettinius approved of
.
26

Hashi:ngton•s suggestions.

The state

Department cabled the latest developments on French

sponsorship to Moscow, London, and Chungki:ig.

~·la.shington also

informed its allies about its refusal of the reservation.

Since

further negotiations with Paris would greatly delay the issuance

2 4.

Ea~·dan
P..ay:;:ior 7 •Frsnch
Sponsor::>hi.p
.:J
.••

26.

-

19.45, p .. 2, Box 285, steGt.lIU'.lS Papers ..

roid.
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of the

san

Francisco invitations~ (.he Secr~ta.::-;/ reluctantly G.ecid0d

')7

to send them out by Varch l.'-

;·iith the French problem still botharing hi:n,'.:itettiniU3 asked

Raynor late in the afternoon to see if he could devi::;e ::;ome formul:l
by which to reduce the consultation period with Paris.

The· chief

filr&ri.can delegate even suggested sending a personal note to de Gaulle.
The Technical Expert arranged a 6:30 P.N. meeting in !·1e:d.co City
2
id th Pasvolsky, HcDermott, and riotter to study the whole problem. 9

This strategy session produced no fo:r:nul.:i. for a quick solution
to the sponsorship dilerr..rra,

The Secretar; 1 s advisors, however, did

support his idea of a private cable to Pari3.
a note but never sent it.

Stettinius d..""ai'ted

The po t.anti:il correspondence ::; ta ted. that:

I p·~rso:nally ~;oUld deeply ~·rnlcom-3 the accepwncE;;
by the French of sponsorship since thi3, ~Y dear
"'d .
' . .
c• -o s.l.. . on or ·t.'ne reGenera. 1 1 i<-Ot.w.. oe a <3rumng .. e .. , n vra vl
a:::;sumot.ion by .France of her place as a great ~o·..;er
and of her disposition t.o act in full cooperation
with the other g::-ea t powers in carr;:Lng out the
.I..

n

high respansibili ties which repose in nations of
that rank and iniluence.30

Around midnight, Grew wired the -Secretary from ;·Iashington.

He

reViewed the state Department's responses to the day's events.3
As it stood, the San Francisco invitations would be issued on
P.arch 1.

Hopefully, tbe position would be explained fully and

··--..

27. stettinius, Calend3r rlotes, Feb.n.iar:f 25, 1945, p .. 1 7
Box 285, StettiIJ.ius Papers.

28,.
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syr:ipathetically by the Ar;;erican t;overnrr.ent.

!Ii th the po::;sibilit,y

of French sponsorsliip now almost completely destroyed, Stettinius
was confronted by a new problem -

from im:i.. ta ting Paris 1 ex.ample.

how to prevent other na !:.ions

1'hus, hi::> first ueekend in r-Iaxico

City ended on an unr.appy note.
These two days, the twenty-fourth and tha

t:~enty-fifth,

flected the Secretar-.r's ability as a caret.:iker diplorr.'.lt.
from the focal.. point. of

wr~iga

to coordi:r.ate American policy..

re-

~·O.thdra·11n

a.i.':r.'ai.r3, he bad per:ni t bd hi3 aides

Indeed he r.ad :r.ade the final deci-

sion on-m..cuiy issue;:;, but the ideas and suggestions for policy
responses bad not originated with him but with hi::; staff.

In

Mexico City, Rockefeller had directed the Ar.ierica:i delegation and
its support of the Columbian ni:m--rtggression r,act..
been instrumental in. drafting the radio o.ddre3s.

MacLeish had
Grew and Dun."1.

bad recommended the refusal of the French reservation.

P.aynor,

Pasvolsky, and McDermott .b.ad rrade vital cont!'ibutions to several
policy issues, from the NEC program to the· San Francisco invi tations.

Edward Stettinius, the capable manager of men, had employed

his advisors well.
FEBRlJARY 26, 1945

Upon his retu..""'Il from Cuernavaca on Hond.ay morning Februar.r 26 1

the French sponsorship pz-oblem still plagued the Secretary.

After

meeting his wife's plane at the i·!exico City airport, he went to

the Hotel Gene·1 e and telep?1on~d ,rar::es Dvr...--i at, the State Department.
They reviewed the controversy with the ?ro-:risional C-ovcrnr.:ent 5..n

Paris.

Dunn advised 3gainst s::~:,.-t::.ng a personal note to de Gaulle

-6.5-

and ·emphasized the seriousness of the sitU.3.tion..

Slc.ri:.t.iP-1.us Loo

ims fearful of the implications arising from French
sponsor.

o.~ri.~sion

as .'..\

He speculated about how r..any countries would be cli:3-

posed to fallow the Parisian r..odel.

The Assistant Sucre tarJ bell cved

that France .had taken the position of not :·ranting to support the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Consequently, he noted: "that rrakes our

decision clear-cut, that there is no possibility we can accept her

.... .

'

.

as a sponsor on ... r.w..s oasJ..3 • 11

J2

Before ecdi!"lg the conversation,

the chief American diplomt suggested tr.at a .final alternative might
e;dst..

They could ask Anthony Eden, the Bri tL;h ?oreign Secret.:1::-J,

to intervene and expedite the whole rr.atter.

This bst id.e..a was

' 1ved •33
t emporari.ly· sne

After his phone callp Stettinius ::;ent a cable to .Joseph Grew
outlining the procBdur~~s for r:akin,5 a .simultaneous cmnouncer:ient of

the San Francisco invitations..

At noon on r~rch 1, Grew was to

publicize that the United states government was transrnitti:ig invitations to the United Nations conference on behall" of the sponsoring
powers.

At the sarne time, the Secretar; would issue a ~ratement.

from Mexico City, commenting on the Security Council voting powers
agreed to at Yalta.

This interpretative remark from the Chapuitepec

talks was to be considered as just a news release from a diplomat

. .
34
on an official rm.ssion.

32. Statti::tl'..15, C:ilec.d.:1.c ~Tot,~s, F~'oruary 26 7 19l;.5, p. 4 1
Box 285, Stettinius .Paper;:; ..
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sponsorship problem.

J\ ri1essa.::e
~,

~eri.~.w

-

by

~"'""'1...;_c-....
~· 11 n ,,;:ica.::;:;;.:i
~ \.
d· or

"'··'-'

James Uir.ant from london described a r.:eeti11g bt.!b•een Sir Ale.:c C::idogG.n
and French officials.. In answer to the French ins.is tence on amendmen ts to the proposals, Cadogan had expbined that the text: as it
stood afforded an ample opportunity for submi. tting further recommendations durir..g the forthcoming conference. 35

Georges Bidault

of the Provisional Government stated, however, that a triple in'litation had been received in Paris.

The three sections included

a request l) to participate in the conference, 2) to join in the
sponsorship of the conference, and 3) to partake in prelir.ti.nary
consultations to establish a trusteeship !>ystem.

The first poln!",

was satisfactor/ to the French; but as for the ::;ecor.d, ilicbult.

remarked that the "Big Tnr.,;e" h::id i"orr::ulated the Dur:1barton Oaks
plan. wi. thout mentionLng or accepting Paris 1 desire for amendr.'.ents .3

6

Therefore,. the de Gaulle regime could not accept sponsorship of the

San Francisco Conference.
Between his conversation with Dunn and the arrival of the
Winant dispatch, Stettinius attended a 10:30 A.M. session of the

conference steering committee.

This meeting was highlighted by

talk of breaking off relations :dth Spain ..

Dr. Padilla was critical

of the pressure ex3rted by certain groups to pass a conference
"•
~
1
.:.ocnm
resolution isola 'w..ng
l' .1.a.nco 5 . . "o-'' ~ •
0

1945,
Telegro:Jr StettL"liU3 to ,Joseph Gre':Tr
28~. Stettinius ;).:ipers •
') Bo"""
-1
.....
/.
.
36. stettinius 1 Co.l~nd.:1.r Notes, Fe'orJ::i:-,y 26, 19li5, :p .. 5,
35..

n
• •

He stated tb~t the Me~...;co
........
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City Conference should not deal with r..at7.ers which do not involve

the continent..3 7

An Urllbruayan delegate o.rose o.nd

~!1nounced

his

support of a proposal walcoming the establishme!1.t of a democratic

system L"l Spain..

He

decla;-~d

that Spanish affairs were of interest

to the American republics because of their origins and Madrid's

proximity to the war zone. 38 A representative from Peru challenged
this argument.

He supported Padill:J.'s case against a Spanish reso-

lution and rer.arked tr.at the Cha.pultepec

tall(s

did not have the

right to dictate a nation's political philosoph,y.

The Uruguayan

delegate replied tr.at after the exp.;u'ience of this 1.,;ar, it would
not be possible to perr:Ii.t the existence of a Nazi or Fascist government anywhere.

For tris reason, he wanted a !3tatement issued

by the conference stressing the desirability of a dewncracy in
Spain.39

As the ;;;eetin.g progressedt diplomts from Honduras, Peru. 1

Panaw.a, and other Latin American stat.es voiced their support of
Padilla 1 s position.

Against this stiff opposition, the Uruguayan

representative requested his suggestion be withdrawn from consideration.

The Secretary did not reveal his position on the

Spanish resolution, as he abstained from the debate.

In the early afternoon, the Auerican steering committee as-

sembled at the P..efor:ra Hotel to brief Stettinius on the importance
of hemispheric solidarity and the Colurnbia."l non-aggression pact.

37,.

-Ibid.
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· • •
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General Embick, Dr. Pasvolslw, and Judge Hackworth

e:np!~.asized

the

necessity of inter-American cooperJ.tion from poll ti cal, cconorrd.c 1
. -'- o!.~ view
. .. 40
an d nu."lit.a ry poin..s

A discussion ensued as to how to

make the Columbian security proposal ir.unediately applicable w-lthout
be~ng

hampered by congressional debate and ratification.

ftdol! Berle,

the American Ambassador to Brazil, was asked by the Secretary to
aid Pasvolsky and Hackworth in resolving this matter.

Nelson

Rockefeller then reviewed the status of con.f erence resolutions.
He observed that seventy-four proposals r.ad already been submitted.
The United States itself was planniP.g to L"1troduce ten resolutions
on various topics from censorshi.p to economics.
announced that Assist..-int

Secreta~J

Clayton

Hockefeller also

:~ould

be ready to issue

the next day a stater;;ent of principles underlying inter-.!\merican

..
41
economic relaw.ons..

Ll.ke Stettiniusts first

plena~J

::>ession

address, I.atin American interest in this speech was mounting.
Long after the Farrell regime passed away and the Argentine prob-

lem was forgotten, and years after the debate aver voting
procedures in the Security Council was resolved or shelved, the

southern republics feared that their poverty would remain.

42

They

hoped t:b..at the upcoming Clayton message would reassure them of·
Washington's· economic cooperation and financial support.
Throughout the day 7 the conference committees resumed their

work after the weekend break.

The SecretarJ' s Coimnission II on

-

40. Ibid.
41. .Jb:ij_ .. , p .. 2+.-i ni.as* Ga.lendar'
.
42. S i.,.v...,......,_... _.. "
L. .'.:).\.
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the world organization however did not plan to r.ieet until Harch 1,
the day the San Francisco invitations were to be issued.

This

postponement of commission hearings gave Para-Perez's sub-committee
time to collect and summarize la tin American views on the Dumbarton
Oaks

proposals~ 43 The

delay also gave Stettinius the opportunity

to study developments within other study groups.

Harley Nottert

John Lockwoodt Joseph Jolmson,_ and Dudley Bonsal were among the
~any

Foreign Service personnel who provided the Secretary with

progress reports from other committees.

For example, the chief

.American delegate was informed by I.ock1•ood that Commission I

on the war effort was working on several resolutions.

Arr~ng

pro-

posals tba t had been drafted were the United States recoaunend.'-ltion

on eliminating the remaining sotirces of subv-ersi ve influence within
the hemisphere.

1Uso u.."lder consideration 1·1as a resolution to place

arnaments production directly under the control of each national

government.

In Commission III,discussion centered around Washington's

suggestions for strengthening the inter-American system.

Senor

Nieto del Rio of Chile felt that the American idea to hold annual
meetings of the foreign.ministers was too cwnbersomet expensive,
and urmecessary. 44 Other delegates like Garcia Salazar of Peru.

agreed with this.

Another recommendation to buttress the regional

arrangement, expanding the political functions of the Pan American

Governing Board, was also criticized.

These negative attitudes

James Reston, ".L-1tin American Needs Dominate Conferenczr 11
New Yo6: ~, Fab!'llary 25, 1945, P~
44.. Stettinius, Caler:d::i.r- Notes, Febru.;;:::-7 26, 1945 1 p. Jp
Box 285, Stettinius P:ipe:-:.;.
113

..
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though, dealt with only minor provi3ions of the Co;nmi.ssion III reso-

lutions.
Like the weekend activities, the t"Wenty-sixth found Stettinius

concentrat; ng much of his tima and energy on the French sponsorship
issue,,

Devoted to the United Nations cause, he wanted the .San Fran-

cisco Conference to successfully establish the machinery for preserving

world peace.

Within the Chapultepec sessions, the proceed.L"l.gs were

moving along smoothly..
hindered.

The A;na:ric.:m resolutions had not really been

The Secreta:rJ had a cordial relationship with the press ..

His first conference speech and radio broadcast had br:!en wellrecei ved.

But the Hexico City Conference

1-Jas

now at a critical

juncture.

Post•~ar

possible.

Latin Americans were anxious to hear of concrete technical

economic plar..ning had bean delayed as long as

aid and development programs from the United States.

Tne Stettinius

plenary session address had been partially reassuring, but now the

herrd.spheric delegates wanted to hear economic expert William Clayton• s
statement of specific projects.

CHAPT~R

V

ECONmuc ISSlJtt:S, DUMBARTON OAKS PRJFOSAIS ;.:rn

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESOLUTIONS

FEBRUARY 27, 1945
By the middle of the second week, proceedings at the Cb.apul-

tepec talks were in high-gear.

The drafting and refi..'1.ing of

resolutions filled the time span between the Clayton address and
the issuance of the San Francis co inn ta tions.

Like the other

delegates, Stettinius responded to the conference's fast pace by
adhering to a full schedule.

Pressure on him mounted as the day

to discuss the Security Cotmcil voting procedures approached..

New

issues joined the U>'U'esolved French sponsorship problem to increase
the Secretary's burden.
foreign policy..

He had to

~~ld

resolut.:Lons to fit

A~erican

Proposals like the herrd.spheric security pact r.ad

to be adjusted in order to r..ake it immediately applicable to the

United States.

He also had to coordinate the activities of the

American delegation, keep Hashington informed, and attend various
press conferences and plenary sessions.
Although stettinius directed most of his attention on the
twenty-seventh to events surrounding the econonti..c speech of WilJiam
Clayton, the recurring headache of French sponsorship demanded his
interest in the morning.

Du..ring an early telephone conversation

with James Dunn, the Secret..'lry decided to contact A..rithony Eden
about possible British intervention in the sponsorship affair.

When reached in London, Eden ~;as surp.1..:..sed to hear o.f the de Gaulle
· h<>ck be San l"rancisco invitations..
government• s refusa 1 to ~ ..... ·

·-71;_
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sympathized with Stettinius's delic:lt.e tas!{ of rcgubting the
curiosity of eighteen la tin Arilerican foreigr1

mini~ters.

.2den prom-

ised to take the matter up immediately o.nd do everyt.hlng in his
power to obtain a favorable decision.

1

To give London a chance to

negotiate with the French, Stettinius sent out a circular telegram

in the afternoon, ordering the chiefs of missions to delay releasing the invitations.

In the meantime,he received a cable from Grew

which suggested the rationala behind Paris• position..

The Act.i...""lg

Secretary agreed with a Neli York Times article that de GauJ.J.e could
not accept sponsorship because he felt that 1) amendments were
necessary to rr.ake the Dumbarton Oaks proposals compatible T:1i th a
Soviet-French alliance and 2) the prior approval of the Secu.."'ity
. .
2
Council for regional arrangements was an objectionable provision.

Replying to the Uashlngton dispatch, Stettinius ::;tated that:

".from

the standpoint of frankness and barrr.ony i t is most ir:rport.:mt to the
great cause toward which we are working for the invitations to be
issued on .LJ.arch l.';3

Although willing to let the British make one

last attempt to gain French sponsorship, the Secretary was determined
to publish the invitations with.in two days.
Preoccupied with plan.."'ling the San Fr3.ncisco talks, Stet tinius
·
d mosv
+
r.n.sse

~ th
.e

o~

dail:y delegation
briefing and the conference
_,

steering coamtl.ttee meeting.

Hockefeller as his chief alternate

1.. stettiniusr Calendar .Notes, ?e'o.rt::..-lry 27, l945r p. 4,
Box 285, Stetti!lius P.:lpcrJ ..
2 ..
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presided for him at both gatherings..

L-i an optiG1.istic r.anner,

Rockefeller told the United States diplo1r.at3 at the deforrra Hotel
that the work of the conference poi::ited to auspicious results for
the governments and peoples of the countries invol7ed.L'

He also

reminded the delegation tbat William Claytcn•s policy statement
would be delivered at ll:JO A.H. before a joint session of the economi.c commissions (IV and V).

Professor William Benton of the

University of Chicago suggested that the presence of a large press
corps be utilized to clarify any confusion derived from the Clayton

speech. Adolf

Berl~

and others proposed that American represent.a-

tives from business, labor, and agriculture be present at the two
scheduled press conferences (at, 1:00 P .. H. and 3:30 P• .M.) to properly
interpret the key economic message.

Thus, Stett.inius's afternoon

raeetings with reporters would take on further value.

Turning to

the subject of resolutions, Rockefeller declared that they should
be confined to issues associated with inter-American action.

5 Hat-

ters of world concern should be subrrd.tted to the San Francisco
Conference.

Observors assigned to the five committees reported

that the drafting of resolutions was progressing for the most part
at a satisfactor"/ rate.

at an awkward stage.

Only in Commission III were deliberations

A strong Mexican proposal calling for the

creation of a roving political body within the regional system had
been introduced to this study group-

4.

John E..

1
d,
LoCieiiOO

The United States opposed this
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motion.

It wanted to strengthen the present Pan A:::icrican Union

rather than weaken i· t .••.,1· th
~ ·
, thi"'., over,..1..<..1pp.:i.ng

~ ··
6
rec o:nmenua1:.-:i.on..

,·\.~~

the delegation meeting ended, it was decided to contim.i.e the prac-

tice of daily briefings for consultative purposes.7
From this gathering of the American diplomats Rockefeller pro-

ceeded to the lO:JO A.M. conference steering committee session at
Chapultepec Castle.

stetti..."lius was engaged at that moment in a

telephone conversation with Anthony Eden over the French sponsorship issue and could not attend.

debated at this meeting.

Two unusual recommendations were

The first one was a Cuban proposal for

the conference to recognize the traditional boundaries of Polnnd.
An Uruguayan delegate contested this suggestion on the grounds that

the subject matter was of no concern to this

hemisphere~

Others

agreed that the Polish resolution was outside the scope of the
conference.

Thus, it

i-ias

id thdrawn from con.sidera tion.

The dip-

lonats then discussed the Chilean proposal to invite Canada to

became part of the Pan American Union.

Led by P..ockefeller, the

representatives from Honduras, UrtlocruaY and other cotmtries also
questioned the propriety of this recommendation.

The Assistant

Secretary declared that such an invitation would be an embarrassment to Canada, the Urited States, cu"l.d Great Britain because of
the Pan American Union's regulations excluding nations which form

6. Lodowod, Delegation r~eeting H.eportr Febt"J.3.ry27~ 1945,
P• 2, Box 285, stettinius Papers ..
7•

Calendar Motes, Feonmr:r 27t l9L~5r !-h 2r

c:-1-etti"tiius
t.J....

u

---

:
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part of a kingdom.

8

The Chilean delegate argued that his propos.:i.l

was derived from the belief that the Canadian goverrn:!ent would \'lelcome an invit::ltion to membership.

He indicated willingness however

to submit the resolution to whatever modifications might nake it
acceptable. 9

As the conference steering committee ended its morning session,
Stettinius completed his exchanges with London.

With the sponsor-

ship problem now temporarily in the hands of A..11thony Eden, the
SecretariJ was able to attend the joint meeting of the economic com-

missions, where around noon Clayton began his policy address.

He

noted tr.at over the past four and one-half years the United States
had purchased five billion dollars worth of goods from the American
republics.

"These transactions had been abnorr:ial in size and char-

acterj they had been entered into with the purpose of defeating a

powerful and ruthless enemy, intent upon the destruction of our
.
liberty
and yours."10

The Assistant Secretary observed that Iatin

America's first concern now dealt with the sudden termination of
procurement contracts and the resulting shock to their postwar
markets.

He assured the delegates tr.at American policy would seek

an orderly, gradual withdrawal from wartime commodity demands.

we will continue as in the past to give appropriate
notice of the curtailoent or termination of pro-·
curement contracts. We will confer freely with

-..

John E. 1ockr.·1ood, Conference Steering Co::-ni ttee l?.eport 1
February 27, 1945, p .. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.
8.

9. stettinius, Calendar Notes, Feb!'u.'.lry 27 t 19.4-5, p .. 3,
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you ;n reference to such reductions and the
necessary adjustments which they will involve.
We will consider and cooperate with you in
measures designed to effect these adjustments
with the least possible shock to your
.
econorm.es
• • . • • ll
Clayton felt that the southern republics' second w~jor in-

terest was related to the dollar balances they had accumulated in
the United States during the present hostilities.

He warned them

against draining off these balances at the first opportunity through
the purchase of luxury goods abroad.

clared that it

~ds

The Assistant Secretary de-

in the best interest of the hemisphere that a

substantial portion of these dollars be utilized for the sound
development of latin American industrial, agricultural, and mineral
resources. 12

Consequently, the inter-American standard of living
1
would be raised and continental production increased. 3
vfnen Clayton got down to the prospects of Washington• s supplying its southern neighbors with the needed goods to stimulate
their economies, he i-ra.s not too optimistic.

With reference to

the availability in the United States of tools, wach.inery, and

equipment which were required to implement their postwar policy of
economtc modernization, he told the diplomats that this was a difficult problem.11+ The Assistant Secretary defe.~ded his nation• s

Wa.rtime record on this score by pointing out that even United states

. , p ..

5..

ll.

~

12.

Ibid., P• 9.
·

13. Ibid ..
14. David Green, The Cont::i.inment of latin Af.1.e:.:-ica (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1971), p .. l?J ..
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industries had managed without vital replacements.

During the

transition period, the hemisphere would be hard-pressed to obtain
capital goods, but i·lashington would endeavor to satisfy this cru-

cial need.15
Attempting to remove any pessimistic feelings, Clayton revealed

that Congress bad increased the capital accounts of the ExportImport Bank in order to make larger loans for latin American
.

d evel opmen t

'

prOJec~s.

16

He also endeavored to allay fears that

Europe would receive the buLl{ of Washington• s foreign aid and thus
hinder the economic adva.."'lces of Central and South America.

He

pointed out that a rehabilitated war zone would provide the southern republics with a market for their goods.

17

The Assistant Secretar'J summed up his views by stating that the
United States was defi..'1.itel;f committed to a postwar policy whl.ch
sought a substantial expansion in the world economy.

18

It recog-

nized the interdeoendence
of nations in matters of economics and
...
proclaimed that labor standards and social conditions could be
improved only through the removal of trade barriers and the adher1119
. Cna
' 'rter of th e ""1encas.
'~ .
ence to an "Economc

This American

statement of principle would seek such objectives as equality of

15.

-

Ibid., n. 174•

.
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access to raw r:aterials, elim:i..na tion of the excesses of econo:nic
.
20
nationalism, and promotion of private enterprise.

Stettinius, sitting in the audience, felt that the economic
address made an excellent impression.

He noted that while the .first.

reactions of I.a.tin American representatives indicated disappointment that Clayton had not made more substantial commitments, a more
considered vlew crystallized and the moderation and balance of his

statement were worth far more than rhetorical bombast ...

21

It soon

became clear to less biased observers that the United States approach

at the Me::<:ico Gi.ty Conference was to stress advice rather than assista..~ce

and recommendations rather than commitments.

Some of the

advice and some of the recommendations were intended to r.iollify
I.a.tin American resentment over past problems by implying future Amer.
ican
comau.•t men t s. 22 The only concrete program outlined by Clayton

had dealt with the Export-Import Bank.

The Assistant Secretary bad

really given little comfort to the delegates by his general assurances

of United States cooperation in the transition period.

Unfortunately,

stettinius did not perceive completely the superficiality of the
Clayton address.

Without clarifying such pronouncements as the

desire to remove,trade barriers, the delegates could interpret certain passages w:i th the wrong connotation..

20.

John

tifecham,

They could depict a

The United States and Inter-American Se-

curity (Austin, Texas: University oi' Texas Press, 1967), p .. 266.,
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dic_hotorcy between the economically "colonial" Latin America and
the economically mature United States, in which the older, more

efficient industries of the North took advantage of the;, South's
2
newly-developed resources. 3
After listening to Clayton's policy statement, Stettinius spent.
much of the afternoon reviewing it with journalists.
press conferences.

He held two

At the 1:00 P.M. briefing, American represen-

tatives of labor and industry expressed their endorsement .of the
message.

Because of a luncheon date, the Secretar"J cut this session

short, but asked reporters to reconvene at J:JO P.H. at the Edificio

Imperial.

This later gathering was highlighted by a discussion of

American assistance during the postwar adjustment period, progress
towards strengthening the inter-A1.1erican system, and measures to
.

.

insula~e

. h ere agains
. t
t h e herru.sp

1'

•

•

.t:>•

1~"G..s in~i

1tra t•ion.2 4

Stetti.'11.ius opened the second press conference with the observation that a spirit of fine and excellent cooperation permeated
the Chapultepec :tall<:s.

This friendly environment he noted, had been

aided by Glayton•s statement of postwar assistance.

This speech

represented a mature conclusion as to the practical methods of ad-

vancing the development of the American republics for the benefit
of everyone.

23..

25

Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs~ 1945, p .. _13,.

24.
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Following his comments on the econoilci.c address, the Secretary

stressed the importance of a strong regional arrangement to achieve
. ti on of Nazism
.
th e comp1 e t e e1iIIIl...."'13.
from the hemisphere. 26

Before fielding questions from the journalists, Stettinius

introduced Clayton.

In reference to economic solutions for.post-

war problems, the .Assistant Secretary stated that:
I don• t think that. I have anything much to add to
what I said this morning. A ver-J prominent gentle-

man from one other American reoublic said to me
just a few minutes ago: "That. '-ras a very nice
speech you made. Now the question is ta turn it
into .facts .. " I don't anticipate any difficulty in
that direction. We have tried to undP.rstate rather
than over promise • • • • I don't believe we will
have any difficulties in turning into facts and
deeds things we promise down here • • • • I have
been tremendously impressed by this conference. I
think it will turn out to be a very useful and constructi Ye one, and I am very optimistic regarding
relations between the United St.ates and the rest
of the hemisphere • • • • 27
At the conclusion of Clayton's optimistic remarks, the Sec-

retary proceeded to answer questions from the press.

Some reporters

touched on the delicate issues of Argentina and French sponsorship.
The chief American delegate refused to comment on the status of
28
the Farrell regime in relation to the Mexico City Conference.
He also withheld bis opinion on releasing inv:Lta tions to the San

Francisco conference.

Stettinius did reveal that his Commission II

was in the process of su.rr.marizing Iatin American views toward the

Dumbarton Oaks proposals ..

26.

27.
28.

29.

-
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The press conference ended in a unique fashion.

The Sacretary

had always sought to improve the public's ir.ipression of the State

Department.
Ame~can

To restore prestige to his agency, he felt that the

people should understand, and at times, participate in

the operations of the Department.

For this reason, he had brought

representatives from labor, industry, and agriculture to Me.xi.co City
to serve as advisors.

Stettinius now introduced these individuals

to the press and allowed them to issue statements.

Union leader

George Mea."'JY declared that: "this conference represents to AmeriC'.ln
labor an opportunity to give expression to some of its real ideals
and hopes.

Uow from a practical point of view we see the conference

as a step in the direction of a permanent peace. 1130

.Meany

also

stated that he was in complete agreement with the wording of the
Economic Charter of the Americas and the rest of Clayton's speech.
Eric Jolmston of the American Chamber of Commerce voiced his approval
of his delegation's econonri..c program and proclaimed that: "as one
of the greatest creditor nations of the world, the United States
was responsible in no small measure for the economic balance of the
world and particularly Latin America. 1131 Other non-diplomats who
spoke at this time included David McDonald of the CIO, James Patton
of the National Farmer's Union, and Alfred Goss from the Hational
Grange. 32

JO. ~·
P• 8.

Jl ..

Ibid .. ,

32.
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While Stettin.:i..us was holding his briefings with the press,
other American delegates were developing conference resolutions at
afternoon committee heari_ngs.

The deadline for all but the economic

proposals had been Monday, February 26.

W.:i.. th the last economic

recommendations .introduced on the twenty-seventh via the Clayton
address, the Chapultepec talks now had to act on a total of one hundred and fifty-five resolutions.
with the Americ:m delegation.

Of this number, eleven had originated

The United States was concerned about

such topics as strengthening the inter-American system, free access
to information, cooperation in health and sanitation, surrender of
ri-a.r criminals, and the Economic Charter of the Americas .. 33
Commission I met as Clayton was giving his policy statement
and after a full discussion approved two resolutions entitled "The
Establishment of a Perma.Jient 11ilitar'J Organization" and "The Control
of Armaments."3 4 Stettini.us•s world organization group continued
to postpone :i.. ts hearings because the swnII'ariza tion of Dumbarton Oaks
views had yet to be completed.
The most interesting developments occurred t-rl thin Commission III.

This body supposed:I;r assembled to observe the
independence day.

Domini~ Republic's

After the appropriate speeches, Luis Anderson

of Costa Rica suddenly brought up the subject of Columbia's proposal for a mutual guarantee of territorial sovereignty.

Because

33. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grewt F.ebruar<J 2'!, 1945,
P• 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers.
J4.. John E .. I.oc~<;~"OOdr Cornmi.ssion
P• 3 , Box 285r stattinius Papers.
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o~

the ir.iportance of this resolution, he

~·.anted

it 1.1.bt!led

11

Decl.:.lration

of Chapultepec" and approved by acclamation of the corr.mittee.35
This created an embarrassing situation for the American .r:iembers of
the group, as the resolution contained certain provisions iihich they
were not prepared to accept.

Among the objectionable clauses was

the obligation to intervene militarily to prevent aggression in cases
where a majority of the

A~~rican

republics voted for such a measure.3

Sen.a.tor Warren Austin opposed Anderson's motion for the United States
by pointing out that in the absence of an English te..""Ct, more tir.ie
lJas

needed to study the recommendation.

He also mentioned the de-

sirability of awaiting Senator Tom Connally's arrival the next day.
Commission III agreed to delay its decision on the question of accla!T'ation u.."1.til ll:OO A.H. the next day.37
Stetti...-.Uus•s people on the inter-America..'1 study group met twice
on the twenty-seventh after the corrmi.ssion hearing to plot strategy ..
In the early afternoon, Austin told his colleagues that the Anderson

motion had come as a 11 bo~bshell"

to

hir.i.

38

He pointed out that the

proposed non-aggression pact required congressional approval, which
could not be obtained before the next committee session.

Dr. Pas-

volsky suggested asking P..oosevelt to utilize his special presidential
war powers to make the 11Declaration of Chapultepec" ir..mediately

19~5,

35..
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applicable to the United States.39 Once hostilities were concluded,
there would be plent.y of time for Cofioaress to draft a perma.."1e.11t
treaty.

After arriving at this solution, the rr.eeting ended.

In the early evening, Rockefeller, Austin, ar.d

Technical Expert

Dudley Bonsal met \dth the sub-committee of Commi.ssion III.· Hi th
the security pact question hopefully resolved, they turned to another
troublesome issue.

Me..uco had introduced a resolution to substi-

tute the Governing Board of the Pan American Union with an ambulatory
council consisting o:f ad hoc representatives meetL"'lg every si:<: rr.onths
in a different capl. tal.

Rockefeller urged them to move forward and

not backwards as the case would be if the present set-up were
scrapped. 40

A compromise was reached after some r:rinor revisions

were made in the membership o.f the Gover:ling Board.

The delegates

agreed to rotate the office of chairman and hava the board composed
of diploll'ats other than the inter-American Ambassadors to Washington.
Mexico found these 1:1easures satisfactorJ and withdrew her resolution.

stettinius later noted that:

"there was a tendency to propose the

creation of a variety of new agencies rather than to consolidate or

build upon the exist.ing·bodies."

41

February 27 ended i-ri. th many matters still in flux.

Depending

-upon Eden's efforts, French sponsorship might still be achieved.,

-

Ibid .. , P• 4.

-
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The full effect of the Clayton address had yet to be gauged.

Now

that the American economic policy statement had been issued,
Commissions IV and V could finally take on a full load of work.
Stettinius•s world organization group had yet to fL"lish its task

of sw..marization. The "Declaration of Chapultepec" also had to be
completed.

Thus, the Secretary and his delegation still faced a

heavy schedule of conference activities.

FEBRUARY 28, 1945
Wednesday, Februar.r 28 marked a full week of He::ci..co City sessions.

Within this time span Edward Stettinius successfully filled

the role of manager of men.

He and his staff had manipulated the

conference age..'1da in accordance with the goals of American forei&'ll
policy.

The Clayton address had partially reassured the latL'1

Americans of postwar United states cooperation and yet left the
door open for American aid in the reconstruction of Europe.

The

hemispheric security pact was in the process of becoming conditionally
applicable to the United States.

And the Pan American Union was

being strengthened rather than tom apart.

The

only dif;t;iculty the

'secretary had encountered was the matter of French sponsorship.

He

spent much of the twenty-eighth negotiating over the San Francisco
invitations <L"ld analyzing press reaction to the conference.

He also

welcomed the initial appearance of Senator Tom Connally, Cbairr;)an of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at Chapultepec.

And finally,

stettinius witnessed the first dissension withL"l Cor."..-:U.ssion II
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

OV·3r
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WashL"1gton 1 s chief spokesrran began the d.ay by presiding over
the 9:00 A.H. delegation rr.eeting.

He received the usual comrai..ssion

briefings and reviewed the previous day's actb'ities.

Senator Austin

noted in his report that each nation associated with the hemispheric

non-aggression treaty was bound by constitutional limitations~ He
remarked that the United States as well as the other republics would
endeavor to overcome legal obstacles to join the pact.

'By invoking

such measures as the president.ial war powers he and Pasvolsky were
maki..ng the Columbian proposal applicable to the United States for
the duration o.r the conflict with the A.::cis powe:r-s.

Irockefeller com-

mented that the "Declaration of Chapultepec" reflected a fear of

aggression by neighboring countries from Argentina, Peru, the
43 F•o llo Wll1
· ·
. g a 11 -'-h
Dorm.mean
Republi Cr a....-1d Hai. t•i .
"' ese rerrar.k s,
Ambassador George Messersmith i;arned the delegation against resolutions designed to form regional blocs as these were usually authored
by those not friendly to

,f

1

•

~~as.tung

t

on.

41+

Throughout the morning, Stettinius examined studies of press
and public reaction toward the Chapultepec talks.

He also scheduled

short intetJiews with correspondents Heston and Lara of the
New York Times and Elliston of the Washington Post.

On the home

front, American interest in Ia.tin America was greater than at a.'1.y
time si..."lce July, 1944•

Commentators tended to vi~w the conference
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as.a "dress rehearsal" for San Fr:mcisco

n~d

success in Mexico City trould strengthen the
the upcorrd.ng United Nations r.ieeting .. 45

pointed out trat a

An:eric~.m

r;osition at

'.i'he Argentine question and

economic problems received most of the emphasis in various periodi-

cals.

In reference to the controversy with Buenos Aires, the

Associated Press, Christian Science Monitor, Business ;-reek,
Walter lipprnann, and Charles Pergler were among those skeptical of
any concili.atory moves by that nation.

46

Former diplomat Sumner Welles

was among those in the minority, who favored recognition of the

Farrell-Peron regime. 47
The other focal point of interest, the Economic Charter, received

a mixed reception.

The Baltimore Sun and Gabriel Heatter enthusias-

tically praised it, while the Hew York <Tournal of Commerce and
P.aymond Swing criticized it because of an absence of more concrete
suggestions for the irnplementa tion of freer trade within the hemisphere. 48

1A.any leading newspapers including the Uashi.Igton Post,

the P:hiladelphia Ino,!;!irer, and the Nation agreed with William Clayton 1 s

statement that the United States would help soften the shock of
economic dislocation within the hemisphere during the postwar period.

on

other subjects such as the inclusion of representatives from·

Congress, labor, and business within the United States delegation 7

45"' survey of American Press Reaction, .?ebruar.1 28, 1945,
p 1, Box 285, Stetti..."lius Papers.
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tl1:e press voiced its approvai .. 49 Stettinius ::iust have been natisfied when he read these studies.

T'ne American people y1ere closely

following his actions and were .for the most part supporting his

hard line toward Argentina and his promises of economic assistance
to lat.in America.
In the early afternoon, the latest chapter in the French sponsorship story began with a phone call from Joseph Grew in Hashi.ngton.

The Secretary discussed idth his second--in-comma."ld the absolute
necessity of rnaintai..'1.i.ng friendly relations with Latin America in
50
light of the delicate situation with France.
After a few other
remarks to Grew, he got James Dunn on the phone for a strategy session.

He told DunJ1 that if France should ir.ake a final decision not

to 5ponsor the San Francisco· conference, he
to him imn1ediately.,

wan~ed

the news relayed

Thus, a special raeeting of the latin American

Foreign Ministers could be convened to interpret the situation
properly before false rumors threatened hemispheric solidarity.

To

stettinius's amazement, the Assistant SecretarJ revealed that British
diplomat Sir Alex Cadogan had successfu.lJ;r persuaded the French to

accept sponsors hiP•

51 The acceptance, however, was conditional,

.

based unon
. the ulacing of Paris amendments on the same footing as
the Dumbarton Oa.1<.s proposals.

52

49.. stettL"lius 1 Calendar Notes, February 28, 1945: p. 7,
Box 285, Stettinius Papers~

-

50 .. Ibid., P• 2.
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The Secretary phoned Pad.ilL:l. to inform him that. the de Gaulle
government had "fallen into line 11 and would back the

Um ted nations

He remarked to the Mexican Foreign Hinister that there

conference.

would be no trouble and that:
We can all go hand-in-hand, but I can• t :promise to
make the announcements tomorrow (March 1), because
we have to i'iOrk out the form of the invitations
both in London and Moscow. However, I feel sure
everytbir.g will be ready by Friday or_ Saturday

(March 2 or 3) at the latest • • • • ::>3
Relieved to hear of French cooperation, Stettinius was in a
happy mood until he received a second call from

~Jashington"

Presi-

dential advisor Jonathan Danials notified him at 4:00 P.M .. that
Hoosevelt i..ianted to annotmce the Secu.""i ty Council voting
in an add:ess to Congress the ne.."'<t day.

gate's credibility in

Ne:dc~

procedur~s

'l'he chief American delt..._

City would be destroyed if thi3

occur~ed,.

All along, he had promised the Latin American Foreign Hinisters that

they would be informed of these voting procedures the first moment
.
.
·+ ~·
. d e publi c. 54 The Secretar<J
the San Francisco
invit.a11ions
were ma
depicted this touchy situation to Daniels and added that consulta-

tions with London and Moscow were not completed yet.

In concludi..~

the conversation, he told the White House aide that he preferred to

be guided by Grew and Dunn in the final decision on the congressional
55
address, for they were closer to the situation.
In the early evening, Stetti..."'lius again talked to DU.?),,,.'1 at the
•
1.,
"
d l .
.
Describing how Dame.Ls
.:act p.:-essure u!:l, na
~

State Department.

revealed. that the ultir..ate ans;1er would come from him a;:d Grew ..

.. ,

53.

~

54 ..

-Ibid.. ,
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~

~

~
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nu.zm noted

that the United States was obligated not to di.'.3cuss the

voting procedures imtil the invitations itere issucd,.5b
issua..~ce

had not occurred yet,

P~osevelt

~-iince

the

could not outJ.i.ne the

functions of the Security Cou.."lcil to Congress without breaking an

international agreement.

Therefore, the Assistant Secretary prom-

ised his boss that he would oppose any premature announcement of
the procedures, including Roosevelt's speech. 57

Por the moment,

it appeared the i."1Vi ta tions could be released without embarrassment,.

i·lhile Stettinius was attempting to keep on top of the sponsorship controversy, hi.s world organization study group i·.as voicing

opposition toward the Dmnbarton Oaks proposals.

Corrmi::>sion II

Secretary Para-Perez had assembled his sub-committee at ll:CO A.H.
to examine the slowly accumulated commentaries on the United Nations
At this gatheri.'1g, Hr., Gutierrez o.f Cuba acknowledged his

plan.

responsibility for a resolution condemning the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

After the meeting, he told Technical Expert John Cabot

that the proposals were contrary to inter-American juridical concepts,
-g
failed to refer to international law, and lacked a preamble • .?

For these reasons, the Cuban senate would never accept the pro-

visions.
"By

the time the sub-committee reconvened at 4:30 P.H .. ,

Gutiarrez had radically changed his thinki...'1.g
. on the United ~Ia tions,.

James Du:-:n - Stetti.>tlust T·-:!lephone Co!1.vers·3. t.icn,
.
. '.. .
1, ·Box 28.5 1 Stec,r.i. ruus t"apers.
,......._

57.

~ ..
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In. a contradictor-J rr.a..'1.!1.er, he was still cri tic3l of certain
"poorly chosen principles" i'ihich allowed for a power g.:i.p between
the General Assembly and the Security Council

.:i.~

gave the whole

organization a totalitarian character.5 9 Yet, he also stated that

the Dumbarton Oaks program was a good basis for creating an· inter60
national peace-keeping body.
At this second meeting, delegate
Cordova of Mexico also introduced a resolution, which in effect
recommended to the San Francisco Conference the common views of
Iatin America regarding the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Gutierrez

and other comrrri.ttee members supported this resolution as a means

to communicate their disapproval of certain provisions.
labeled it a preamble for the presentation of ideas,

Cordova

~..;hich

would

protect the liberty of action of all the Axerican republics.

61

Stetti."li.us's representative at this session, Dr. Pasvolsky, re!l'.arked
tP.at the delegates should study the resolution further and make no

final decision on it until after the submission of Para-Perez's
report.62

It appeared that the American representative was advo-

cating postponement in order to give his delegation enough time to

study this new development.

Thus, the concept of a United Nations

was fast becomi."lg a tremendous thorn in the side of the Secretary
and the state Department.

Already beset by the sponsorship problem,

stettinius now faced dissension within his o:.in commission.

59 ..
60.

61.
62.

-Ibid ..

Ibid~, P~

Ibid .. ,

-

-

Ibid ..
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somehow had to disassociate his people from any proposal cri tici::i.ng
a program they had helped create.

The

.t·~e;dc:in

recommendation could

only work to alienate the United States from the other co-author5
of the Dumbarton Oaks provisions, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.
Fortunately, the other commissions were not encountering the
difficulties experienced by the world organization grouo.

The war

effort corrmi.ttee was studying ways to eliminate Fascist subversion
within the hemisphere..

Comnri::;sion III on the

i

nter-Ar.:orican system

v.ia.s revising the Pan American Governi..71g Board and the non-aggression

pact in line

~dth

Hasbington's policies.,

It also created an Inter-

American Economic and Social Council to help solve transitional

problems.

The economic bodies were also busy incorporating Cl.:iyton•s

principles in.to their resolutions.

They were in the process of

drafting a proposal to lo:"fer trade barriers i;<l.th few exceptions ...

Outside of the verbal opposition in Commission II, activities
were proceeding without incident.

At 5:30: stettinius went to

Buena Vista rail.road station to welcome Senator Tom Connally.
Texas Democrat was an expert in Latin American relations.

The

The

secretary hoped his timezy arrival would strengthen the American
delegation in its efforts to overcome criticisr.i.s aimed at the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Now that the French sponsorship issue

was temporarily settled, these criticisrr.s were the only key issue.

-93-

MARCH 1, 1945

Since the conference was not encountering any r.ajor difficulties, the SecretarJ n:ay have assumed tbat his presence in the
capital was not absolutely necess:u-.1.

His papers do not suggest

any other reason for his withdrawal to Cuernavaca for a lum:heon
date on March 1. After attending a morning session of the United

states steering committee, he departed at 12:30 P.H. for a reception at the Cuernavaca residence of Sanor

Economics ?1inister.

Ser~ano,

the Hex.i.can

iii.th this exit, Rockefeller, P:lsvol310J, and

other top aides once again directed American foreign policy in
Mexico City.

They coordinated Washington•s interests in the com-

mission hearings and participated in the revision of certain resolutions.

The American delegation began the day with a 9:00 A.M. briefing on the activities of the world organization cormi.i.ttee.

Pasvol8ky"

reported that the compilation of vie~-s on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was almost completed.

So far, only Haiti had expressed full

agreement with the provisions.
Despite Cuban criticisms, it appeared that all the republics
were willing to use the-Dumbarton Oaks program as a basis for the

creation of an international body.

63

After these introductorJ re-

marks, Pasvolsky outlined three complex issues within Corrmission II,
''--.

which threate."'1.ed Washington's postwar objectives.

The first matter

01"
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po_wers mianimously wanted to attaL'1 uni V:!rsJ.li t:l 0f r.:emoership aml

changes in

pu..~ses

and prL""'lciples in order to include references

to international law and respect for treaties.

They al.so

~ought

greater power for the. General Assemb},y and guaranteed L:iti..'1 Americ.:.n
representation on the Security Coun.cil.

The southern republics de-

sired, too, greater scope for the international court, the right to
settle intei-American disputes through the regional system, and

the establishment of a committee for cultural cooperation.

64

Since

these modifications were contrary to the "Big Three" conception

of an international body, the United States had to separate itself
from the Mexican resolution.

The State Department.. could not ap-

preach the San Fran.cisco Con.f erence condemn.ing its own beliefs in

a United Nations •
.Another problem tied to Commission II dealt -:.dth the American

proposal supporting the Dumbarton Oaks program.

Accordi.."'.lg to a

secret agreement, He.."Ci.co was supposed to introduce this recommendation without reveal.i.--ig American authorship.

At the time of

submission (February 28), a Mexican delegate announced the move

"on the behalf of the United states." Since this action violated

the prior arrangement, the proposal was withdrawn and not immediately
reintroduced due to differences within the Mexican delegation,

The

United states diplomats had to reach an u.11derstanding with their

Mexican cotmtar:-....arts before tbis subjact could be brought up again 0

\.,.,.
d
Ge
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right moment Padilla would come through Hitn :in acceptable reso-

lution. 65
A third comple.-< issue facL-ig the world

organi~a ticn

group was

regional integration.· Brazil had dr.'.l.fted a proposal recognizing

inter-American supremacy over the United Nations in hemispheric
rratters.

Unfortunately, this resolution had received widespread
American observers believed the

support from the I.a.tin delegates.

recorrn1er.dation would promote regionalistic ra the:- th:m international

attitudes

to~rd

world problems.

Since the United States favored

one u."ri.fied community of nations and not sever.:il loc.:J.l alliances,
this resolution would require some revision too.

Thusr the three

issues involvin.g IE.tin American alterations, the .Mexican subr:rl.ssion
controversy, and the Brazilian proposal revealed that !fnshington
.1
dif"
. ' hin ('~o;;:mission
. .
definitely had to reconci-e
... erences m:r.,,
II. 66

After Pasvolsky•s lengthy report, the Ar.ierican delegates dispersed to carrJ out their corr:mittee duties.

At 10:00 A.H., Stettinius

trade his first and onJy appearance of the day at a conference ftmc-

tion.

He attended the United States steering cor.mittee meetin.g and

received the Commission·II briefing he had missed an hour earlier.

His advisors, particularly Senators Austin and Connally, went over
•

.j.

in detail the proposed non-aggression ~c~.

I.atin American countries

had developed a great enthusiasm for this resolution because it
would check the aggre.ssi ~re tendencies of ArgentL.1.a and also syrr~

-

Ibid., P• 2.
Ibid,,, P9• 1-'2 ..

b?lize their solidarity ..

67 Consideri..'1g the proposal one of

keystones of the conference, they had entitled it ti1e

of Chapultepec.n

11

the

Decl3:.:-ation

The Secretary noted th..1t. .:is r:-.at.ters ::>toad, the

non-aggression pact Has divided into measures to be ci'fective during

the present hostilities and measures to be deternti.ned by a·treat.y
for the postwar period..

Turn:in.g to the French sponsorship issue,

he expressed confidence in the existing situation.

the de Gau.lle regime

i'l<lS

68

Now that

backing the San Franc.i.sco Conference, it

would not be long before the invitations ond voting procedures could
be publicized.

At 10:30 A.H., Stett.i.nius and his staf.f gathered

around a· radio to listen to Roosevelt's congressional speech.

Al-

though reception was poor, they heard no premature presidential
69
announcement on tLe operations of the Security Council ..
Grew nnd
Du.'1.11 had successfuJJ.y prevented the chief executive from breald.ng

the Yalta agreement on simultaneous publication.
With his departure for Cuernavaca, the Secretar.1•s role in the

Chapultepec talks diminished temporarily.

The major developments

of March 1 took place not in the plenary sessions of the foreign
ministers, but rather in the corrunittee meetL~gs of the lower-echelon
diplomats.
The war effort group was progressing with just a minimum of

problems.

It had already drafted and approved resolutions related

67.

~~t P•

6S..

Green Hackt1orth, Conf e.rence SteerL1g Gonm.i. t tee L·Ieeti.:1g,
,,.~. p .. 1 , Box 285t StettL'lius Pa~ers~
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to further mi.li tary coopera lion, the eli.rain.:i t.ion of subversive
activities, and the seizure of war c::-ir:rinals.
aimed to stamp out Fascist influence within the

These proposals nll
~'iestarn

hemisphere.

In fundamentals, Co:nmi.ssion I had made no departure from the United
70

States

point of view.

Ironically, the study group with all the ma.ior probleII'.s did not
even convene on the first.

po~tponed

Commission II supposedly

its

meeting because Chairnn...'l Stettinius was preoccupied by a luncheon
date at Cuernavaca with the Mexican Economics Hinister, Senor Serr-.J.no.
In reality, the Secret.ar; 1~s in no position to assemble his com-

mission and release the San Francisco invitations.

He still had to

await the conclusion of consultations w:Lth the Soviet Union.

l·iith

the world organization group in an U."1set.tled state, Stettinius' s
remarkable optimism surfaced.

He wired Grew that:

11

on the whole

confidence is felt that the work of this comrrci.ttee will result in

a satisfactory conclusion. 117l

Since no ;;weting was scheduled until

March 2, when Para-Perez was to issue his preli.minarJ report on
Dumbarton Oaks, Pasvolsky decided to call on Padilla.

The conference

president informed him that the Mexican submission controversy was
a "mistaken of some sort and that the desirable resolution would
emerge eventually.

Telzgram Ir Stettinius to Joseph Grewr r.!arch 1~ 1945 7
•
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Commission III com.11enced in tbe i7!0r:'ling of :-larch 1 a :µ::imgr.:iph
by paragraph examination of the revised United States resolution

on strengthening the inter-American system.

Comprorai..ses had been

ma.de along lines which trould preserve the Pan American Union and

Washington as the seat of the Union.

Among the principle changes

i-Jas the prohibition against herai.spheric ambassadors to

serving on the Union's Governing Board.

~'iashington

A number of Iati.....-1 American

republics had opposed this cban.ge due to the added expense of mrin-

taining an extra ambassador and the possibility of dissension among
equals.

Theorizing that too rr.any diplomats were under the thumb

of Washir1gton, He..uco had supported this prohibition. ?J

revision lirrrited the Director
ten years without re-election.

G~neral

of the

~nion

to a

Another
ter~

of

A third provision directed the

. Pan American Union in coD.aboration with the Lriter-Ameri.can Juridical
Comrai..ttee to compose a "Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man and State."

This charter was to be submitted at the l946

hemispheric conference in Bogota, Columbia..

Consideration of

Commission III's most important resolution, the regional nonaggression pact, was deferred until March 2, in order to give
senator Connally time to crJstallize his 'Views.

So far, the prO-

ceedings and compronri..ses of Commission III were regarded as

satisfactorJ to stettinius and the American delegation.74

73.

7eleg.ram I, Stettinius to Grew: 1-larch 1: 1945 r p .. J 1
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In the economic field, there had been a r,er.dency unt.:il

February 28 to mark time 1·;ai ting for Cl:l.yton' s address..

But

fin.ally, Cornr:rl.ssions IV and V bega.."1. to negotiate problems and dr.'.lft

resolutions.

Sub-cor.im:.i..ttee r.:eetings were char3.cterize<l on the one

hand by lat.in Ar...erican desires for a United States commitment to
continue purchases and on the other by the United States• tmwi.1linc,o-ness to go beyond Cilyton• s statement.

75 One case i'1here the

question of co;;-imitment a::::-ose revolved around coi'..fee prices.

The

southern republics sought postwar price increases for coffee prod-

ucts.

Evading the question: Americ.:m diplomats just referred to

the need for equitable prices for both the consumer and producer ..
In general, there seemed to be no disposition to force issues over

6 The In.tin Americans •~i.shed to stay in line

American opposition .. 7

irl.th Washington on the fre.;dom o.f

int~rnat.ional

trade prL'"'lciple.,

They still wanted to insert individual ::>pacialized reservations

to protect hemispheric bailnces of foreign e.:tchange <:h"1.d infant
industries. 77
In comparison with economic questions, there was greater

unanimity over social resolutions.

A proposal caJling for inter-

American cooperation on proble~~ of health and sanitation had
already been drafted.

American delegate Katherine Lenroot was

highly influential in corr..':li.ssion attempts to resolve soci~l problems.

In one case, when Mex:L:o introduced a resolution recor.;mending

75..
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.that minimum salaries be tied to price fluctuations, Hiss Len.root
led the opposition against this ur.just proposal.

She final.J.J'"

succeeded in revising the resolution to favor a constant rise in
real irages. 78
With Stettinius out-of-town and most of the American diploll'ats
in committee sessions, the French sponsor issue re-emerged.

In

the late afternoon, Hayden Raynor received a phcne call from
James Dunn in 1'/ashington.

Du.rm infor:ned hie that the Soviet Union

would not accept the changes in the San Francisco invitations demantled by the de C--auJJ.e regime.

Word had been relayed by the Eng) j sh

that Moscow refused to perr:ri..t any alterations in the Crirr.ean agreements.

He suggested to Raynor that Ambassador Caffery be notified

of the situation and instrticted to nresent an ultimatum to the French.
The Technical Expert agreed that Paris should decide by Friday,
March 2 either ta accept the original text or ckop out of sponsorship. 79

Throughout the evening, P.a~or attempted to contact Stettinius

at Cuernavaca.

He final.J.y reached him at 8:30 A.M. the following

The chief American delegate approved the Dunn proposal to
80
obtain a final answer from France.
Once again, the sponsorship

day.

issue presented a messy situation.

With the e."\:ception of the sponsorship question, acti vi tics
throughout the middle of the conference's second week J:i.ad come off

rv
79+

Box 285,
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smoothly.

Although uncomfortable scenes had developed ::iround ot.her

. issues, Stett.ini.us and his colleagues were optimistic
obstacles would soon disappear.

t.b~'lt

various

Incidents like the Cuban criticism

of the Dumbarton Oaks, program and the

t·~e=dcan

submission controversy

were minor in comparison to the sponsorship struggle.

ifoiJ.:e the

Secretary successfulJy shaped conference resolutions in keeping
·with Washington's foreign policy, he could make little headway id"t.h

the stubborn de Ga;uJJ.e regime.

CP.APTEH. VI

TF.DUBLESOME ISSUES AND CONFERENCE

PR.OC~F'DINGS

MARCH 2, 1945

As the second t-1eekend of the conference approached,
Edward Stettinius concentrated on eliminating issues which hampered
negotiations at Chapultepec.

The French sponsorship controversy

was his m:lin concern.. Paris !1:1d to commit itseLf before he could
release the San Francisco invitations.

Further delays in publi-

cation could only have a negative effect on United States - latin.
American relations.

The Secretar.r also had to iron out differences

within Commissions II and III.

He had to overcome hemispheric

opposition to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, particularly the
principle of regional integration.
His schedule from Barch 2 to Harch 4

r~flected

to work behind the scene in resolving matters.

his preference

Over this time

span, Stettinius did not participate in the more rigid, structured
meetings of the conference steering committee and the American
delegation.

He felt more comfortable discussing policy issues

within the informal settL"lg of a luncheon or reception.
Throughout the morning of the second, the Secretary was once
more wrapped up in the sponsorship affair.

B.ayden Raynor called

cuernavaca at 8:30 A.H. to inform him of Hoscow' s rejection of the

French reservations.
Expert .his approval
1..

Shocked by the news, he gave the Technical
+

vO

•
pres en..,t l")3.rJ.S

stettiniusr Co.J.er:d..3.r
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When Ray:ior contacted Washington at ll:CO to relay Stettinius•s

instructions, he learned of further devalopmcnt.s in the controversy.
The State Department had

r~cai. ved

word from the British of Paris c

refusal to accept the· Soviet decision as final.

The .French had

ordered their ambassador in Moscow to raise the issue there;.
James Dunn told Raynor tha.t London had asked for a twenty-four hour

postponement of all American diplomatic responses in order to give
?

differ~nces,.-

the French one last chance to reconcile

This matter was referred to Stettinius on his return at noon
to Mexico City.

He discussed the British request with

Messersrrd.th~

Rockefellar, Pasvolsk;r and Technical Expert Avra Harren.

They all

agreed that a postponement would involve consider3ble risk, but
the only alternative

astrous.

'il<lS

French

~rithdr.:iwal

and that would be dis-

The chief American delegate ;md his aides arranged a

forty-eight hour delay but made a firm

cornmitm~nt

to announce the

invitations no later than 10:00 .Monday morning, March 5.

T'ne

Secretary felt this schedule must be final and unalterable.

3 He

L"lstructed Raynor to have Dunn notify both the French and British

of the postponement devised with great difficulty as a courtesy to
Secretary Eden.

Stettinius also tried to contact Padilla about-

the situation and seek his advice.

Unfortunately, he could not

reach the Mexican Foreign Minister before leaving for a social
gathering at :ifliich he was guest speaker~

2 ..

3.
4,.
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With the sponsorship issue still on hi::; m.:L-:.d, the Sec:::-et.3.ry

attended a reception, in Rockefeller's and his honor, given by
the American community -ln He;dco City.

At this party, he made a

brief good will address emphasizing that A.'"nerican policy aimed to

encourage a system of diplomacy broadly representative of a composite of United States interests and opinions.
cordiality of American citizens in Mexico.

He praised the

Their amiable ways

had helped to advance a spirlt of harmony at the Chapultepec talks.
Stettinius hoped that in the future Americans abroad t.,rould accept

a new

responsibility~

He remarked:

I look to this community a."ld to tha groups of
United states citizens resident in other American
republics, for their friendly interest and cooneration in realizing many of the aims of our
:friter-American program • • • .5

Reviewing the actiYities of the conference, he declared that the
resolutions on public health, education, and nutrition were designed
to br...ng the

co~mon

people of the hemisphere closer together.

The

wasses were a significant factor, since international relations
were no longer confined to the relatively narrow policy interests
and contacts of government officials.

The chief American delegate

declared:
Diplomacy becomes more truly representative of
the L~terests and welfare of peoples. It becomes

an inter.lational vehicle for social and economic
welfare, enabling nations to share responsibilities
for cor..mon prog::-ess a:'ld securi t;'r. Ilow the broad
representation of pub~c s~nti.ment. ?ecorn;s indispensi?.~11-:; to d.iploaacy J_n t.ne e 11olu-c.1ort er post-tla:r·
intar::-'.ia tional :::-elations ..
At t~e I:it~r-A;;:erican com··~renc~ no·,.1 in progress
here, you :1.:·vre doubt.l2ssly 08Serred an .qt,t<~~;1pt by the
Stettini'f.isr ~t.-;;e.:~ca:i Co;r~1;l11ri.ty Spe!eChr ~·!arch 2, l9L1..5,
p. 2: Box 285: Stettirtius i?apers

5il'
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United States government to r..ake its diplomacy

broadly representative. Our delegation cmb:rJ.ces
representatives of commerce, labor, agriculture,
industry and social welfare and the press.. It
really represents a comcosite of national interests and opinions • : •• 6
Staying at the reception only long enough to deliver his
address, the Secretary then hurried off to a 2:00 P.H. luncheon

date at the Reforma Hotel.

Under the guise of a social gatheri."1.g,

he had invl ted Forei,gn t1i.Jil5ters .Alberto Lleras Ca:nargo oi' Columbia,

Jacobo Varela. of Ur1.ioauay, Hildebrando Accioly of Brazil, and
Luis Anderson of Cos ta Rica to dine wi. th his top aides,.

Utili~ing

the personal approach, Stel",tin.ius hoped to transform the dinner
i.""lto a strategy sessio:i on the \wording of the Act of C.hapultepec. 7
The. United States delegation disapproved of certai.'1 passages in

part three of the Act..

This section dealt with the relationship

of the regional system to non-hemispheric organizations.,

Foreign

M:i...-ri.ster Camargo made some suggestions as possible substitutas,
none of which were acceptable to the Secretary or Senator Connally ..

The Columbian diplomat felt that it should clearly be understood
that the maintenance of peace on the American continent was to be
solely the responsibility of the American states.

He argued that

otherwise Great Britain and particularly the Soviet Union might
intervene in the poll ti cal affairs of the .bericas to the detriment
8
of the inter-Awerican system.
Both Stettinius and Connally in-

'
o 00 ....... +
2.
7,. Luncneon
..c"e.·
"t 1'-."'r~·n
-= - --,
Stettinius ?ape:rs8

_1_91,
=. •.
,~/.

~'
~

...l., ;~,',)~-!'
2.?_r..:.
-- .~ ._
...,_,.,
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_sisted that they could not enter into a regional agreer.:ent at this
time which did not harr:ionize with the United Hations pl.:ln.
replied that:

C.::i.margo

"if the United States is w:illing to allow l!.'uropean

states to intervene in the settlement of political problems in

this hemisphere, it would appear that the Nonroe Doctrine is being
abandoned."

9

Connally emphatically denied this charge.

Senator Austin

finally ironed out differences by proposing that a compror.ri.se

paragraph be inserted into the Act.

The new section irould ackno-;..-

ledge that the regional arrangement was to be consiste.'1.t with the
purposes and principles of the general international organization
10
upon its creation.

He drafted such a passage and it was immediately

accepted by all present.

Following the delicate situation at the Reforr..a, the Secret.--iriJ
held an interv:iew with Hr. Akin

of~

magazine at 4:15 P.H. and

then retired at 5:00 P.M. to his Cuernavaca residence.

He spent

the evening reading daily committee reports and composing a long
telegram to Joseph Grew.

Some unusual observations were included

in the cable to Washington.

Stettinius noted that sor.ie American.

journalists had been raising questions about delegation disagree-

ments over economic matters.

In fact, no such disagreements e:dsted

as complete unanimity linked the various government agencies and

representatives of labor, industr.r and agriculture.,

9..

10.

Ibid.
-stettiniusr

Cal~dar 1rot.;sr g3rch 2~ 1%-5 1

Box 285, stet tinius ?a.:pers"
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that the reporters irragined that there i.-Jcre difficulties because
they had been barred from economic sub-committee hearings on extremely sensitive topics.

11

The Secretary related another s·tranga epi:3ode inYolving the

Mexican press.

Individual business groups within the c.:i.pital

favored local protection for industr'J over free intema tional
trade.

To voice their opposition to the Economic Charter and its

pri_nciple of f:-ee t.ra.de 7 they had taken out full page advertisements in the local newspapers.

AnalyZL"'lg this situation, labor

advisors to the American delegation could fL"ld no proletariat
angle for the advertisements.

StettL-U.us reported his colleaguest
I

belief that the action represented nationalistic feeling plus
12
local poll tics, namely opposi tior. to l)adilla.
Further discussion of the incident was postponed until George Heany had ·time
to conduct an investigation.
Host of the telegram to Grew highlighted the progress of the
The Secretary felt tr.at issues were car.ring to focus

corrmissions.

as the tension molUlted.

He revealed that:

should bring forth the essential debate.

1113

"today and tomorrow
Events indicated tr.at

the conference might be able to conclude its work by Tuesday,
March

7.

The war effort cormtl.ttee for instance, had almost finished

its tasks.

P...esolutions to create a permanent inter-American

c.t. t' · ·
Telegra.m1 J1..e
;:.::.nius .._O
,,
Box 2$7, stattL"lius P3pers.

ll..

P• 7,

12.

~

13 ..

-

.,

p .. 6~
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_Defense Board, eliminate the remaining centers of subversion, and
prevent the immigration of Fascist undesirables had already been
submitted and approved.14
Stettinius•s dispatch pointed out however, that Commission II
1.-ms bogged

do...m by circumstances beyond its control.

The

world

organization group could not draft a final proposal until the
terms of the San Francisco invitations were publicized.

He in-

formed Grew that certain representatives within his conmLssion
were exercising individual prerogatives rather than those of their
respective delegations.

There were

di~turbing

did not have full control of his people.

signs that Padilla

The Cubans al3o were

.
no t f unc ti oru.ng
as a urn.. t •15 Consequently, the Guiterrez criticisms
and Mexican submission controversy had occurred ..
The telegram revealed tr.at within the economic con:m.issions
discussion centered around the continuance of wartime purchases
during the transition period, the export of capital goods, and the

16 These groups were also working

elimination of wartime controls.

on transportation and subsidy recommendations.

Another interest

of Commissions.Ti/ and v.was the hemispheric funds and property of
the Axis powers.

American delegate Oscar Cox :bad made a strong

statement on the importance of returning looted property to its
rightful owners and stopping the flight of Fascist capital to
..

Lat-in

Araeri. ca. 17

-

11+. Ibid .. ll P• 2.
15. Ibid.
16 .. Ibid .. , P• .3·

17 ..

~

. , P•
,·:,
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Considering the length of Stetti.'lius' s t·:!legr3.m (::;even pa3es) :-

it \:as unusual tii.at no comment
affair.

t•'<lS r:ud~

on the French sponsorship

Perhaps because of Po.ris' previous lack of cooperation"

he was resigned to the fact that there would be no fifth sponsor

of the San Francisco Conference.

The weekend would at least give

him an opportunity to rest before the Norub.y oorning publication

of the invitations.
MAP.CH 3 1 1945

Stettinius reb.xed at Cuernavaca on the third and pursued a

very light schedule.

.

~\cart

.

from reading a few co:n:n:i.:;sion reoorts

and arranging the post-conference trip ta Cuba, hls time
voted to social functions.
i.Il

':<JaS

de-

He had lunch with Padilla and Camacho

the early afternoon and later returned to

~·:e;dco

City for a

dinner given by the chiefs of delegations in their honor.

DlL.-ing the day, the SecretarJ received a cable from Spruille
Braden, the American Ambassador in t'.avana.

Tnis wire advised t.he

chief American delegate against stopping off in Cuba after the
Ghapultepec talks.

Braden believed that a Stettinius visit to
18
Havana would be misinterpreted and over-emphasized.
He sug-

gested.that Rockefeller make the good will trip in his place.

The

Secretar'IJ immediately relayed the Braden cable to Washington for
Joseph Grew to exarni..'1.e.

He also contacted Rockefeller and Av1:a

\·Iarren for their analysis of the wire..

They .agreed that a decision

18. stettinius, Cal2;:ciar trotes, ~"'..::ir 1~:1. 3r 194jt ?• 3?
Box 235, stett:L"l.i.US P::i0er0 ..
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_should come from the State Department, i·;here the Cuban situation
could be studied in greater depth.

Although Stetti..>Uus Hould m·;ait

word from Grew, he felt at this point that any non-compliance wl th
1
Havana's official L"lvitation trould create a r:ti.su."'lderstanding. 9

While the Secretary contemplated his trip to Cuba and·
socialized, the American delegation also moved at a slower pace.
Foreign Service personnel had few conference duties or sub-committee
hearings on Saturday.

The usual delegation

bri~fing ~as

he1d at

9:00 A.M. with Rockefeller, Pasvolsk;'r and economic advisor
Wayne Taylor reviewi...ng the progress of different committees.
Rockefeller observed that the inter-American study group had re-

conciled its differences and almost completed the Declaration of
Chapultepec.

Outside of

a: Bolivian diplom:it• s criticisms, the

Deeb.ration had been received with rr.arked enthu:3iasm.

The Bali11ian

representative had voted for it but still believed the document
to be incomplete as it failed to acknowledge his landlocked countr.1•s

need for Pacific seaports.

20

Pasvolsky informed the gathering

that fifteen nations had .submitted commentaries on the Dumbarton

Oaks proposals. He speculated that Para-Perez's Commission II
sub-comnti. ttee might be able to sumnarize the various views by
March

5. Wayne

Taylor reported that differences of opinion within

Commission IV centered around the cotton subsidy program, moderate

20. Telegr3 m, Stettinius to ,Jos~ph Gr2·.·r, :'.:n-:;h 3, l9l,_5,
P• 2 , Box 287, stetti.nius ?a.pe:cs"
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_protection for new industries, and the developraent of rr..:irketJ for
synthetics.

21

In general, the discussions revealed that the !-le;d. co City
Conference had very little U.'1finished. business.

major rratters though to clear up.

There 1vere some

The world or-ganization group

had yet to draft a final resolution on the. Dumbarton Oaks program

or hear Stettinius' s s ta tarnent on Sacuri ty Council operations.
The inter-American commission still had to r.iold rniscellan':!ous

proposals into the "Declaration of

~·fe;dco. 11

This Declaration set

forth some twenty principles including the right3 of man, the sovereignty of states, the ju..."'idical equality of states, and the

repudiation of territorial conquest.

Mex:ic.:m diplomats attached

great importance to this resolution and hoped .for its speedy :rnbmission and

?2

approval.~

Finally, the Economic Charter of the

Americas had to be shaped to fit both the United States and Iatin
American objectives in the transition period.

Therefore, such

issues as wartime controls and purchases had to be resolved.

MARCH 4, 1945
The fourth was a day of rest for the delegates to the Mexico
City Conference.
were conv~ned.

No delegation, commission, or plenary meeti.'1.gs
Ll..!<e his colleagues, Stettinius took the day off 1

preparing for the publication of the &u'1 Francisco invitations

on Monday.

23

21.

~ .. , n ..

22.
23..

-

J ..

Ibid ..
stettinius, Caler:dar ~lotesr lsrc::1: !.-, 191,_5 1 ::i .. 11'
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While the Secretary rested, State Departz:ient officinl

B'Jiri~~ton

called Mexico City to verify the text of the ::;ir:iultaneous Sa.'1.
Francisco announcements.

As previously agreed, Grew would release

the bids to the United Nations conference at noon on March 5 in
Washington.

The Secretary ~'lould do the same in Mexico City.

Both

would reveal that the United States was co-sponsoring the meeting
with Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China.
Byington suggested in his telephone conversat.i.on that there be no

elaboration of the French sponsorship affair.
merely state that

~·1hile

The Department would

the French Provi3ional Government had acknow-

ledged its willi..".lglless to participate in the San Froncisco Conference,
conditions had been placed upon its sponsorship which were

unaccept~

.
.
.
24
able to the otner r.aJor powers.
Stet tinius recei vad this las t-mi.nute proposal

i-;.i th out

conment.

He must have looked forward to the Monday morning session of hi3
Commission II.

In less than twenty-four hours, the pressure to

issue the invitations and reveal Security Council operations would
be gone.

His brief speech to the·world organization would satisfy

the cu...-iosity of rrany I.atin American diplomats.
MARCH

5,

1%.5

stettinius's overwhelming interests on Monday were naturally
directed to bis Commission II speech on the San Francisco invi t.a.
t ions ..

Both he and bis fellow delegates Here an.nous to .have the

invitations released..

21.;. ..

-

Ibid., p .. J.,
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.hir.i of a heavy burden.

The

n3gging

would be permanently removed.

problem of French Jponsorship

For latin American diplomats, the

publication t1ould hopefully quell their fears that the Security
Council was not merely a rubber stamp for the foreig.J. policies of

the

11

Big Three. 11

The chief American delegate returned from Cuernavaca an hour

before the Commission II session to r.ake the final preparations
for his speech..

Promptly at 10:00 A• .11., he arrived at the long-

awaited world organization meeting in the salon of Chapultepec
Castle.

Stettinius's "Calendar Notes" give a candid description

of the scene. As he entered the long, narrow room filled with
delegates and newsmen, the Secretary was caught up in the importance of the gathe:ci"1g.

He observed that t.he setting was appropriate

for his his tori cal announcement vd. th the
of

He.xi.can

statesmen.

labeling it the

~·ialls

lin;;!d with portr.:ii ts

25
11

most significant occasion of his forrral par-

ticipation" at the conference, Stettinius delivered his address
standing at the end of a long horseshoe table.
marked

by

The meeting was

warm geniality as he began his speech emphatically and

persuasively. 26

The SecreW.r'J followed the B)ri~'1gton formula arid

prefaced his message with off-the-record comments on the French
sponsorship issue. :nthout elaboration, he si:nply stated that

251»
Box 286 1

26.

Stettiniusr Cal:zndar I'fotesr
stettini~s Papers~

-Ibid ..
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Paris' conditions for sponsorship we4e unacce9tablc to the four

.

')7

other major powers .....

Stettinius reviewed the steos t.J.ken to c..:;tablish an i:iterm.tional peace-keeping body.

The allies rud pledged by :iigning

the Moscow Declaration of 1943 to create a general securlty; org.:l~t

nization.

the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, they had drawn up a

vast program for postwar cooperation.
11

our t.:lsk has been to exch.:l.nge

vie~1/S

"In Mexico City," he noted,

and to chrify our thoughts

on essential features of the world organization of the future and
on the relationship to it of our i.."1.ter-An:erican system, .:md thus

to prepare ourselves rr.ore fully for the work to be undertaken at
.

San Fra.'1.cisco., 11

23

The Secret.:lrJ then issued the invitations to the United Nations
conference and n:o·red on to the most critical section of his address,

the Security Council voting procedures..

He revealed that each

member of the Council would have just cne vote.

Procedural matters

of this body would be decided by the affirmative vote of seven
members.

All other business would be approved by a majority vote
2

of seven including the concurring ballots of the perr.ianent members. 9
The Secretary stressed that any

nation appointed to the Security

council, whether temporarily or permane.'1tly, could not participate

27 •

Stettinius, Commission II Speech, rfarch 5, l945, P• 1,

Box 285, Stettinius
28 ..

29,,

~ ..

Papers~
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in council decision-making on an international dispute to which it.

was a party.

"This meant," he rell'.arked, "that no nat:Lcn .Ln ti1e

world will be denied the right to hav3 a fair hearing of its case
in the Secu.ri ty Cotmcil, and that the equal, demo era tic rights of

all nations ivill be respected."JO
More than half of Stett.inius 1 s twelve-minute speech was devoted

to an explanation of voting procedures.

He dafended the rights of

the major powers to dictate council operations.

were nations which possessed

iJ1

The "Big Three"

sufficient degree the industrial

and mill tary strength to prevent future international coni'licts.
Although the first class statzs had designed the genero.l security
organization, he declared that the responsibility for the establishment and r..ai.."'1tenance of a peaceful itorld order was the obligation
of all nations.

Concluding on a note of high emotion, the Secretar'J

stated:
He have the opportunity.

;·fe have the will.

Pay

God grant us the vision and the strength to sustain
us. It is rey faith that together we will build
this world of freedom and security - a ~orld at
peace at last.31
Both Padilla and Ambassador Belt of Guba rose to generously
congratulate Stettinius for his remarks.

The Mexican Foreign Mini-

ster said the speech would i-1arm the hearts of all men of good trill.
He praised the Secretary for his splendid work in building a better
world and appealed to his co ll eagues t o

31 .. ~-

1
'
• '
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c.'ha..,J. r:ieer,ing
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·San Francisco Conference) the high purpose of :~stabli3hi...'1g justice

J'"l

for which men are dying, that it may be giv<::n 1asting realit:r." "After these felicitations, Par3.-Perez presented his long
report on the Dumbarton
lution.

T.nis

Oa.~s

co~.mission

progr-3.m, together with a draft reso-

recommendation conceded. that the purpose

of the Western hemispheric republics Has to cooperate with one
another and

~dth

all nations loving peace in netting up a general

world organization based upon the DU;11barton Oaks propozials.

The

Cuban delegates, though they had previousl.y opposed the proposals,

now moved for the adoption of the resolution.

They believed that

the recommend.at.ion would not only make clear the determination of
the American states to st.rive for the establishment of an effective
international body but also place on record certain criticisms
which they had to offer with

:::-esp~ct

to the Dumbarton Oaks program..33

.A Peruvian representative pointed out, however, that t.he resolution

lacked a specific provision regarding the relationship between the
inter-American arrangement and the world organization.
a..'"l

He sought

amendment stipulating that th_e regional system would act only

in accordance with the principles of the proposed United Nations.
An Uruguayan diplomat, voicing similar sentiments, stated that ·

there should be no e;cclusion of the world organization from
.
jurisdiction over Arne:rJ..can

~a

tt

ers~

34

In opposition to this line

l945,
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of thought, a Brazilian delegate argued that the intcrn.:i tional
body should intervene .in herrrbpheric afl':iirs only when the regional

system broke down.

To reconcile divergent i.'ieiis, i t

that Para-Perez would consult

~-i:ith

\.:-ds

agreed

the delegates and work out a

formula of comprorni.se.35
Following this debate, Stettinius placed the resolution before
the Commission and it t·..a.s unanimously approved by acclamation ..

Before adjourning the meeting, the 3ccretarJ thanked Para-?erez
for his report and also expressed his hope that the members of
Commission II would work together again in San Francisco.

Finall,y,

he announced:
Gentlemen, our work is done; I nm sure we all
agree that the results achieved in this Cow.mission
will stand out as a truly historic contribution
to the greatest cause in th~ world.. ;;e are all
going on to the next stap im:nensel,y .fortified in
our deter:rrination to ei chi eve the crea lion of a
~iOrld organization and in our faith that the
United Nations shall succe.:!d in t:us supreme
endeavor .3 6

Having instilled a feeling of cordiality and a belief that
a real service was beiJ1.g rendered, Stettinius successfully achieved
. t•
his goal for the wurld orgaru.za
ion group. 37

At times, La tin

American delegates had criticized the Dumbarton Oaks proposals·
and even suggested a list of revisions in the form of a Mexican

J6.

·· ·
,,vO'""'·
~~i·--;on II
Stctt.J..ntUSr
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:Japers ..
Box -?85 '- st.ettinius
-

l~epor-t~ :~rch

) , 1945, p. 1,

-118-

. resolution.

In the end, ho:•evar, the Secretar.:r ~~as oble to per-

suade them to accept the proposals at least.
at the San Francisco Conference.

Thus~

a3

a b.:.l.;;is .for di::;cus 3 ion

the ll~s tern hemispheric

states could approach the United Nations t.:J.Ll.\:s as

.::i.

unified group

desirous of peace.
With his commission duties completed, Stettini.us turned to
another conference problem -

the Argentine issue.

He invited

diplomats from Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, P.aiti, and El Salvador
to a 2:00 P.M. lu.."lcheon to consider their relationships with the

Buenos Aires government.

This meeti..'lg accomplished very little.

But its significance lies in that it marked the Secretary's first

attempt in Hexico City to cope with the alienation of Argentina.JS

At 4:30 P .. M., the chief American delegate assembled his top
aides for an important strategy session.

Conna1ly, Austin,

Messersmith, Rockefellar, and others met with Stettinius to

dra~

up plans for bringing the Chapultepec talks to a successful conclusion.39

several topics were discussed, ranging from the pro-

priety of submitting a resolution of thanks to Dr. Padilla for
his fine chairmanship to the possibility of drafting a formula

for the eventual return of Argentina to the hemispheric fold. ·The
secretary also brought up the subject of his post-conference trip

to Cuba. Ambassador Hessersmith noted that American problems
Cuba were rooted i."'1 the sugar purcha3ing policies.

Uni'ortuna tel.y,

JS .. StettiniUSr Calenda:r notes, ~''.arch 5, 1945, p., 6,
Box 286, stetti.:iius .Pap~rs@
.39·

-
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. over the past three years, tha State Departi:1ent fi..:.td bt:~n unable to
exercise a stabilizing :L"'lfluence.

~Ievertl1eless,

he believed th..:i.t

40
a stop tr..ade strictly on a courtesy basis t·1ould be aooronriate.
. ..

.

Rockefeller supported thi:; view..

SL"'l.ce Ambassador Braden had

already expressed his disapproval of such a "vi!lit, and Grew had
yet to submit a judgment, a final decision was postponed.

Follow.L.-rig the dialogue on the r<.avana trip, Assistant Secretary
Clayton briefed the gathering on the development of the economic
resolutions.

He observed that Chile and Brazil had introduced

proposals calling on the United Statas to close do;..n •,o1ar pl:mts
in competition with the basic resources o.f L:l tin .America..

This

recommendation was directed exclusively at Ar.:etlc:.m rubber and
nitrate factories. 41

Clajton revealed that whlJ.e Brazil had been

influenced to iii thdraw its resolution on rubber prciduction, Chile
had refused to cooperate.

Stettir..ius stated at this point tti.at.

neither proposal was within the proper scope of the Herico City
Conference.

The nitrate question was a private matter between

the United states and Chila.

He suggested that a letter be sent

to the Santiago regime arranging for consultations at a later date.42

Before endi..71.g the meeting, the Secretary commented on leaks
to the nress concern:L!g the business of the delegation steering

.

James R.-...0 ston and other cor:-espond~ts had published

commi•tt ee.

191+5,

41 ..
42.
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·unfavorable stories about internal disputes.

E>t•:!ttinius decl.::i.red

that "they would have to do better in San F'r.lnci::.co, 11 implyi.:ig
perhaps, that unfounded rumors would h.:ne t.o be elir:Unated at
the United Nations conference.
Since his taJk with the delegation steering committee dragged

on, the chief American diplomat missed most of the 5:00 ?.M. plenary
session.

In the early evening, he met briefly with Rockefeller

and then retired to answer his correspondence.

Writing to Grew,

he related that the Act of Chapultepec was a meeting of the minds,
where all the American republics signing the document had guaran-

teed the security and integrity of not just one or two nations but
the whole Western hemisphere.

11

It was a real step forward toward

111
the success of the San Fr3.ncisco Ccnference. +3

The Secret.'.l.r"J also infor:ned his assi3t.:lnt in ';fashington that

Corrrnission III had adopted the 11 Declaration of

t-~exico .. 11

This

resolution by the host country embraced seventeen broad social
precepts and principles of international law.

"Declaration" had aroused little debate.

He noted that the

"Evidently, the dele-

gates seem to feel it was a contribution to Mexican prestige and
did not examine it closely • • • •"

44

Overall stettinius exhibited an optimistic mood in his dispatches of March

5.

The conference proceedings continued to meet

the objectives of .American foreign policy.

43.

-Ibid,.
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. republics had finally agreed to accept
as a basis for discussion in

s~

th~

ilu:;;ba ..:-ton

Francisco.

Oa~<s

proposal::;

A r.:!giona.l. :.;ecuri ty

pact had been drafted to become the keystone of hemispheric de-

fenses.

Economic and social resolutions fores!'ladowed closer

cooperation between Washington and its souther.1 neighbors dUring

the transition period. With all these positive accomplishments,
one critical issue still had to be resolved.

The Secretar<J ob-

served that "the outstanding theme of press and delegate interest

was the Argentine situ.a !:.ion, but it had not. yet reached the stage
.
1145
of publi c di
. scussion.

very soon.

-·

Ibid ... p .. /"'

This lack of publici t..y would be remedied

CP. APTEii VII

OVERCOMING FHL\L OBS'l'.:\CIES:

ARGi!:iI'i'IN~ ISOU'l'10~1

AND THE Ei'ID OF TifE CONFEIIB:iCE

HARCH 6, 1945

With the conference near cor.ipletion, Stettinius's duties
at Chapultepec were greatly reduced.
responsibility

~.,as

His only rell'aining najor

to oversee the final processing of resolutions.

Most of the corr.missions had submitted their recommendations to
the conference as a whole..

The status of these proposals had yet

to be determined by the plenary sessions.

Thus on !·'.arch 6, the

SecretariJ spent considerable tine studying resolutions in prepa.!:"3.tion for the day's

pl~nar;

r::eeting.

PL:lgued by the Argentine :i.ssue,

he also scheduled a luncheon with IatLYJ. American diplor.nts to di::;-

cuss further relations with the Farrell regime.

Throughout the r.:.orning, Stettinius reviewed conmssion reports
written by his aides. Adolf Berle's paper informed him that Commission I proposals were based upon the principle that the .American
1
republics constituted an integrated defense zone.
Therefore, the
war effort committee suggested that a permanent hemispheric planning board be created for military affairs.

The commit.tee also

sought government control of the production and distribution of
armaments.

This did not mean the nat.ionaliza ti on of the mu.'1i tions

industry but rather govern.':1ent regulation of it.

Other resolutio~s

·
C" 1 er:d.:i.r !Jot es. I,;areh 6: J..·?45 r p .. 1, Do:c 286~
1. Ste"'"t·J....'1.:.US~
u.•
•
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dealt with protecting the hemisphdre fram Ax:i.::. ::;uoversion ~md \·w.r
criminals.

3erle cited two difficulties that hi:.3 commission en-

countered.

The first controversy centered around the cri teri.:i

to distinguish political exiles from \-l<lr c:-im:inal::>.

A method had

to be instituted whereby the c:listi...-1ction could be made without
eliminating the right of asylum.

The second problem was defining

subversive action so as not to interfere :iith revolutionarJ activi-

ties which sometimes

occurr~

within an American r3public.

This

issue was debated without the intention of frustrating the possibilities of political chaD.ge.
In

2

the Comrrd.3sion II report, Pasvolsky summarized only the

key proceedings.

This body had considered fifteen recorr.mendations,

five of which had been submitted to the full committee and three
Stettinius's world or~ani:~ation group bad pa:.wed pro-

approved.3

posals 1) accepting the Dumbarton Oaks program as a basis for
discussion in San Francisco, 2) reaffirming the Atlantic Charter,

and 3) acknowledging the right of 1·1omen to participate in inter.
~
4
national coruerences.

As the Secretary analyzed the resolutions of Commission III,
he noted three of broad public and internatior>...al interest.

5
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The recommendation for freedom of access of information had been.
adopted unanimously by the comr:ri.ttee with fc;, minor changes.

This

action had been favorably received by Americ.'.4'1. journalists and
radio commentators.

The Haitian proposal against racial discrimi-

nation had been passed too.

It reaffirmed the principle that all

men are entitled to equal rights and opportunities.

A third reso-

lution paid homage to the Domini.on of Canada for her contributions
to the war effort.

It also recognized that relations between the

American republics and Canada were becoming closer daily.

6

The Commission IV paper presented to Stettin:i.us by Technical
Expert August Maffry covered a wide variety of resolutions.

Pro-

posals of commercial :interest dealt with the Economic Charter of
the Americas 1 inter-American transportation systems, and hemispheric development

progra~s,

Other measures sought to prevent

unemployment and increase the sale and distribution of primar-.r

products.

In reference to social matters, Maffry revealed that

his committee had produced suggestions for inter-American cooperation in the case of European war orphails, a charter for women
and children, and a Declaration of Social Principles of the

7
.
Amencas.
The progress of Commission V was outlined by advisor
Wayne Taylor.

He observed that his group had approved eight pro-

grams geared to economic cooperation in the prosecution of the war.

7,. Au,gust

YE.i'f~r,
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-Of great interest to the delegatas was a war-ti;::e price control
resolution.

It recommended the continuous revision and review of

controls, keeping in mind that price ceilings Ghould be appropriately related to the costs of production and transportation,
and

that the prices of raw and manufactured r:ia.terials should have

a fair relationship.

8

.Another proposal desired to make cap.ital

equipment available to the underdeveloped
a fair and equitable basis.

south~rn

republics on

Tied to this suggestion

cept of an economic advisory committee.

~.;as

the con-

This proposed research

body would compile data on economic problems from each hemispheric
power and hopefully produce concrete oolutions.

P.aving a strong

interest in enemy financial and commercial holdings, Commission V
passed three other resolutions.

i·ii th respect to

~"d.s a~ts

of

dispossession,:ao transfers made during the period of enemy occu-

pation would be recognized.

A declaration on gold policies would

bind signatory nations to refuse to purchase gold having an enel'1\7

taint.

And finally, neutral nations were called upon to demobilize

Axis assets. 9

Along with the five commission reports that the Secretary
perused, he read a surYey of press reaction to the San Francisco
invitations.

A majority of the top American newspapers welcomed

the Security Council voting procedures.

The operations of the

Council were labeled "constructive and reasonable" by the New York
Times and characteri::ed as an "ingenious .fo:--r.1ul.J."

8. Stetti:nius~ Calwdar i'Iotest 1-'a.:rch
Box 286, Stettinius Papersa
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. Herald Tribune.

10

Of the few opponents to voting procedures radio

commentators Earl Godwin and

~·!alter

Kiernan were the most bi ttcr ..

"Another victoi-.r for Stalin," declared Godwin, "and a swell way to

bat sl'l'all nations around and let any one of the big nations act
the bully."

her way."

11

Kiernan described the invitations as

11

Russia gett:irig

France's failure to sponsor the San Francisco Con-

ference received only a rnodente amount of comr.ient -

mostly to the
effect that Paris missed an opportunity to increase its prest.ige. 12
After spending the first half of the day reading conference

proposals, Stettinius hald a 2:00 P .. H. luncheon with latin American
diplorrats~

He discussed the Argentine situation uith the Foreign

Ministers of Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and the
Paraguayan Ambassador to i;Iashington.

Unanimity existed among all

delegations that the only alternative was to pass a resolution at
the conclusion of the talks expressing regret at Argenti."1a 1 s ab-

sence but indicating hope that in the interest of continental
unity she would adhere to the Act of Chapultepec and other con1

ference provisions as well as qualifiJ for United Nations membership. 3

In accordance with conference plans, Dr. Padilla was to bring this
resolution to the attention of the Buenos Aires government through
the machinery of the Pan American Union.

The diplomatic language

of the proposal would seek to make clear tr.at Argentina had to bind

10. su.....-vey of Press Coverage of t..h.e I;:;su.ance of the San
Francisco Invi ::.ations, g;irch 5, 1945, P• 11 Bex 286, Stattinius Papers.,

.,

P• 2.

11 ..

~

12 ..
lJ.,

~~1 p .. 1 .. ,
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_herself to Hex:i.co City and United Nations dt;icisions in order to
join the American and world security systems.
the draft would attempt to avoid any

At the 5arne

t.ii~e,

of nn 1Jltir.atum.

sugg.~stion

The conference recommendation would thus obligate the Farrell regime
to take explicit action against Axis agents, war

crir.~nals,-

finan-

cial and commercial concerns on one hand and abandon its aggressive
tendencies on the other.

14

Lo.tin American support for a resolution

of this nature i;-rouJ.d appeal to the Secretary.

This proposal would

reflect hemispheric solidarity without pitting the United States

against Argentina as individual adversaries.
Following the luncheon, Stettinius attended the 5:00 P.H.
plenary session at Chapultepec Castle..

At this meeting, more than

twenty resolutions 1·1ere given .final approval by the conf'erence as

a whole.

Among the recommendations passed were those concerning

a perrranent inter-American Defense Board, strengthening the regional
system, and the Declaration of Mexico.

. 6 end ed • 15
business for March

\.Tith this session,conference

In the early evening, Secretary and

Hrs. Stettinius hosted a black tie dinner for the heads of dele.
Em'
gations at the Amen.can·
•oassy. 16

stettinius reviewed the day's activities in a cable sent to
Joseph Grew later on that night.

14.

He noted that:

James Reston, "Conferees Soften Tone On Argentina,"

New York 'l'i.:nes 1 ?-:arch 7, 1945, p .. 9 ..

15., T0legra:n 1 Stet tinius to Grew, i,:a.rch 6, 19li-5, p .. 4,
Box 286, Stettinius P3pers~
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Everyone f~els that not.eworthy progress has bcdn
made toward cooperation of the Americ,:m republics
with the world organization and no negative criticism has been voiced beyond some irnllcations of
disappointment that France is not among the nations
sponsoring the San Francisco Conference. The
resolution regarding Argentina is in draft form
but is unlikely to be presented till th~ meeting
of the Steering Committee on Thursday.l7
The Secretary also revealed that while the Chapultepec talks were
proceeding smoothly, there uould be an extension of the conference. 18
The delegations would not depart before Thursday evening because
of difficulties in the coordinating committee.

Over one hundred

and fifty resolutions had to be edited, typed, and translated
before a conference adjournment.
MARCH 7, 1945

Much like the preceding day, Stettinius spent his time on
March 7 in strategy talks debating the Argentine issue and in a

plenary session legislatirig resolutions.

At this point, most

delegations favored the proposed statement of regret as the best
means to handle Argentine isolation.

American diploirats, however,

wanted to make sure that the document would not place the hemi.spheric republics in an embarrassing situation at a later date.

Therefore, when the Secretary was not at plenary sessions formlizing recommendations or attendi.11g to last-minute conference
busi.--iess, he and his aides were e.xaming relations with Buenos Aires.

17. ~·
18..
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At both the 9:00 A.M. delegation meeting a:!d the 9:h5 A.. M.
steering committee copJ'erence, State Department official5 studied
the pros and cons of the Argent:.:ine resolution.

Unable to attend

these gatherings because of his brief courtesy call on President
Caw.ache, Stettinius sent Hayden Raynor in his place.
uncertainty existed at the first meeting.

A mood of

The question arose

whether or not Argentina should be allowed to join the United Ma-

tions unless she declared war, in as r:ruch as some other Latin
19
American nations had only decl.'.lred a state of belligerency •
Both William Clayton

~11d

Hichael McDermott felt that public opin-

ion at home would not be satisfied unless the Farrell regime

initiated hostilities against the A.us powers.

They considered

a war declaration absolutely necessary for A=ger.tina • s return to

the "family of nati.ons. 1120

Rockefeller pointed out, howe·.rerr that.

according to the conference proposal, the Buenos Aires government
need only abide by the United Nations• Pact and the Me..'Cico City
decisions to be welcomed back into the hemispheric fold.

This

resolution did not specify that Argentina declare war, although
there was such an implication.

Rockefeller urged his colleagues

not to push Farrell's regime into the pre.sent conflict.

Warning

against writing something into the resolution that was not expressed

there, he perceived that outside pressure might create such a
reaction in Argentina that its people would refuse to satisfy the

19.,
20..
p .. 1, Box

Ibid ..
Havden Ra;1-nor~ ·Delegation. L·leati:ig Eeport, i·'.arch 7 1 1945,
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terms of the proposal.
of thinking.

21

Senator Austin did not accept this line

He believed that the American delegation should

publicly stress the need for an Argentine . . . ar clecl.:.l.ration.

Though

such comments would be popular, Rockefeller felt that t.hey would
22
do a disservice to American foreign policy.
Immediately after this debate, a rump session of the steering
committee convened.

Following further polemics, this gathering

agreed that the Argentine resolution should indicate that. the

Me.'tico City conference viewed the Farrell regime as an integral
part of the Ainericas.

Consequently, Argentina should place her-

self in a position to concur with the work of the Chapultepec taJ.l<:s
and strive to become a signatory to the United !Ia tions Declara lion •.2J

Having found unanimity only in the belief that the Buenos Aires
government belonged within the hemispheric bloc, Stettiniusrs top
aides assembled once more at ll:JO A.M. to brief him on their

earlier discussions.

Before

exarr~ning

the Argentine controversy,

the Secretary commented on the value of keeping congressional
leaders informed on conference proceedings.

Senator Austin and

Representative Johnson replied that the dalegation had kept them
abreast of diplomatic matters..

Hoving on to the Buenos .Aires ques-

tion, the debate reswned tihen Austin again stated that Argentina

21.

Ibid., P• 2.

22.
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. nust defini te:cy declare

•~ar

to be reinst.:ited.

Accepting tiu::; vie:.;,

Stettinius stated that:
We should not even open the door a crack un.til she
Argentina had declared war and that ~·;as the a tti tu.de
all delegates would take ~hen they 1·;ent home.24
Although there were conflicting opinions within the steering com-

rnittee on the war declaration rotter as evidenced by the Austin and
Rockefeller positions, the group st.ill :mpported the proposed Ar-

gentine resolution.

In other words, Stettinius and other America.'1.

delegates may have privately desired Argentina's entrance into
the war, but publicl,y they supported her adherence to the Hexico

City resolutions and the United Nations Declaration for re-admi::;sion.
The Secretary noted later on that the Argentine resolution was

11

the

product of the draftsmanship of many delegates and seemed to have
complete and enthusiastic acceptance. 1125

Thinking perhaps of dif-

ferences idthin his own delegation he also observed tl"'.at., lacking
consensus, some individuals might oppose the resolution when it
came up for final approval.

26

To inform the newspapers and the general public of the American

delegation's activities and views concerning the Argentine resolution, Stettinius scheduled a 1:00 P.N. press conference.

Surpris-

ingly, he made a few introducto~J remarks and then departed :for

24..
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·an "urgent appointment."

Revealing hiG gratification uith the

progress of the conference, the Secretary just hinted that hemispheric solidarity

>.Ja.S

within sight and excused himself• 27

Rockefeller conducted the rest of the conference and outlined
off-the-record American responses to the Argentine resolution.

He

mentioned that Stettinius had held a series of luncheon rneeti.."lgs
with latin American diplor:'.ats to exchange views on the Buenos Aires
question.

Considering these sessions "inspirational," the Assistant

Secretary remarked that they 1-;ere
nimity, frankness,

characteri~ed

and directness.

28

by tremendous una-

He stated too that the

Washington delegation had continuously encountered a unique problem at the conference.

Argentine represent.:itives had worked behind

the scenes w:i. th diplomats from every hemispheric power except the
United States to ga:L-i quasi acceptance at Chapultepec.

Rockefeller

revealed that the United States ims attempting to eradicate this
back door diplooiacy among the American republics.

He declared

that:
One of the points we ~..anted to arrange at the conference is to get a line back of which all the
Americas would stand together, to get away from the

problem of not knowing what other republics are
think:Lng • • • • .And I think we have here something
the Argentine Resolution which the Americas as a
group -- twenty repuolics represented here ~ can
stand together on a.~d subscribe to, so that for

27.,. Stettinius, Press Conference St.:ite;:;ent, March 7 7 l945r
P• 1, Box 286 1 Stettinius Papers ..
28. Nelson A., Rockzfall•~r, Pr:;ss Cortfere!'.!ce Statement 11
Harch 7, 1945, p .. 2 1 Box 2S6r Stettinit~3 Papers ..
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the first time we rove got a uJlified position which

eliminates all of this mnuevering mid r.:oving .:i.round,
in which nobody can quite tell i·1here they nre.29

After assuring the reporters that the Argentine resolution
did not commit the United States to granting diplorratic recogni-

tion to the Farrell regime, Rockefeller introduced Adolf' Berle.
The American Ambassador to Brazil explained Argentina's obligations

if she signed the United Nations Declaration.

The Buenos Aires

government would have to devote all· its mill ta!"J and economic resources to the struggle against the nations of the Tripartite Pact.
Although this did not necessarily entail a declaration of war.
Argenti.Yla would also have to pledge not to rrake a separate armi-

~ii th

stice or peace

Following their

the Axis powers .30
for~al

statements, both Berle and Rockefeller

fielded questions from the press.

One journalist inquired as to

the most deplorable aspect of the Argentine situation.

Rockefeller

replied that "it was the Farrell regime's inability to put itself
in a position to participate in the Chapultepec talks.•;Jl

Before

concluding, Berle announced that the Argentine resolution Would
become a public document after the final plenarJ session on
Narch 8.

At that tirr.e, it would be attached to the final act of

~

.the coruerence.

32

.,
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From the press conference, the interest3 cf the American del(!gation shifted to the 5 :00 P .('!. plenariJ 50ssion.

Stettinius re-

entered the picture as he participated in the final passage of
various conference proposal3.

the utmost difficulty could one
sidered.3.3

VotLY?g 1·1as ::;o rapid that only with
k~ep

up vith what Has being- con-

Ten of the last recommendations were decided upon by

title, without any debate of the individual clauses within each
text.

The Secretary and his latin American colleagues approved

of measures ranging from guidelines for the progressive reduction
of price controls to safeguards for democratic ctluca tionaJ. systems.
As the final conference proceedings moved into high gear,

stettinius spent part of the evening planning his schedule for the
last day of the Chapultepec talks.

He had to prepare himself for

his plenary session address thanking Dr. PadiD...:l and President
Camacho for their work.

The chief Ar..erican delegate also had to

arrange for his departure from Mexico City plus take care of lastminute details concerning his radio broadcast the following evening.
As these matters were attended to, the prospect of successfully
concluding the Mexico City Conference must have defi..'11.itely pleased
him.

1-i<\RCH 8-, 1945

Edward Stettinius was a v·erJ visible figure on the .last day
of the Chapultepec tall-cs.

Shift:L'lg scenes quickly, he basked in

33. Hayden P..aynor 1 ?l:;;nary Session Repoct, l·iarGh 7 1
p .. 1, Box 286, Stetti:rl.u:.:; Pnpt;:rs ..
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. the limelight of the final delegation r::eei:.ing, plenary ::;es3ions,
press conference, and radio broadc.:ist..

Pr.llsing h.b colleagues

at these gatherings for their contributions in
in turn was congratulated for hi::; efforts.

:·~e:cico

Ci t:.y, he

Not only the sacrifices

of la tin Ar.ierican diploma.ts, but also the friendly i·iays and· personal
diplor:acy of the Secretary were acknowledged as instrumental in
the successes of the conference.
At the L3.st 9:00 A.H. delegation briefing, Stettinius depicted
the Mexico City negotiations as a series of advances of real importance.

He expressed his appreciation to P.ockefeller, l1essersmith,

a..-r1d their staffs for their part in attaining these positive results.

Believing there had never been greater harmony between agencies
of the United States government, starting with congressional
representatives o.nd goL'l"lg through both old-line and emergency branches,
he declared that:

11

this demonstration of unity has inspired many

and been of tremendous assistance to the Defartment of State. 11 34
Following these remarks of con:mendation, the chief American

spokesman read an Associated Press disfatch from Argentina.

This

cable indicated that the Buenos Aires government was wiDing to
take a conciliatory position.

Farrell's Foreign Minister,

Cesar Ameghino bad issued a statement endorsing the aims of the
.Act of Chapultepec.35

Though it now appeared that the contra-

versy with Argentina might be near an er..d, Stettinius pointed out

34.. stettirilus, Calendar Notesr ?·'.arch S,
Box 286, Stettinius P::ipe:rs.
35..

Ibid.
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the possibility of a new threat to Arr.erican foreign policy.

HuI'.:ors

persisted that some hemispheric republics r.d.ght establish a cor;lffion
policy prior to the San Francisco Conference and thus form a L-itin
American bloc at the rr:eeting.

He charged hOckefeller with the
6

responsibility of preventing such a situation..3
L~

the absence of Tom ConnaJJs', the Secretary next called on

Senator Warren Austin for a few remarks.

regarded the Mexico City Conf0rence

3S

The Vermont poll tician

a "helpful experiment"

He noted that a great e.xmnple had been set biJ the

toward peace.

cooperative action within the American delegation.

Austin thanked

the Foreign Service personnel for the treatment attributed him
as a Republican opposition member of the United States Senate and

especially the openness with uhich he had been dealt..3 7

Before adjourning, Rockefeller rose to thank Stettin.ius on
behalf of the delegation for devoting two weeks of his time to
the Chapultepec talks.

His subordinates appreciated his sacrifices

at an important r..oment in world events to viOrk in Me..-d.co City in
full equality with the representatives of the othar American

Rockefeller stated that the Secretary's leadership
38
had been a real inspiration to the United States delegation. ·
countries.

From the Hotel Reforrm gathering, Stettinius went to the
National Palace accorn:--...,anied by Rockefeller,. Hessersmith, and

36. Ibid.

37.
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. Warren Pierson, head of the Export-Import Bank, for an ll:CO A.N.
appointment with President Car.iacho.

The chief :\rr:erican dalegate

and the Mexican leadar held a thirty-five rai.nute conversa t.:ion

which was marked by extrer.ie cordiality

.3 9

During a previous talk

at Cuernavaca on Harch 3, the Secretary had conveyed to Camacho
P~osevelt's

President

greetings and hopes for a renewal of the

pleasant exchanges initiated the year before at Corpus Cristi and
Monterrey.

Stettinius prai:>ed Camacho for the const-.ructive super-

vision he and Dr. Padilla had given the conference.

He also commended

the Ca!IBcho adrrd.n.istration for its progressive programs which had
strengthened ties between the United States and its southern. neigh-

bor.

40
The He.."ci..can president replied with great emotion as he spoke

warr.Uy of Roosevelt and of the Secretary's efforts at Chapultepec,. 41
He felt that Hashington and Mexico City would no longer be fearful
of each other as they solved mutual problems without :incident.

stettinius later noted in his journal that Camacho spoke with obvio~

sincerity and a certain amount of feeling.

He observed that

the President's manner of expression undoubtedly reflected his
genuine attitude of friendship toward the United States.

42

After his conversation at the National Palace, the Secretar-.r

proceeded to the plenary session scheduled for noon,.

.. ,

P• 4~
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opened the meeting by nzklng i-;hether there
the reading of the final act,.

Sever3.l

~.yere

del~g.:itcs

an,y motions before
took this oppor-

tunity to make speeches compline;:iting the \'/Ork o.f P.J.dilla o.nd
Stettinius.

The chief

fu~erican

his final plenary address.

spokesman than rose to deliver

In a brief tiro-rn:i.nute talk, he "paid

tribute to the hospitality, generosity, nnd goodwill of the Mexican people and their leaders.

The Secretary mentioned the deep

interest and helpful influence of President Camacho in the labors
of the conference.

In reference to.Padill:l, he declared that "his

outstanding work in organizing this historic assembly and brilliant
manner in which he has conducted its deliber:J.tions h.'.l.ve contributed
beyond measure to its ::;uccess. 1143

Stettinius concluded by expres-

sing his hope that it :wuld be hi3 good fortune to welcome many of

the delegates including the Me.xi.can hosts to the San Fr.'.lncisco
Conf'erence in a few Heeks.44
iT.nen Padilla regained the floor he unveiled the gratitude of
his countr.r by interpreting the advances of the conference L'l'l terms
of the diligence and efforts of the visiting delegates.

Having

paid this compliment, he directed the passage of the final act
and some sixty resolutions covering almost everJ field of hunan
endeavor.

43. stetthnus 1 Plena:rJ Sess-5..on Speech 7 Earch 8, 19l·5!'
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After the plenary ses3ion, Stettiniu3 ottcnded a mid-afternoon
luncheon for delegation heads and then went on to hold his lnst
press conference at the Edificio Imperial at l+:JO.

There he rrade

just a brief statement revealing his intention to visit President
Grau Sa..'1 Martin of Cuba after the conference.

He also thanked

the reporters for their cooperation at Chapultepec and bade them

farewell until the United Nations talks. 45

Nost of this conference

was utilized as an opportunity for American advisors to publicize
their views on the Chapultepec meetings.

as his top aides -

The Secretary looked on

Rockefeller, AustLJ., Connally, and Hessersmith -

gave short speeches and fielded questions from reporters.

P..ockefeller,

speaking first, repeated his remarks of the earlier delegation
briefing praising his boss.

He comrr.ended St.ettinius for his policy

of delegating authority to those around him and for his inspiring

leadership.

The Assistant Secretary also spoke highly of the

journalists and regarded his ossociation with them as one of his

·
hi ps in
. Ifvex:i.co
.
C].. t y. 46
happiest relations
When a Venezuelan reporter asked if reactionarJ republicans
would place obstacles in the way of the Good Neighbor Policy,

senator Austin answered with an emphatic "No!"

The Vermont poll-

tician went on to voice his adrn:i.ration for the conference practice
of "open cove.11ants openly arrived at. 1147

He and his fellow senator,

t
.
Stet.tiniu.sr Press Con.!.'~reEce .J\,a er::em:. 1 1·".arch 8,
1945, p .. 2, Box 236, Stettinius PapeYs.
.~
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Con."lally, had participated in free and public Ui:::;cus3ion;:; of

hemispheric problems.

conf~rence

Austin regarded the

"uplifting" for himself and declared that

"~·1e

as a t:;reat

have really accom-

plished tremendous progress toward the objective that is.of vital
interest to evecy father and nother of a soldier • • ., and .we

have discovered what warm sympathy there is ar.:ong L:ltin Americans

and South Americans. 1148
Following his congressional colleague, Tom Connally tallted to

the reporters about the Act of Chapultepec.
regional pact had realized his hope of

so~e

He remarked that the
day making the security

and safety of the Western hemisphere the responsibility of all the

American states.

The Texas Democrat observed that this "act of

co::J..aboration" consisted of two phases.

the attack of a non-American country on
would be regarded as

a..'1

In the first instance,
ai~y

hemispheric republic

act of aggression by all the regional

powers, who would present a united front against the potential
conqueror.

Secondly, Connally declared that as a family of nations,

the hemisphere had ta.J<en a great step in the interest of selfpreservation because "no American aggressor can, with safety,
attack his neighbor 7 or any other nation without incurring the.

risk of unified hostility and resistance .. 1149

He concluded that the

defense pa.ct r.arked an epoch or era in international relations and
international law and was "a great milestone 3.long the high1ray which
we hope is leading to peace and

4s ..
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George Messersmith issued the last :::;tatement at the press
conference.

He spoke of the significance of the Chapu.lt.epec talks

to the inter-American scene as well as the world picture.

The

United States Ambassador also revealed that he never had any doubts
about the outcome of the conference.

"I had no fears at all as

to the success of this meeting because I had the absolute confidence that first of all the American delegation, headed by our
dynamic and understanding Secretary of State, would come here with
a full understand.:Ll'lg of the problems which we had to face."5l
Messersmith believed tl>.at at no time in the history of the Amer-

ican republics had a gathering of this kind been held in an
atmosphere of such complete cordiality a.r.d. seriousness.,

Having given his aidas the chance to voice their opinions on
the Cli..apultepec talks, Stetti.."1.ius revealed similar sentiments in
a radio speech over the CBS network at

9:15 P.H.

He felt that the

conference had achieved truly historic results.
We r..ave reaffirmed our wartime coll.aboration in
the struggle against the .Axis countries, strengthened
our system of inter-Amer-lean cooperation, and
assured the participation of the American republics
in the effort to organize the world for peace and
security.5 2
The Secretary speculated that the conclusions reached in .Mexico

City would contribute to the success of the upcoming

Sa,.,

Francisco

meeting and also foreshadow the complete a."'1d perfect organiza lion

51. Jl?1£ ..
52. stett:L!i.us, f'3clio Speechr .i>br~h Sr 1%5 7 p ... lr
Box 286, StettL!i.us Papers~

-142-

of

t~e

regional system at the

for Bogota in

inter-A~erican

conf crenca scheduled

1946.5J

SlLm.arizing the accomplishments of the Cb.:i.pultepec talks, he
outlined sL"'C agreements which he considered to be of extraordir..a!"IJ
significance.

First of all, the American st.ates were united in

their effort to stamp out every vestige of Nazi influence L"l the
~'lestern

herrri.sphere.

The delegates J:i..ad passed resolutions aiming

to elimL"la te A.id..s subversion and prevent the escape of war crir.rl.nals.

Secondly, after full deliberation, the hemispheric republics

had endorsed the DUr:Jbarton Oaks proposals as a basis for discussion
at the United Nations conference.

Recommendations from the Hex:i.co

City gathering Hould also aid :i.n the creation of :m international
body.

Stettinius an.--iounced that

11

the i;vorld co.n rest assured that

the American states are prefCired to join 1rlth the other United
Nations in the successful establishr.1ent and maintenance of the

. ..
1154
world orga.nJ.zaT.J..on •

.Another great conference achievenent, according to the Secretary, i-ms the adoption of the .Act of Cli.apultepec.

The United

states and its latin American neighbors NOuld band together in
the future to resist aggression from without or within the herrri.sphere.

Of comparable importance was the agreement to strengthen

·
+·
.;.,.,ter-,'1.lh
' .... e.,...;
and reorgaruze
vne .....,_.
.J.- can "Y"'-'-em
>>' ~ \, I..

11

C1 .; "'···...,~ring .Z.he
steady
~
..L...L.

.0--

growth of inter-Arr.erican fraternity and cooper3tion during a cen-

53 ..
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tury," Stettinius stated, "it is noi'i a,sreed that conferences of the
American

s~tes

will be held regu.l:ll"'ly at four year intorvals; that

there be regular annual and special emergency meetings of the Foreign Hinisters; that .the Pan American Union
powers. 1155

~1ill

be given increased

In addition, he pointed out that the functions .of numer-

ous existing inter-American agencies of juridic.:il, mi.li tary, social
and econor:Ii.c character had been extended or reemphasized.

The fifth advance made at Chapultcpec was in the :fields of
economi.c cooperation and social welfare.

The provisions of the

Econorrd.c Charter of the AmeriC3.s and the Declaration oi' l1exico
represented the delegates' attempt to rededicate themselves to the
high principles of huma."li ty.

Proposals had been designed to rai3e

the standard of living of the hemispheric !T'.asses in an "environment.
of peace, liberty, and security."5

6

The Secretar.r regarded the Argentine resolution as the final
significant agreement.

In an act of solidarity, the twenty Amer-

ican republics had devised an equitable t·ray for the Buenos Aires
government to return to the hemispheric fold.

Under the just terms

of this measure, the Farrell regime i·rould become a signatory to
the United Nations Declaration and the final act of the Mexico.
City Conference.
For all these achievements, Stettinius paid tribute to the
vision and steadfastness of statesmen like President Gamache and
Dr. Padilla..

He also

Ibid ...
·

p .. 2 ..

aclmo~iledged

that Frank"lin RoosevelVs long

and earnest efforts to foster irier.dsh.ip among the irnnti.spheric
powers had been !7'.anif ested by the successes of the con.f crence.
In closing, the Secretar; depicted the Ch.:ipult.epec agreerr.ents

a3

a "concrete expression to t:hat spirit of Good neighbor which has

long since found acceptance among all the peoples of the Am"ericas."57
Stettinius's participation in the CBS radio broadcast was his
last public function at the Mexico City Conference.

On Friday,

March 9, he departed for a brief goodwill visit to Cuba and by
Saturday afternoon, the American diplomt was back in

~·/ash.L.,.,.gton.

In a final cable to Joseph Grew from Chapultepec, he exhibited hi:.>

persistent optimism.

With his conference duties fulfilled, the

Secretary's dispatch portrayed the two and one-half Heek ga theri...ng
as the culr.ri.nation of a good,

neighbo~ly

which the P..oosevelt ad.1ri.nistration had
the last twelve years.

policy and an

consi::::;t~nt.ly

attit~de

pursued during

58

5S.. Telegram~ Stettinius to Jo::;cpi1 Gre,.,,
P• lr Box 286, stettinius Papers~
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CHAPTER VIII
conCLUSION
Like Stetti...'"lius, the American public .:md press reacted quite

favorably to the Hexi.co City Conference.

The New Yorl< Tit:1es,

Washington Post, and other leading newspapers labeled the assembly
"as perhaps the n:ost successful ever held by representatives of
the American republics."

A life magazine cdi tori.al noted that

"United States diplomacy had just colile through a ver:y tricky
international

conf~rence

and corr.e through well .. "

1

The passage of time has permitted the hi0torian td more
clear];! analyze the CJ:i.apultepec talks.

Thirty years after the

conference, one can perceive that although the meeting was compara ti vely successful, it did not ::;ettlc verJ r.ruch.

2·

Most of the

important policy decisions :rade ·,·1ere of a recorrmenda tor-.r or provisional character.

In order to rrake them definitive and effective,

r.ruch still rerr.ained to be done by subsequent conferences. 3 Several
political rratters, including the further reorganization of the
regional system, were to be referred to the ninth hemispheric
meeting in Bogota in 1946.

Concrete economic affairs would be

discussed at the Inter-American Technical and Economic Conference
scheduled for July, 1945. E.'ven the Act of Chapultepec was-merely

1. AnalyGis of Conference Press Cov0rage, p. 1, Box 283,
Stettinius Pape:-s,,.
2.,. Gordon Connell-S:ni t:1, The I.nter-.;rr:eric::m S·rstem
(New York: Oxford University Pressl' 1906):- p ...133 ..
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provisional pending the conclusion of a

coll~ctive

security treaty

and constitutional adju;;tments by the sig:n.ato.q powers.h
\fr1ile the Hexi.co City Conference tempori::ed on rn:m,y issue,
there were other matters it did not consider at. all.

The subject

of Franco's Spain and the American activities of the Spanish
Falange were termed irrelevant by the delegates.

The i'uture of

European colonies and United States naval and air bases in La tin

Ameri~

was also not on the agenda.

5

Though hi.'1dsight has shown the Chapultepec t.:ilks to be less

a success than once thought, the negotiations still achieved some
noteworthy results for Arnerican foreign policy.

Stettinius and

his aides helped to draw up a solution for elinri.nating .Argentine
isolation.

They also overcame la.tin American resentment toward

the proposed United !ia tions and gained hemispheric acceptance of
the Dumbarton Oaks plan.

The Uashington delegation allayed too

the fears of its southern neighbors, that the United States would
not support their postwar development programs.
For a rran not formally trained in the field of international

affairs and considered by many just a "caretaker secretar.r,"
stettinius did an admirable job as the chief American delegate in
Mexico City.

Der.:-0nstra ting his ability to work under pressure,

he surmounted the problem of French sponsorshlp and avoided any
possible er.ibarr3.sscent stemming from the United States 1 dual
interest i.1. t.he regional system ancl the world organiz.J.t.ion.

The
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Secretary's personal diplo:nacy won him the fricndshio of the Hexi-

can hosts, namely Ca:racho <!nd Padill.:i., o..."1d 3.l.so ir.:proved i·rorking
relations wi. th Ia tin American diplorrat::;, r..any of >·:ham later collaborated with him on the United Nations Ch.:l.rter.

In addition,

Stettinius established good rapport with the press and consequently,
received favorable publicity for his department.

American ,journa-

lists endorsed his practice of having laymen, representative of
different sectors of society, on the delegation.

They also sup-

ported his efforts to obtain a freedom of information resolution.
Utilizing the medium o.f radio, the Secret."lr:f brought into focus
for the public
operations.

~lashington•s

diplomatic goals and State Department

His policy of passing on responsibility to top aides

could only have helped to improve the

~orale

of the department.

Besides this, perr:titting .Rockefeller, Pas•101sky, Eaynor, and others
to direct certain activities in Mexico City must have impressed
hemispheric representatives \d th the cohesiveness of the lunerican
delegation.

In view of these facts, Ech-iard Stettinius conducted

himself and American foreign policy in a ver.r competent manner at
the Mexico City Conference of

1945.
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